

Lund 1974

The Historical Genesis and Material Basis
of Racial Endogamy in Racist Societies

Paul Conlen

The Historical Genesis and Material Basis
of Racial Endogamy in Racist Societies

Paul Conlen

The Historical Genesis and Material Basis of Racial Endogamy in Racist Societies

by Paul Conlen

Lund, 1974.

Department of Sociology
University of Lund
Fack
S-220 05 Lund 5
Sweden



C O N T E N T S

Introductory Remarks	4
Chapter One: Theoretical Considerations	
1.1.The Question of Which Branch of Sociology is Relevant to this Discussion	13
1.2.Endogamous and Semi-Endogamous Social Groups	16
1.3.The Role of the Legal System in the Development and Decline of Racism	21
1.4.The Relation of Racism to Capitalism	29
Chapter Two: Racism and Endogamy	
2.1.Legal Prohibitions on Inter-marriage	38
2.2.Prohibitions on Interfornication	46
2.3.The Function of Such Legislation Within the Framework of the Race-System	56
2.4.Exogamophobia and Segregation	61
Chapter Three: The Historical Genesis of Racism	
3.1.Slavery as a Social Institution	67
3.2.Slavery in Recent Times in the European Ultramarine	75
3.3.Miscegenation in the Slave-Societies of the Ultramarine	78
3.4.The Development of the Race-System Within the Framework of Slavery	90
3.5.Another Model: South Africa	103
3.6.The Development of the Race-System in the American Southland 1865-1914	119
3.7.The Race-System Seen in Historical Perspective	131
3.8.Brief Notes on Certain Other Minor Aspects of the Race-System	145
Footnotes	156
Bibliography	164

SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In this present work I have made use, not only of rather unconventional methods of analysis and perspectives, but even of the subject which is hardly in the spirit of the times and thus needs some defending. Within the last few years the word 'racism' has become increasingly popular in most languages and has now entered the vocabulary of the masses. In certain languages it has come to have connotations which it does not have in others, but in most it has come to be a synonym for 'prejudice' or 'xenophobia' or discrimination of minorities or out-groups of some kind or another. This process has gone furthest in the French language where the word has also achieved the broadest range of connotations, being equivalent to the English word 'prejudice', and is now commonly applied to situations in which the groups involved are not thought of as races. Like many compounds, it has lost its close identification with the original root. Thus 'racism' is now conceived of as being only primarily, and not necessarily, connected with the relationship of various 'races' to each other. Added to this is a certain amount of confusion about the nature of 'races', but the general consensus is that groups may be qualified as such only if they differ from each other in some hereditary physical traits. I have, myself, gone against both trends, but more against the former than the latter and it is this which I must explain here in some greater detail.

The attitudes now taken in the advanced Western countries towards what is thought of as 'racial discrimination' are themselves ideologic, and thus not scientific if we think of 'science' and 'ideology' as opposites. But it can also be argued that they are hardly even scientific in the terms of the social sciences in these same countries. Moving from the realm of the social sciences to that of mass-media, one descends to an even lower level. Several years ago the American television carried a series of programmes entitled 'All in the Family' featuring a main character named Archie Bunker. He was depicted as a 'prejudiced' or 'bigoted' individual, inimically disposed to all outsiders and 'minorities'. His name has, for the time being at least, become synonymous in American English with the social phenomenon he was supposed to illustrate. At about the same time, a group of well-meaning but unsophisticated former Résistants in the Dordogne felt it appropriate to combat 'racism' by erecting a sign-board on a public highway in their province with the text: 'Agressif sur la route étroite; Raciste dans ce monde si petit; Vous courez à la catastrophe!' This is the way our contemporary bourgeois society envisions everything. 'Racism' is inappropriate in a world grown small (should it be more acceptable in a larger world?) and can be combated with the same measures with which the traffic authorities combat the high accident rate. In fact one can even combine the two campaigns. It is purely 'Archie Bunker' who is to blame, and the general problem is presented as one of unenlightenment on the part of people known as 'racists', who seem to be the producers of the phenomenon rather than its products. This now being the case, it is logical to see this form of 'lack of enlightenment' as part of a greater whole comprising other forms of the same thing. Thus the attitudes taken by white racists towards blacks, we are told by authoritative social scientists, do not differ from the 'prejudices' which male chauvinists display towards females. This then justifies the use of such expressions as 'male racism' or 'sexual racism' to refer to what was previously called male chauvinism. It is a pity to have to point out that these view-points are superficial and journalistic and that they do more harm than good by confusing the issue.

'Racism' as here conceived of (i.e. as a social system) has many similarities with feudalism, something which might permit us to compare the history of the two words. During that period which may properly be called 'feudal' the word itself was unknown. It first occurs as late as 1727; it was popularised only in the succeeding generation, primarily by Montesquieu; after another generation had passed it was seized upon by the bourgeois of the Convention as an epithet which they readily applied to everything they disliked. But the last remains of that social system were eventually crushed, hence feudalism came to be viewed in a less

emotional light and eventually the word lost its epithetical connotations. Anyone can verify this for himself by comparing what Abbé Sièyes once said about 'feudalism' with what Marc Bloch later said about it. At the same time, the bourgeois enlighteners of the 18th century also sought to explain the existence of such a social structure and they produced an explanation which later generations derided as 'naive'. For them the destinies of society had previously been ruled by 'superstition' and 'prejudices', to which they contrasted entities known as 'reason' or 'enlightenment'. This attitude was ahistorical for it assumed that social formations depend upon 'reason' or the lack of it rather than upon its situation in a certain historical development. Thus, for example, the wars of the faith, the Inquisition, - all this could have been avoided if people had been a little more intelligent. It is, first of all, not a coincidence that certain of the words deriving from the vocabulary of these 18th century enlighteners have become the stock-in-trade of persons discussing racism (e.g. intolerance, prejudice, bigotry). Beyond that it is clear that the present attitudes towards racism resemble the attitudes taken towards feudal culture in the 18th century, that is, attitudes which later generations looked upon as naive. I have elsewhere pointed out that, if feudalism were to be studied from the same perspective as that from which racism is presently studied, then one would have to define it as 'estate-intolerance' or 'estate-hatred' or 'estate-prejudice' or something else in this line.

Behind these attitudes lies an assumption which can hardly be considered scientific and that is that racism is immoral. Most of the propaganda of the United Nations Organisation is also based on this premiss. Two generations ago, in the days of the League of Nations, nobody seems to have realised that racism was immoral, but it was then held above dispute that slavery was immoral. Hence that body, in its time, condemned slavery in the same manner as, more recently, racism has been condemned by the United Nations. Another line of argumentation is that racism 'violates human rights'. However shocked enlightened and radical bourgeois democrats may be to hear this, a Marxist can never agree with these attitudes, especially not as stated in this way. The expression 'Human Rights' was never heard until the dawn of the bourgeois era. Previous societies all held that humans, as such, did not have any rights, but that rights were peculiar to different sub-groupings within society. This implied that different groups had different rights. Thus it is silly to think of humans in pre-bourgeois societies as having any rights which they can lay claim to vis-à-vis others in the same societies. It is obvious that the right to freedom cannot be a 'human right' in a slave-holding society, and, analogously, the right to full legal and civil status is denied to certain people because of their 'race' in those societies which we here call 'race-societies'. In Europe there may admittedly be a further confusing factor which supports the attitude that racism is immoral: racism in Europe belonged to the ideological baggage of fascism and was invariably connected with the antisemitic movements. But 'moral' and 'immoral' are relative concepts (like 'legal' and 'illegal'), determined mainly by the social structure which a specific society has achieved at a certain level of its development and we cannot utilise them when judging other societies. In this sense the racism represented by fascists in Europe, particularly by the National-Socialists in Germany, may be qualified as 'immoral' because it conflicted with moral concepts long accepted within precisely these countries. It is another thing with racism in South Africa and the American Southland. In the latter case racism is not so much immoral as reactionary. It represents a stage of social development far below that of our own society, and one which is hindering (or has hindered) the further social development of the countries named. This determines our attitude towards racism in those countries, an attitude which is based on evaluations which are scientific rather than ideologic. To condemn racism as 'immoral', to argue that it violates some universally valid 'human rights', to decry it as 'prejudice' or 'race hatred', to define the problem in an emotional and moralistic way, - all this is to fight one ideology with another ideology.

This is not impossible. Neither is it here denied that the ideologies behind these antiracist sentiments may be less ideologic than racism itself (and hence preferable). The only point we wish to make here is that a Marxist always prefers scientific weapons to ideological ones.

But people who fight more reactionary ideologies with more progressive ideologies do not do so because they are unenlightened or stupid or irrational. To claim such would be to repeat the mistake of the enlightened bourgeois antiracist. Ideologies are not objective, but there are objective reasons for the existence of ideologies. Why then do people, obviously interested in combating racism, nevertheless choose to do so with inferior weapons of analysis? There are three reasons. The first emanates from the United States, a country which alone has always provided more than half of all scientific work on this subject. The changes made in the American social structure in the 1960's were quite radical, in my opinion, and their consequences in the long run cannot yet be determined, but these consequences should not be underestimated. But, like any other reforms in American history, including ones of a much less radical character, these reforms and changes were introduced from above in such a way as to reduce to a minimum the active participation of those who were themselves to benefit most from them. The same establishment which has now carried out these reforms is hardly interested in having these radical social changes analysed and understood by those who have witnessed them, and even less by those who have participated in them. Hence it encourages a perspective which defines the problem as one of 'prejudice' against 'minorities', and which associates this question with that of the oppression of women and 'poor people' (also held to be 'minorities') and which seeks its answer in something known as a 'pluralistic society'. The second reason for the maintenance of this unscientific perspective is more transient. In Western Europe exploitation and discrimination of immigrant workers (mainly from non-European countries, comprising persons often considered 'coloured') as well as hostility to them from certain sections of the native population have necessitated countermeasures and counteragitation. It has appeared to be an efficient means of combating these phenomena by associating them with racial discrimination in South Africa and similar countries and by appealing to the sentiments of revulsion and contempt which most Europeans have towards such countries. This can easily be achieved simply by using the word 'racism' (which has the added advantage of being associated with fascism, primarily National-Socialism, in the eyes of the older generation). But it would seem to be a dubious way of helping the immigrant workers by confusing the discrimination and exploitation which they suffer from with the more complicated situations in South Africa or the South. Confusing these two things does not help the victims of either systems of discrimination and oppression; quite the contrary, it plays into the hands of those who act as apologists for these reactionary systems.

Finally the peculiar situation in which the United Nations Organisation has found itself has only contributed to this tendency. To condemn racism as 'immoral' and qualify it as a 'violation of human rights' is the result of a compromise, for there are member-states of the United Nations which quite unabashedly practice racism. But the majority either oppose it or have no reason to support it, hence the United Nations may condemn racism as well as slavery, whereas the League of Nations was only able to condemn the latter. At that time, the majority of the members of the old League opposed slavery but not racial discrimination. The position which Uno and Unesco take represent, to simplify somewhat, the average position of its members; hence it condemns certain reactionary social structures as 'immoral' while remaining silent about other, less reactionary ones. The line of argumentation it adopts in its campaigns against racism and racial discrimination must also be a compromise of the same type; hence the prevalence of arguments about 'prejudice' and 'violating human rights' rather than a more scientific line of argumentation.

In this work I have dwelt more on the factors which led to the rise of a certain social system in certain countries, while being much less precise on the equally important question of those factors which tend to liquidate the system. This, together with the rather detailed exposition of certain historical materials in Chapter Three, as well as the method of explaining the functioning of a social system while describing its historical development, - all of this is easily liable to create the misimpression that the conclusions which I have drawn from my materials 1) proceeded directly and automatically from the materials themselves, and 2) were arrived at in the same order in which they are presented. In fact, however, the contrary is the case. Long before I began to survey any materials, even more the historical ones, for discovering how the system is supposed to function, or supposed to have functioned earlier, - long before this I had been struck by the absurd contradictions which the race-system had more recently been producing in certain industrialised milieux (primarily in the industrial sector of South Africa's economy). I was therefore well aware of the contradictions in which the system would later become entangled when I began to study it at an earlier stage. In fact, this must have been the reason for my original interest in the question. Hence the functioning of the system in previous decades or centuries is exposed to analysis by observing the dysfunctioning of the system in its present, declining stage. A social system is rarely studied when it functions smoothly and when its contradictions are hidden. The first motivation for such an analysis comes when it has already begun to dysfunction because of the development of its contradictions. This leads more or less inevitably to two lines of analysis. The apologist for the established order, wishing to restore it to its previous vigour, seeks to explain its contradictions as transient aberrations which extraneous factors have produced and which can be suppressed or eliminated. A more critical analyst, less interested in reforming the system or reinvigourating it, assumes that contradictions do not suddenly arise, neither do they intrude from the exterior, but that they are, themselves, inherent properties of the social system. Hence the latter can never be understood without the former having already appeared.

The first contrast that strikes the outside observer is the difference between this system's adaptability to, and compatibility with, urban and rural conditions. In South African cities things go on which occurred in Europe during the last war. The habit of the police of conducting 'pass raids' and the general idea of passes and the repression connected with them are reminiscent of many measures of control introduced by the German military authorities during the Occupation. Yet this is part of normal 'leace-time' administrative practice in South Africa. But such things are hardly considered necessary in the countryside. Neither are 'whites only' signs considered so necessary and in many rural places segregation is achieved in a spontaneous manner without such signs. Race-riots, the terror of every race-society, are a purely urban phenomenon. In the United States in the 1960's, cities were 'shaken' by race-riots where Negroes made up 20-25% of the total population (in no case more than 30%). Yet in Mississippi as late as 1960 there an entire (rural) county with 79% black population where no such thing as a race-riot had ever occurred in living memory. In fact the first signs of the decline of this system appear in connexion with urbanisation, specifically with the urbanisation of the inferior race (which occurred in South Africa around 1900 and in the Southland around 1914). Residential segregation is another outgrowth of the system which only becomes necessary under urban conditions. Nowadays South African racists express fears about the effects which residential intimacy between the races may have, especially as regards children playing together. Yet these things have always been common on the farms and no-one has ever expressed any fears about their consequences. Observe simply the fact that, in South Africa, it is probably the farmers, the most reactionary and 'racist' part of the population, who are the best acquainted with African languages (because of the intimacy in which they live with Africans). Nowhere in any polemical literature in these countries will one find any debates about the role of the non-white, inferior-raced man in agriculture. This is so taken for granted that it

is never discussed. The real arguments revolve around what role non-whites will play in cities and in industry. This contradiction can be observed in primitive form as early as the 1870's in South Africa. The use of African labour in the diamond mines brought Africans into all too intimate contact with Western technical conditions and made them harder to control. In this respect one must understand the attitudes of the farmers in South Africa. It is the custom of the wishy-washy liberal antiracist to blame everything on the farmers and suggest that they are simply uninformed and unenlightened 'bigots' who persist in outdated attitudes out of pure blimpishness. This habit of liberals is based on a confusion of the two economic spheres. However outdated and inappropriate the farmers' attitudes might be in the cities and in industry, they are perfectly well attuned to conditions on the 'old farm' and there is no objective reason for South African farmers to take any other attitudes.

It can also be argued that the whites in the rural districts are not as economically superfluous as those in the urban areas. An exploiting class is always 'parasitical' by definition (i.e. it expropriates a disproportionate part of the social surplus product), but in a narrower sense one must distinguish such exploiting classes which fulfil necessary and indispensable economic functions and those which do not. In the rural districts most Africans clearly see that the whites perform all sorts of functions in the economy which they themselves could not now assume. Most rural Africans cannot read or write and do not have driving-licences, two things taken for granted among whites. But in the cities it is an entirely different story. The African worker clearly sees that the uneducated white performs functions for which he, the African, is just as qualified. It is this realisation which leads to greater militancy and resistance among urban Africans (interpreted as 'cheekiness' by the racists). The perfectly parasitical nature of the large part of the urban white population makes Africans less apt to tolerate the further expropriation of the social surplus product by these same elements. This explains why those Africans who offer most resistance are those who suffer the least under the present system. For, if 'oppression' led to revolt, it would obviously be the Africans on the farms who would revolt first.

Then there are all the contradictions evolving from the incompatibility of aims in trying to apply apartheid and at the same time exploiting cheap black labour. The official Nationalist pipe-dream about a future arrangement, whereby Africans will live near 'white areas' but enter them only to work for the whites, is an attempt to ignore this contradiction. If Africans work for whites, then they are part of the same economy, regardless of whether or not one wants to call the territory on which they reside 'their own home-lands' or whatever else. The policy of the government is contradictory in itself, for it tries to apply two diametrically opposed policies in two different spheres. What it does in agriculture is basically the opposite of what it does in industry. Its policy in agriculture is to inundate the farmers with all the black labour they want and the latter's appetites are more or less insatiable in this regard. In industry, on the other hand, it attempts to strangle the labour-flow, to make it more expensive and to raise industry's costs by insisting on 'job-reservation'. To the extent that blacks are to be exploited by industry, it prefers to purchase totally unskilled and primitive African peasants from Namibia or Mozambique and to replace them after a few years' employment. The contrast is easily illustrated if we speculate on what would happen if one tried to apply 'job-reservation' in agriculture. Let us assume the government suddenly went out to the farmers and insisted that one-fourth of all farm-labourers would have to be white and that the farmers would have to pay them five times as much. It would double the labour-costs of the farmers. Outside of the fact that the farmers would unseat any government which ever tried to suggest such a thing, it would not be practical in any case because agriculture would not be profitable for whites under such circumstances. The margin of profitability is higher for industry, hence it can keep going despite 'job-reservation' and the 'civilised wage policy'. This is not to say that employers are indifferent to such a policy. The same contradiction appears, not between economic sectors, but between the various economic activities of the same individual in an important class, namely that of the 'little

whites' in the cities. The white 'proletarian' is a Jekyll and Hyde who takes diametrically opposed attitudes to the question of 'job-reservation' in two different situations. When he goes to sell his labour-power on the market, he demands that jobs be reserved for him, that he be hired first and fired last, that employers pay him four to five times what non-whites get for exactly the same work and that he be allowed a certain modicum of freedom from coercion and dignity vis-à-vis the employer which non-whites do not enjoy. He insolently bases these demands on ideologic arguments about the necessity of saving white 'Christian Western' civilisation and takes offence because the hard-boiled employer is more interested in his profit than in such altruistic causes. But when that same little white goes out on the market to hire a house-servant, he suddenly turns around and takes a black. There are any number of advantages in it for him, for one he can control a black servant in a way that a white would never tolerate. But other than that, his freedom to hire the non-white makes it possible for him to have servants. For, if he had to pay four to five times the price for a white servant, he would not be able to afford this luxury. Not only that, but he is also a true Jekyll and Hyde in that it is impossible to bring him to realise that there is any contradiction in his behaviour. The two examples are not arbitrary. These are two functions - farm-labourers and house-servants - which must be allotted to non-whites for it would not be profitable to employ whites in these capacities and whites have hardly been employed in them in the last 100 years. The time will come when this tendency inevitably drags down one function after another into the non-white job category.

Next we come to all the absurd contradictions evolving from the fact that capitalist industry, occasionally of a highly advanced and technologically complex character, is forced to operate without a completely free labour-market. The black labour-force is not free to sell its labour-power freely like the white labour-force. This is achieved by laws regulating everything from where Africans may live to who may be accepted as apprentices. This is, incidentally, in the interests of the farmers, for no African in his right mind would ever remain on a farm if he had the opportunity of working in the city. It is argued that racism may be in the interests of capitalist employers because it makes it possible to hire cheap non-white labour. Naturally the capitalist employer is most enchanted with precisely this aspect of the matter, but, on the other hand, he only profits from this cheap labour if, and to the extent that, he is allowed by law or custom to employ it. In Europe the employers once gave preference to female and child labour for precisely the same reason and they howled when the working class and the landlords made common cause in order to stop this. Obviously 'job-reservation' could hardly appeal to any capitalist in his right mind.

Marx showed how, once capitalism was established as the reigning mode of production, even agriculture was reorganised on a capitalist basis. The difference between a European country and South Africa is illustrated precisely in the fact that the opposite has happened there. Agriculture, first of all, is still organised on a pre-capitalist basis. But these pre-capitalist labour relationships have even invaded industry, precisely because there is no free labour-market. White society has always been completely dependent upon non-white labour, but this only threatens the position of the whites in a capitalist economy. Thus the attempts to protect the dominant position of the whites by preserving pre-capitalist forms of production relationships. In the United States this contradiction was never so severe because blacks were taken into the industrial production-process gradually and, originally, at incidental points. In South Africa industry (mainly extractive) started with a dependence on non-white labour.

In addition to the heartache which the absence of a free labour-market causes the poor capitalist, there is also the headache caused by the fact that the race-system (even in attenuated form) reduces the mobility and transferability of labour. This applies to everything from large regional migrations down to the micro-level of the factory where personnel officers (as in the United States) were previously saddled with the extra problems of taking considera-

tion of 'race' when it came to composing compatible work-teams on the floor.

To illustrate what we have said about the 'immorality' of a social system being a matter of which level society (or some class within it) has reached: the restricted black labour-market in South Africa appears to be particularly 'immoral' to the employer and some of the most humanistic and stirring demands for the right of free employ have come from the directors of diamond-mining companies. Here in Europe, where capitalism long ago buried all its predecessors in the historical process, we are little likely to be confronted with such examples of 'capitalist humanism'.

Capitalism and racism are incompatible, but where they must coexist they come to some form of a compromise for the time being. This compromise may be more of the one or the other type, as the following example will suffice to show. Besides the fact that there is no free labour-market, there is not even a free capital market. There are laws prohibiting, or seeking to prohibit, persons of this or that race from investing their money in enterprises declared to be on the territory of some other race. In capitalist societies is a functionary of his capital. He is nothing but a necessary appendage to capital. Just as Marx often quoted the saying, '*L'argent n'a pas de maître*', we could apply this same idea to our specific example and say: '*Le capital n'a pas de race*'. Observe now what happened in 1915 in California. A case was brought before the supreme court of the state where a Negro appellant challenged the constitutional validity of laws allowing for so-called 'protective covenants' to the effect that Negroes might not own, or reside at, immovable property in certain sections of a city (an example of so-called 'racial zoning'). The court found that it was unconstitutional to forbid anybody to own property because of his race, but it was not necessarily unconstitutional to forbid him to reside on his own property (!) for the same reason. In other words, they granted him 'right of ownership' but not 'right of use'! The right to own property was considered so sacred that even a black could not be deprived of it; the black's right to his 'pursuit to happiness' was a completely different matter. In this case capitalism won out over racism. This again demonstrates the relative nature of moral codes. (The example is illustrative in another respect because it shows how misleading the 'xenophobia' perspective could be. In Europe there is more than one country where the right of foreigners to own immovable property is not considered so absolute, and even one where it is not granted at all, but no one would stomach a law forbidding foreigners to reside as tenants in houses in certain sections of the city.) Compare this now with what happened in the Transvaal during the Second World War. A law was unceremoniously passed forbidding 'Asiatics' to own or operate stores in a certain section of the city. The 'Asiatics' in question promptly tried to play off capitalism against racism. They reorganised themselves into an anonymous joint-stock company and sold all their property to this company. But racism won out. The whites responded with an amendment to the law extending the same prohibition to companies where shares were held by 'Asiatics'. Segregation of capital! What could be more immoral from a bourgeois point of view!

All this does not remain without its consequences. One consequences of the system is that it is impossible to develop a black bourgeoisie as a buffer and to provide for this type of indirect rule. Here the more flexible race-system in the United States was more successful and the South Africans now regret that they had not thought of this ramification in good time. Another consequence is that a significant portion of the African labour-force vegetates away in relatively unproductive agriculture in the 'home-lands' while the poor capitalists thirst after more cheap black labour. This is the result of the lack of a free labour-market. The system, in several different ways, subsidises agriculture, inter alia by putting masses of cheap non-white labour at its disposal; otherwise agriculture would hardly be profitable for whites. But this then prevents the rationalisation of agriculture. An even more catastrophic effect is the parasitism which the system encourages. In a modern 'late-capitalist' consumption soci-

ety, exaggerated consumption is encouraged as a stimulus to a high level of production (i.e. material production in industry). This is impossible in South Africa because excess revenues go to support unproductive employment of non-whites, primarily as servants. This leads indirectly to the production of persons of non-white race. The system therefore encourages the 'locations in the sky' which the Nationalists deprecate and criticise (just as frantically as they enact all the legal measures which encourage them). Because of the cheapness of black labour on the servant market (which is relatively 'free' compared to the industrial labour-market!) too many blacks are put to 'work' as gardeners, washer-women, maids, servants, 'caddies', etc. There are probably about 100,000 non-whites employed at such unproductive functions in the industrial area of the Transvaal, and at least another 400,000 in other parts of the country and the bulk of these are Africans. This system therefore prevents the rational utilisation of the labour-force which the country holds, preventing an expansion of the country's productive forces. There is no possibility of changing this within the present system. Even a 'redistribution of wealth' via a heavily progressive income-tax would change nothing; the problem is structural. It is a redistribution of functions in the economic system, that is, of production relationships, which would be necessary to free this unproductive labour for production. Then there is also the question of the repressive apparatus which must perforce grow larger and larger. Parts of it are totally unproductive, other parts (such as defence-production) are pseudo-productive because they appear to be productive in the terms of the capitalist system but, in the long run, produce only inflation.

The only 'solution' to these problems which the whites can produce is to try to hide the contradictions. Thus the Nationalists refuse to allow the employer to hire too many 'workers' ('employees') in a certain branch, but they may grudgingly allow him to hire some extra 'apprentices' or 'handlangers' (as they are called in Afrikaans) from out of the inferior-raced groups, and these he immediately puts to work at the same jobs as the real 'employees' (who must perforce be white). This appears to be all the more convenient because - needless to say - they are paid only a fraction of a white wage but do the same job. But this tendency to let Africans (especially) intrude all the deeper into the vital and important functions in the viscera of industry results in - strikes! What could be worse! In other words, the effects of the 'solution' are worse than the original problem. These are all the rosy perspectives for the future development of the South African economy (which is already a complete anomaly).

This situation has led to another peculiarity which is so bizarre in European terms that it is easy to understand why European Marxists have been wont to misinterpret it. It has been argued that there are black and white workers but that certain circumstances have been able to prevent the white workers from recognising their true community of interests with their black class-brothers. But there is no objective reason to speak of white and black workers as comprising a single class. The whites operate on a free labour-market, the blacks do not. Hence they do not stand in the same relation to the means of production, even if they both have in common a lack of productive property. The whites have a special right, under the present system, to demand a certain portion of the surplus-labour of the blacks (this is what the racial wage differential boils down to).

Thus the peculiar array of classes in South Africa. On the one hand there is a type of community of interest between capitalist employers (especially the larger ones) and the non-white workers (especially Africans) both of whom have a common interest in a free labour-market for Africans and in removing many provisions of job-reservation. Outside of this, however, they have only inimical interests. There is another coalition between rural folk in general (but especially farmers) and white 'proletarians' in the cities. These two groups - mainly Afrikaans, and the basis of the government's electorate - have such an inflated position under present conditions that they are bound to lose at least some of their privileges, whatever happens. But, most probably, they will lose more than

just 'some' of these privileges. In the long run these two groups have no place in an African country for they have accustomed themselves to a standard of living which is out of all proportion to their economic worth (which is practically nil). They are almost totally parasitic, economically speaking. There are other groups such as technicians, shop-keepers and those in the free professions whose position is less clear because they profit from certain features of apartheid but suffer from others. But all together this has produced the classical dichotomy in South African politics which is really an argument about where and by whom non-white labour should be exploited. The Nationalists, who now have the upper hand, prefer to reserve industry for white labour and exploit Africans in agriculture and in incidental functions. The opposite party would prefer the opposite. Extremely large industries could not only survive with a highly liberalised, more 'humane' race-system, but, in fact, they would even prefer it. Hence the paradox of Harry Oppenheimer and the Progressive Party. What this party wants is a purely capitalist society to be erected at the expense of such pre-capitalist classes as are superfluous in the modern economy. This means the majority of the whites and the latter will fight tooth and nail to protect their inflated position because they have no basic place in the economy of an African country and are living on borrowed time. The modified race-system which enlightened capitalists of the Progressive Party type would like to see, would permit the ruling groups within the white race-group to broaden its basis in the non-white race-groups, something which is impossible under the present system.

The Nationalists in South Africa represent a fascistic reaction in that they have tried to suppress, by statute, the inevitable effects of a development which they cannot stop. They have thus been forced to preside over the very processes which they once promised to stop. Their repressive legislation seeks mainly to hide the underlining deterioration in the system and stall off these inevitable changes. By doing so they are probably only undermining their own position. This objective deterioration finds its subjective reflection in the growing disbelief in the official ideology and increasing ideological confusion on the part of many of their traditional supporters. Two inherent effects of the race-system further corrode their base. One is the tendency for the inferior race-groups to merge with each other which frustrates the whites' policy of 'divide and conquer' by playing off the one inferior-raced group against another. The other factor is the tendency for the inferior-raced groups to increase their numbers at the expense of the superior-raced group. Both of these processes continue at present.

In the beginning society is characterised by a division into races, thus we call it a 'race-society'. These races are not entirely homogeneous, but they are largely so. With the passage of time contradictions arise because they do, in fact, become more heterogeneous and classes begin to form inside them. But inherently the inferior race is always much more homogeneous than the superior race (even in South Africa where it makes up the vast majority of the population). As the contradictions continue to grow, however, it appears that the heterogenisation of the race-groups effects the superior race more than the inferior one. These inherent processes produce the contradictions which characterise the death-agony of this declining social system. In South Africa it takes, at present, the form of a stalemate where two coalitions of exploiting classes, representing two stages of social development, are locked in an insoluble internecine struggle which can not be fought out because of the precarious position of the white race-group, which they together comprise, vis-à-vis the non-white race-groups. The exploited would then profit from these contradictions within the exploiting race-group.

The reader who applies this reasoning to the situation in the American Southland (or even in the rest of the United States) will see that almost all of the same objective tendencies have been operative there, but, due to the different proportions in their strength and to different historical conditions in general the result has been what would at first appear to be the exact opposite. What characterises both situations is the replacement of a race-society by a class-society.

CHAPTER ONE : THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1.The Question of Which Branch of Sociology is Relevant to this Discussion

Elsewhere (1) we have developed our concept of race and stressed particularly the necessity of seeing it as a purely social concept, a social group which was not to be considered 'biological' (as such tends to impart to it a natural character). Races were, furthermore, mainly distinguished from other social groups, not by the presence of hereditary physical characteristics as such, but rather by two peculiarities, one of which was that, for the purpose of determining a person's race, descent was to be reckoned multilinely ('all lines are counted; all are given equal weight') and that biological descent took precedence over juridical (fictitious) descent in cases of collision. Races were assumed to be permanent social groups where membership was basically involuntary. In Weberian terms, membership in a race is 'hereditary' and 'inalienable' (2), which is what makes it so peculiar. 'Estate' in feudal Europe could either be 'hereditary' or 'inalienable' but generally not both at the same time. This would clearly distinguish race from class, not only in Marxist terms, but also in Weberian terms, for Weber, in fact, defines 'social classes' precisely as such classes where changes were relatively typical and, in any case, possible, either personally or in different generations. (3) What was furthermore found to be entirely peculiar to races was that endogamy implied not only prohibitions on marriage between members of different races, but even prohibitions on extra-marital intercourse. As Weber held that 'marriage' could only be a meaningful term in contradistinction to other forms of sexual cohabitation (4), it becomes obvious here that it is the production of persons of mixed racial parentage (biologically determined) which, for some reason, must be prevented. In other systems of endogamy marital alliances between members of disparate groups, or persons of mixed legitimate descent, may be considered a disturbance, but as persons of mixed illegitimate descent are not a particularly disturbing factor, extramarital sexual relations between the two groups are not forbidden per se. It is the general contention of this thesis that endogamy in racial societies (societies where the population is divided up into races) is an absolute necessity. Elsewhere (5) we have compared the usual religious prohibitions on (religious) intermarriage with those in terms of which members of different races may not marry with each other, and we found that these prohibitions were qualitatively different.

We have also addressed ourselves to the question as to what extent such concepts as 'prejudice' or 'ethnocentrism' had anything to offer to our discussion and we invariably found that they spread more confusion than understanding. The differences between races within the same society are not due to

distinct origins of the two races but rather to distinct positions within the same society. The different races are not 'strangers' to one another. If any correlation between racism and general xenophobia should be found to exist, it would probably be negative. After all, Americans in the Southern States are noted for their hospitality to outsiders, whereas highly xenophobic nationalities such as the Swedes seem to attach little importance to skin-colour as such. In fact, speaking of 'races' as if they were 'ethnic' groups or related to such is patently misleading. Even Weber realised that most estates were not founded on groups originally different ethnically and that biological resemblance between members of the same estate would most probably be the result and not the cause of estate differentiation. (6) This latter point is important, for tendencies to inhibit intermarriage between different ethnic groups are not uncommon, consequently many people have concluded that such prohibitions between different races are nothing but logical extensions of similar tendencies in regard to ethnic groups. The concepts 'ethnocentrism' and 'prejudice' only add to the confusion here for they seem to indicate that racism is only an extended form of ethnocentrism or xenophobia.

In view of the narrower definition of races we have given, but also in view of our insistence on eliminating the 'prejudice' perspective, our position logically follows that prohibitions on intermarriage and interfornication between persons of disparate race are qualitatively different from such prohibitions (in other cases) and that their main purpose is to prevent mobility and marginality.

Before going on to discuss endogamy as a criterion of certain social groups, we might briefly pause to explain why, in the following, almost nothing has been said about, or taken from, relevant specialist literature in 'family sociology'. The work of most American 'sociologists of the family' are apparently intended for American college courses on 'marriage' which are mainly attended by girls whose main purpose in life is to find a husband. (7) Hence they are not so much scientific discussions of the institution of marriage as such, and of the family, but rather they should be seen as a sophisticated type of marriage manual. To the extent that the question of prohibitions on interracial marriage is brought up, the general tendency seems to be to see it as an extension of similar prohibitions on the part of religious bodies. Thus one Elmer, in a chapter entitled 'Intermarriage: Nationality, Religion and Race' (8) spends most of his time discussing Catholic and Jewish intermarriage prohibitions, but devotes a few pages to the peculiar situation then obtaining in Hawaii (the book was written in 1945). His discussion of racial prohibitions is highly summary and he seems to have considered them nothing but an extension of the tendencies he so exhaustively discussed in regard to religious groups. Other sources of the same type are

even worse. Harold T. Christensen's *Marriage Analysis: Foundations for Successful Family Life*, as the title indicates, is nothing but a guide to young girls (primarily) who are weighing the pros and cons of this or that college boy as a potential husband. To demonstrate not only the character, but also the level, of Christensen's book, we need only mention that he advises against marriages where the female partner is taller (!) than the male one on the grounds that the latter tends to become meek in the course of time (!). Chapter Twelve is even entitled 'Matching for Successful Marriage' (9) and contains the curious suggestion that, 'Genetic matching is important from the standpoint of offspring, which means that every careful mateseeker will want to examine the ancestral lines of his prospects.' (10) From such examples it soon becomes clear that 'compatibility' and 'marital happiness' are the goals on which these books are based. It ought to be patently evident that such goals exclude any possibility of discussing marriage or the family from a scientific point of view. Almost all of these books - even if they are not crass enough to suggest 'examining the ancestral lines of one's prospects' - either ignore the question of tabus on racial intermarriage, or they are much too apologetic about them. As 'compatibility' is held to be important for 'marital happiness', differences in 'background' are held to exclude the former as well as the latter and in American culture there could hardly be a greater difference in 'background' than that of race. Hence most of them do not even bother to discourage interracial marriage in so many words; the inadvisability of such a marriage follows from the general ideological trend of the literature itself.

The only exception to this genre that we could find was a work specifically devoted to intermarriage, published by one Milton L. Barron in 1946 and, in addition to its theoretical considerations, dealing mainly with the marriage-market in the town of New Haven, Connecticut. The author of this book is particularly critical of inhibitions on, or prohibitions of, intermarriage of whatever kind, although his immediate interest in the community of New Haven leads him to devote much more to the question of religious and ethnic intermarriage than to that of racial intermarriage, which could not be of any great interest in a Northern state with a large immigrant population and (at that time) few blacks. At the end of a chapter on the control of intermarriage (11), he writes: 'Underlying all varieties of institutional control of intermarriage, there appears to be one basic element: the desire for group survival. Even when the church has relented, permitting religious intermarriage, the conditional requirements have usually been conversion of the outgroup individual and, more often, the affiliation to the church of all children resulting from the intermarriage'. As we have pointed out elsewhere, it would be impossible to apply such reasoning to the case of racial intermarriage where 1) conversion of one spouse to the race of the

other is either impossible or only possible 'downward' (i.e. the spouse of higher race absorbs the racial status of the spouse of lower race), and where 2) children resulting from it may never be reckoned to the higher race and are generally placed in the racial group of the lower-raced spouse or in an intermediate (but inferior) race-group. Barron must have been aware of this, because he was well aware that opposition to racial intermarriage was even stronger than to religious intermarriage, thus: 'Ethnic groups are less concerned that their people intermarry than religious and racial groups'. (12) The general impart of all this is that prohibitions on racial intermarriage are 1) nothing but an extension on prohibitions (or tendencies to prohibit) other forms of intermarriage, and that 2) 'preservation of the group' is the reason for this prohibition. We have already rejected the first conclusion. Regarding the second there are many problematical considerations, the first of which would be to explain - assuming a desire to preserve the group exists - why certain groups such as 'ethnic' groups are less interested in this goal than other groups, and why the desire to 'preserve the group' should be stronger, let us say, among whites than among blacks. But even more basic is the objection that it is a *petitio principii* to assume that there is any inherent desire on the part of groups to preserve themselves. This is the general claim of racists and nationalists, but there is no evidence to support it. It evolves from a specific ideology, or specific ideologies. There are thus instances where groups wish to preserve themselves and some where they do not (excluding the question of a possible disparity of sentiment within such a group). Thus the question can be reformulated as: 'Why do certain groups want to preserve themselves and not others?' or, 'Under what conditions do groups wish to preserve themselves?' It is the contention of this thesis that, in certain societies, at a certain level of development, and under certain conditions, two (or more) groups with widely diversified rights, obligations and functions live in a type of symbiosis, so much so that all mobility and marginality can be stopped to ensure the smooth functioning of the social system and to stabilise and perpetuate it. This explanation for the existence of racism in the social structure of certain countries, as will be developed, does not apply to the Third Reich, which would on other criteria qualify as a racial society. In this sense, racism should be seen as a type of 'interethnische Leistungsspezialisierung' in the Weberian sense, that is, similar to the Indian castes. The analogies, however, should not be taken too far. (13)

1.2. Endogamous and Semi-Endogamous Social Groups

We will next address ourselves to such questions as to what extent endogamy is a relevant characteristic of social groups, and in such a case, of which ones. We will try to establish here just when and where endogamy is a re-

levant characteristic of social groups. Ever since Weber's day, sociologists have been aware that the right to engage in certain occupations or pursue certain trades has been limited to the members of certain communities, although thinking on this subject has been moulded by the belief that the desire of members of one group (or category) to do away with potential competitors from other groups (or categories) has lain at the bottom of this. Thus:

Mit wachsender Zahl der Konkurrenten im Verhältnis zum Erwerbsspielraum wächst hier das Interesse der an der Konkurrenz Beteiligten, diese irgendwie einzuschränken. Die Form, in der dies zu geschehen pflegt, ist die: dass irgendein äusserlich feststellbares Merkmal eines Teils der (aktuell oder potenziell) Mitkonkurrierenden: Rasse, Sprache, Konfession, örtliche oder soziale Herkunft, Abstammung, Wohnsitz, usw. von den anderen zum Anlass genommen wird, ihren Ausschluss vom Wettbewerb zu erstreben. (14)

This portrayal of things, as could be expected from Weber, is psychologistic and more specifically individual-psychological in that it derives social customs from the aims and interests of individuals, and it also imparts a more or less conscious intention on the part of individuals (or at least: some individuals) to such discriminatory customs. What Weber could not quite grasp is that the social necessity of concentrating power of wealth is a much more powerful reason for such discrimination and that such a necessity can be in the interests of society at a given stage of its development (hence it is not a question of individuals and their interests), which also explains how it can gradually become established custom or law without any conscious intent on the part of any individuals. Furthermore, 'limitation of competition' is also misleading. When one group is denied the right or opportunity to earn a living in one area of endeavour, it is automatically pushed toward earning it in some other line. In other words, limitation of competition may serve the purpose of producing the diversity of functions which may be necessary for symbiosis. This is precisely the case with the historical development of the race-system. It was not the desire of the plantation-owners to monopolise the field for themselves (for they consistently admitted newcomers), rather the necessity of forcing certain sections of the population into slave-employ. As further regards exclusiveness, Weber seems to have been aware that it was sometimes not in the interests of the group and that groups, as such, did not always seek to expand.

Solche monopolistischen Tendenzen und ihnen verwandte ökonomische Erwägungen haben historisch oft eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Hemmung der Ausbreitung von Gemeinschaften gespielt. Die attische Bürgerrechtspolitik der Demokratie z.B., welche den Kreis der an den Vorteilen des Bürgerrechts Teilnehmenden zunehmend zu schliessen trachtete, hat der politischen Machtexpansion Schranken gesetzt. Eine ökonomische Interessenkonstellation anderer, aber letztlich doch ähnlicher Art brachte die Propaganda des Quäkertums zum Stillstand. Das ursprünglich religiös gebotene Bekehrungsinteresse des Islam fand seine Schranken an dem Interesse der erobernden Kriegerschicht: dass eine

nicht islamische und daher sonderberechtigte Bevölkerung dableibe, welcher die für den Unterhalt der vollberechtigten Gläubigen erforderlichen Abgaben und Lasten auferlegt werden konnten - ein Sachverhalt, welcher den Typus abgibt für sehr viele ähnliche Erscheinungen. (15)

Here again it is a question of 'interests' of individuals, the main one of which seems to be enrichment. What is here significant, however, is that Weber seems to have suspected a certain dialectical relationship here. The preservation and maintenance and even the prosperity of the group was to a certain extent dependent upon the maintenance of another group which was not supposed to share at least one of the major characteristics of the first group (here in the case of Islam: religion). It is this fact - that groups do not always seek to expand - that is all too easily forgotten nowadays, for one thing because of the policies of modern national states, almost all of which try to snuff out aberrant ethnic or linguistic (and sometimes religious) minorities by absorbing and assimilating them. This is what is considered normal and natural in a bourgeois society and it is from this modern perspective that it appears curious that the policy of the Attic states or of the Islamic rulers in Spain should have been to limit membership in the state-bearing body. This is also precisely what the racial system does and this is one reason why 'group survival' is an unrefined approach to the question. A group is only a group when it exists vis-à-vis other groups, so that the preservation of one group also implies the preservation of at least one other group. In such cases the rationale behind the group's existence is not taken seriously (as above in the case of Islam). This also raises interesting questions for those who think that it is a natural and inherent feature of groups to attempt to preserve themselves. If such were the case, why is it not also an inherent drive in the group to expand? Seen in this light, racism is an example of exclusivism: the group must be preserved, but not to the extent of blotting out other groups, for the latter must exist as a counterpoise.

When he proceeds to 'ethnic' groups and races, Weber's greater sophistication immediately allows him to suggest analogies which would be quite relevant to us, but his European bias prevents him from seeing racial communities as purely social groups. He seems to impart particular importance to language and religion ('die durch ähnliche religiöse Vorstellungen bedingte Gleichartigkeit der rituellen Lebensreglementierung') but tends to discuss other, less concrete, criteria at greater length. (16) He relates connubial community to the 'community of social intercourse' but insists that they need not coincide entirely. Elsewhere he cites the 'sexual segregation of different estates' as an area traditionally regulated by tabu. In a long passage on the position of Jews in cities (in general, but in mediaeval German ones in particular) he cites their incapacity to take part in the ritual and cultic community of the commun-

ion-table as the most important barrier tending to preserve them as a distinct entity, but mentions as well the Oriental restriction on the connubial community with outsiders as well as the prohibition on commensality (which was directly related to the former, although Weber did not apparently realise this). (17)

In the fourth chapter of the final part of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, where Weber tried to define and delineate such entities as 'classes, estates and parties', he indicates that he sees caste as a type of estate which, via endogamy, has developed into a strict 'connubial community'. Here no mention is made of races, for Weber had previously dealt with them in the third chapter of the second part of the same work, where he discusses them alongside of ethnic communities and nations. This, in itself, demonstrates the confusion attaching to this matter at that time (or even nowadays) for he was prevented from classifying races together with castes, partially because he still looked upon them as biological groups, and partially (in consequence thereof) could not envision them as 'race-groups' (i.e. small groups within a single society). The word 'race', especially in German, did not have the latter meaning at that time. But to return to the long passage in question, he distinguishes an 'estate' from a 'class' partially from the purely transient, economically-motivated character of the former. An 'estate' for Weber has to have a certain ethos or 'honour' to it which leads it - in this order - to restrict its social intercourse with persons of another estate, and then to restrict its connubiality to the same. 'Castes' are defined as 'estates' which have developed even further in the same direction.

Wo die äussersten Konsequenzen gezogen werden, entwickelt sich der Stand zur geschlossenen "Kaste". Das heisst: es findet neben der konventionellen und rechtlichen auch noch eine rituelle Garantie der ständischen Scheidung statt, dergestalt, dass jede physische Berührung mit einem Mitglied einer als "niedriger" geschätzten Kaste für Angehörige der "höheren" als rituell verunreinigender, religiös zu sühnender Makel gilt, und die einzelnen Kasten teilweise ganz gesonderte Kulte und Götter entwickeln. (18)

Further he states that 'castes' imply higher and lower orders, a hierarchy, something which is not necessarily present in the case of 'mere' ethnic groups. Stripped of all mysticism, we find that Weber's description of things is essentially correct except that his presentation seems to reverse the order of causation. It is not, as he seems to have thought, an increasingly strong tendency towards auto-segregation (or mutual repulsion) which leads groups to restrict connubiality, rather it is tendencies to restrict connubiality which lead to increased restrictions on social intercourse, the most extreme forms of which are precisely the prohibition on commensality and the belief that tactile contact with the lower category is polluting (of which there are literally hundreds of examples from our prototypical race-societies). It is amusing to read Weber's

portrayal of these processes where the term 'estate' is coupled to a behaviour and a mentality which seems more properly belonging to a 19th or early 20th century Spiessbürger. What Weber seems to think is that 'we of estate A do not marry with the women-folk of estate B because our estate-honour prevents us from associating with them', when in reality it is our being unable to marry with the women of estate B which gives rise to our specific 'estate honour' with its consequent tendency to restrict social intercourse with just that estate.

As the most recent quotation about the 'polluting' nature of contact with lower castes indicates, the concrete social processes whose functioning Weber clearly perceived are always subjected to a certain degree of semantic mystification, where religious and quasi-religious tabus and sentiments (e.g. 'estate honour') are consistently given an important role as intermediate causal agents. At times these mystic entities begin to lead their own lives and are depicted as regulating social behaviour by themselves. Thus Weber's concepts of 'estate honour' or 'ethnic honour'; elsewhere he speaks of 'erbcharisma' which he originally develops as an accompaniment to the clan, with India as its classic homeland. But he never seems to distinguish a specifically racial form of it, for all his discussion draws examples from hereditary orders where 'race' in our sense of the word is not present. (19) Elsewhere he refers to the same thing, less mystically, as 'Abstammungsprestige', but then again there are other places where he associates such sentiments with even less scientifically valid entities, as when he - in a burst of undiluted German sentimentality - includes something known as 'Heimatgefühl'! (20)

It might, at this juncture, be interesting to say something about what Weber thought about races. His basic weakness here was his belief that races were basically biological groupings. He by no means believed in any inherent racial differences which had to be the determining delineators of social groups under all circumstances, and it can be said to his credit that he was before his time in realising that it was only under certain circumstances that (physical) racial differences were interpreted as being socially relevant, or as being relevant for the constitution of social groups. But he, like his successors, could not explain just under what circumstances this occurs. He seems to leave it to chance and suggest that, under other circumstances, it might have been some other delineative characteristic which might have been chosen. To make matters worse, he was attached to the belief that repulsion of outsiders was a natural human instinct. Elsewhere he suggests that, where physical hereditary differences do exist, they might just as easily be explained by endogamy, or in other words he saw what he believed to be biological groups as arising out of the social structure, just as he also saw the twelve 'tribes' of Israel as arising out of a distinct political divisor (and not the opposite: the whole arising out of the

fusion of the tribes). (21) All of this would, formally at least, put him in the environmentalist camp. He shared with the racists only 1) the confusion about the biological nature of races, and 2) the belief that all communities tend to be repulsed by outsiders. Even in this latter respect he would hardly have offered the racists any solice for he was painfully aware of the arbitrary character of the criteria which are seized upon as 'symbols of ethnic repulsion' ('Symbole die ethnisch abstossend wirken'). (22)

1.3. The Role of the Legal System in the Development and Decline of Racism

Our discussion of certain of the legal problems involved in a racial system also raises a number of general questions as to the relation of social structure and the legal system. What is peculiar (i.e. specific) about racist legislation in regard to intermarriage, interfornication, etc.? For one thing, these laws occur in societies whose legal systems belong to so-called Western civilisation, but there are no parallels to these laws in this particular civilisation. Furthermore, to the extent that there are vague parallels in mediaeval law (as we will eventually see), what is again peculiar is that such parallel tendencies have been dying out and have been rescinded with the passage of time, as modern bourgeois civilisation develops. The irony about racism is that the nearest parallels to it our found in the culture of the Indian sub-continent, more specifically with its heartland in the Hindu religion. In other words, the nearest parallel is in a civilisation which is distinctly non-Western. These considerations together exclude any 'historicist' explanations of the race-system. How then does a social structure come into being which, originally, had no support in the legal system and legal traditions of the society in question?

Previously we have decided to envision racism as a social system, in contradistinction to the views of those who wish to use the word to apply to people who are 'prejudiced' about other, darker-skinned people. To avoid reification and 'idealisation' of our concepts, let us point out that it should be quite permissible to speak of tendencies towards such a social system in other societies as well, that is, in such societies as have shown tendencies in this direction, but which never developed into race-societies in the narrower sense of the word. Our formal definition of our proto-typical cases has been: societies where the legal system distinguishes groups as races, provided that these really qualify as such; and where relations between these groups are institutionalised in accordance herewith by means of compulsory legal statutes. To answer an obvious question here: there are societies where races exist in terms of the legal system but where their internal relations are not regulated by statute of any kind. The regulation of the relations between the races which we have in mind here seeks to prevent four different things: 1) mobility of individuals, and

consequently also 2) marginal individuals, or 3) relations of consanguinity or conjugal affinity, and often these laws are convenient ways of preventing, as well, 4) purely social intercourse between persons of different race. The three proto-typical legal systems we chose were, 1) that of certain Southern states of the American Union, 2) that of South Africa and 3) that of the Third Reich. In the first two instances we have societies where this system develops spontaneously, gradually and unnoticeably in the course of several centuries. It is in these societies where there have developed the most logical tendencies which appear in more dilute form in most other societies of the same type (i.e. the 'Ultramarine', societies founded by Europeans or other continents between 1600 and 1800). In the third instance, the Third Reich, we have a racist system imposed from above by a fascist élite which was originally brought to power to accomplish other aims. This distinction has a number of important implications. The first is that, in the first two proto-typical racist societies, the system is deeply rooted in the national culture, which is not true of the third one. The second is that in the first two proto-typical societies races were social realities before they were raised to the level of legal realities.

The distinction is easily seen if we compare what militant antiracists have to say about races in these instances. In South Africa and the United States it has not only been racists, but even antiracists, who have agreed that whites and blacks make up different races. Antiracists generally argue that the one race is not inferior to the other, or that there is no reason to discriminate, and so forth, but there seems to be general agreement among all concerned that the groups in question are races, that is, that they are real groups and qualify as what people think races are supposed to be. If one goes back and reads the antiracist propaganda which was written during the time of the Third Reich, it clearly emerges that what is being disputed is not that the one race is inferior to the other, or that one race must discriminate against the other; what was generally disputed was that 'Aryans' and 'Jews' were races at all.

There is another important distinction between the first two of our proto-typical race-societies and the third. In the Third Reich the purpose of the race-system was to eliminate one of the 'races' from society altogether, first via emigration and later via extermination. In the other two societies the policy may be similar, but the purpose could never be the same. In the United States the inferior race-group (in the South) was too important a group economically to be eliminated. They were an important and productive part of the economy. Tendencies to eliminate them via enforced emigration can indeed be observed, but only after the system had begun to decline. In South Africa this is even more so. Eliminating non-whites from the economic system in South Africa

would be tantamount to destroying it. Let us, therefore, not be journalistic or Fabianistic when we discuss the 'functions' of the system. The Race Relations Industry and its academic wing are run by pious liberal Fabians and in certain naive text-books on 'minorities' one can read how 'extermination' is the most extreme form of 'expressing racial hatred'. A largely parasitical and unproductive superior race like the whites in South Africa are unfortunately unable to 'express racial hatred' in such a manner by exterminating the masses or productive non-whites off whom they parasite. We have elsewhere shown how the same objective tendencies in the declining stages of the race-system, in fact, lead to the opposite results in the two countries in question. When two races are no longer necessary in the United States it is the inferior non-white race which then becomes economically superfluous (and consequently a candidate for extermination under sufficiently adverse circumstances), but in South Africa it is the white race which ends up in this position. Consequently in South Africa it is the whites who, in the long run, might be eliminated or exterminated. It is therefore necessary to be wary of emotional claims that, for example, 'we must fight racial hatred because it can lead to extermination'. The purpose of the system is to dis-entwine or separate or keep separate two or more groups, but in the first two proto-typical cases the further purpose is to maintain a certain symbiosis between precisely these groups.

The character of racism in the Third Reich is therefore somewhat artificial. A quick, even cursory glance at NS-propaganda on this question will soon verify this indirectly. This propaganda does not start with the problem of convincing the masses that this race must discriminate against that race, rather it starts with the problem of convincing them that they are dealing with races altogether. In such a case, compulsory statute, in Weber's sense, is absolutely necessary. 'Custom' or 'convention', which had developed spontaneously and gradually and almost unconsciously, would never have sufficed. Emotional and unscientific conceptualisations of National-Socialist racism (as 'hatred' or 'antisemitism'), as well as Germanophobia, immediately mislead people to the opposite conclusions. The aberrant, abnormal character of NS-racism in European terms is hidden from view by talk of a 'long antisemitic tradition in Germany'. If such traditions explain National-Socialist race-laws vis-à-vis Jews, then one should expect that the same laws would have appeared earlier, and in a more stringent form, in Poland or Rumania.

This is how Weber would tend to explain the historical genesis of norms regulating behaviour-patterns. The simplest is that of 'fashion' (Mode), next comes 'custom' (Sitte), and then 'convention' (Konvention) and finally 'statute' (Recht). Weber has little to say about 'fashion', but we have elsewhere mentioned how aesthetic considerations in mate-selection may have prompted the system

in its beginning stages. We may leave 'fashion' now and proceed to 'custom'. At such a stage, one does what one does because it is natural and one is used to it. Weber uses the word 'Eingewöhnung'. (23) Behind this is the idea that there are no negative sanctions attached to non-conformity, but Weber does not clarify if this should also mean that there are no negative consequences of non-conformity. If so, then we have, from our specific example, no evidence of such endogamous practices as the result of 'custom'. As we will later see, certain prerequisites being fulfilled (one of which was a sufficient supply of white women), tendencies towards white endogamy must have grown up gradually as an instrumental-rational attitude. Inter-marriage degraded the status of the offspring. Even less applicable is Weber's idea that such changes in custom come about via innovation ('Erfindung'). Weber's favourite example is that of the 'charismatic prophet leader' who comes along and announces, 'it is written - yet I say unto you!' With his penchant for narrow-minded religious sects and their founders, he seemed to believe that innovation - in this conscious and coherent manner - was much more common than it actually was. Much more applicable here would be his concept of 'unnoticed shift in meaning' ('unbemerktter Bedeutungswandel'). This means basically that new laws or regulations are not thought of as such. In our historical analysis of the evolution of the race-system, we have mentioned several examples of such subtle changes, including the emphasis put on the word 'bastard' in the Old Testament. When the meaning of this word changed in South Africa to mean a person of mixed racial descent, an entirely new interpretation was put on this obscure passage in the Old Testament. By means of such subtle changes, continuity is preserved to a certain extent objectively, and even more so subjectively.

Much more interesting to us, however, is the question of 'convention'. This Weber sees as a 'tacitus consensus omnium'. His formal definition is: '(Konvention ist) wenn (die) Geltung (einer Ordnung) äusserlich garantiert ist durch die Chance, bei Abweichung innerhalb eines angebbaren Menschenkreises auf eine (relativ) allgemeine und praktisch fühlbare Missbilligung zu stossen'. Our own study offers evidence that it does not, in fact, have to be a question of direct disapproval. The same method of preventing inter-marriage could be achieved by threatening to degrade the offspring to the status of the lower-raced parent, so that the offspring 'follows the meaner hand' (in the terms of mediaeval law). We have elsewhere shown that racism, as a social system, in its formative stages takes on the form of simple convention. In some societies the 'system' never advanced beyond this primitive stage. It is also 'convention' which disparages racial inter-marriage in many countries where tendencies towards such a social system are weakest. If, for example, a family should disinherit a white child for marrying a black, then this would be 'convention' in Weber's sense. While

we are here interested in the progression from 'convention' to 'statute' in the developing stages of the system, it can be pointed out that at present in the United States the racist system has been robbed of its character of binding law. Thus in a declining progression, 'statute' may pass back to being mere 'convention'.

More interesting is the possibility of conflict between convention and statute. Weber specifically mentioned the Yugoslavian Zadruga (24) which continued to exist in some form during the Austro-Hungarian Imperial period. It was not only not in accord with many provisions of Austrian law, it was in certain respects even contrary to it. In the development of the racist system one of the most problematic factors was this constant disparity between convention and statute. Racism at a certain point had become the established system by way of convention, but statute was far from recognising it and opposed it in many ways. This is what we alluded to (25) where we pointed out how tendencies (by way of convention) to disparage intermarriage and provide for endogamy were impeded by the traditions of the legal system. Marriage was not a part of civic law but of canonic law, hence racist prohibitions of intermarriage could not become established statute and had to remain mere convention. An even better example of this conflict between two stages of development, between convention and statute which ran in two different directions, is the story told of the marital adventures of one unumitted Negress in Surinam. (26) The planters' convention had considerable sway in the colony, and they indeed looked upon it as a very rigid regulation of behaviour, but the ultimate appeal in matters of statute was to an authority in Europe which had no understanding of such a society and no use for its peculiar conventions. Here convention could not become statute, any more than the Zadruga could impose itself over Austrian statute.

But to return to our Weberian analysis of the development of the race-system, racism in this sense must have at one time become established convention in these societies. This seems to have come about spontaneously (gradually, unnoticed) in most places, although (as we will see) there were certain places like Virginia where the development seems to have been much less spontaneous. At this stage, 'convention', people simply and (for all we know) unconsciously arranged their marriages in such a way as to separate a relatively white group from a relatively non-white group of inferios. There is no evidence to show that they felt any compulsion in this, or even that they coherently understood that their social system was in the process of changing. After a while this change was simply rationalised as 'mos maiorum', especially as it seems to have been hidden in a so-called 'unnoticed shift of meaning'. Previous inhibitions about marrying 'heathens' (i.e. non-Christians) were now thought of as inhibiting marriage with

'heathens' (i.e. non-whites) when the meaning of the word 'heathen' changed. Nowadays, long after the fact, ideological constructions are imposed on these historical processes. The official story is that these people living in the 17th or 18th centuries 'struggled to preserve their heritage' or 'struggled to preserve their blood'. We must distinguish between this ideological imposition of a later attitude onto an earlier period (so-called 'anachronistische Zurückführung') and the objective historical reality. In lieu of any more precise evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that this process did not involve any 'struggling' of any sort, as most probably the actors themselves were not coherently aware that they were 'preserving their heritage' or their 'blood'. Similar ideological confusion exists in the racist's head about his more contemporary behaviour as well. In behaving like a racist, in condemning and slandering miscegenation, in demanding the maintenance of the race-system and its laws, etc., in all these activities the racist is acting in an 'instrumental-rational' manner because his behaviour is rationally fitted to achieving his goal, which is the maintenance of a system which puts him in a more favourable position than would some other system (observe, if nothing else, the fact that such behaviour abruptly ceases as soon as the system loses its allure for certain sections of the population). However, in his own mind, everything is mixed up and he believes in all ideologic sincerity that he is behaving in a 'value-rational' manner, that is, that he would most naturally like to break the rules of this system, but that he is prevented from doing so by his inside knowledge that the Good Lord or some other higher authority has forbidden it. Adding to this ideological confusion in his head is his further belief that his behaviour is also in accordance with *mos maiorum*. The two ideological reactions are related, because among the higher authorities who must not be offended by deviance from the racist system there are, *inter alia*, his own forbears who 'struggled' to preserve this 'heritage' and who expect him to follow in their footsteps.

But most interesting is the crucial borderline we now come to, that between convention and statute. The distinction between convention and statute is one of the classical basic questions of German law. Rudolf Stammler had tried to delineate the two by declaring the former to be 'voluntary' and the latter to be 'involuntary'. Weber, however, insisted that the difference was to what extent there was a 'staff' of persons present whose main purpose was to enforce, with physical coercion in necessary, compliance with certain accepted rules. Only in the latter case could a rule be given the status of statute. (27) '(Recht ist) wenn (eine gewisse Ordnung) garantiert ist durch die Chance (physischen oder psychischen) Zwanges durch ein auf Erzwingung der Innehaltung oder Ahndung der Verletzung gerichtetes Handeln eines eigens darauf eingestellten Stabes von Menschen.' Our own historical sketch, however, would call for further refine-

ments. Weber's definition is based on the premiss that all norms, in order to be norms, must be accompanied by certain potential sanctions in the case of non-conformity. In reality this is not always the case in civil law. Our own sketch shows that, at a certain stage of the development, or in societies where the racist system is not strongly entrenched, the legal system may inhibit such marriages as it does not wish to have by leaving no provision for them in the legal system, or by leaving such marriages as invalid and without legal consequences if contracted elsewhere (i.e. where such marriages were not forbidden). It is doubtful to what extent the latter can be considered a sanction in the sense which Weber obviously had in mind. Certainly the former is not such a case. The formulation which Weber used is due to the tendency to discuss law in terms of criminal law solely. As we might point out, there are 'prohibitions' on interracial marriage which do not take the form of 'criminalisation' (as there are many provisions of civil law which are not based on sanctions; the possibility of applying sanctions being the criterion of a crime).

Given, however, Weber's progression from convention to statute, we could now ask: When and why does racism by convention become racism by statute? One instance is when society progresses and becomes more organised and attempts are made to codify into organised, more or less coherent legal provisions, what seems to be the general convention. This happened partially (in regard to racism) in the United States after the Civil War. Legal codifications were drawn up in states where the legal systems had previously gotten along without them. Hence the opportunity arose to include racist provisions. But even more important is a shift from convention to statute because spontaneous adherence to convention is no longer reliable. This may come about, a) because of the admission (from the exterior) of newcomers who may not share the interests or the ideology of the older sections of the population; b) because objective forces inhibiting nonconformity with convention begin to slacken; or c) where there was no such convention at all (as in the Third Reich). It is particularly the last point which needs stressing. The crude and vulgar propaganda about intermarriage and 'race-defilement' in the Third Reich has generally been interpreted as further proof that the 'beastly krauts' were predisposed to racism. In reality it indicates the opposite. Such crude propaganda was necessary precisely because any 'tacitus consensus omnium' was lacking. The eventuality of b) (above) actually happened in South Africa in 1948 with the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. The liberals traditionally raised the objection that such mixed marriages were so few as to justify *laissez-faire* on the part of the state. The racists countered with figures to show that this rate, admittedly modest, was on the rise and had been so over a long period of time. This shows that it was precisely

the poor racists who so clearly heard the bell ringing. The rate was rising because convention by itself was no longer sufficient to inhibit such marriages. Hence a law was necessary to achieve that which had previously been achieved by convention alone. This is also why there was suddenly increased agitation for such laws in the United States in the North (primarily) in the 1920's. It was at that point that the first significant tendency towards miscegenation appeared.

Again, however, these objective and (in a certain sense) necessary processes appear in enchanted ideological delusions when we listen to the racist. In going from simple convention to compulsory statute he is, in fact, going against spontaneous development. In the case cited (1948, South Africa) he is trying to stop with fascistic laws a long-term change in social mores. But in his own mind he is only executing the 'tacitus consensus omnium' against a small minority of (as he would put it) degenerates who had abandoned the ways of their forbears (again the ideologic tendency to appeal to *mos maiorum*), or who have lost 'pride in their own race', or what Weber would have called 'estate honour'.

What we have said above about racist prohibitions on intermarriage also applies analogously to other racist measures, such as prohibitions on casual sexual intercourse. These prohibitions first appear in South Africa around 1900 but in the cities. What had been achieved on the old farm by simple convention, if not, perhaps, even by custom, could only be maintained in urban areas with outright statutes. Again we see the same thing with the institution of the blanket prohibition on intercourse between whites and blacks in 1927. This tried to stop types of cohabitation and fornication which had not previously been disturbing. Again in 1949 a new group had to be added to the list of those with whom whites could not fornicate, evidence of further deterioration of the spontaneous influence of mere convention. Observe also the evidence we have presented to show that the present Immorality Act, enacted to strengthen a convention which was no longer sufficient in itself, meets with greater amounts of disapproval from sections of the population previously in favour of it. The explanation is that the original sentiment, which the law tried to strengthen when convention no longer sufficed, has deteriorated even more; and this despite the law! Thus the objective forces working to undermine this race-law continue to do so unabated even though statute was resorted to in an attempt to arrest this deterioration of the system.

Applying this reasoning again, we come back to the conclusion that the racism of the Third Reich had a very artificial character to it. In South Africa, for instance, convention originally taught people that the act in question was something horrible and repulsive. Law also forbade it. Thus it was a) held to be disgusting and, b) had dangerous consequences (prison). Newspapers in South Africa have never conducted any campaigns trying to create hysteria about this

act. Rather the newspapers profit from a type of hysteria which already exists. In the Third Reich only b) and not a) was present. The act was dangerous because a stiff maximum penalty could be imposed; but before 1935 the act had never been considered particularly disgusting to any larger section of the population. The vulgar hysteria created by such newspapers as the Stürmer was necessary precisely because the masses did not share the belief that there was anything abhorrent about the act itself. This campaign was not the result of any 'consensus omnium', but rather of a lack of it.

But a Marxist can never be expected to look upon a statute as a further extension of convention for other reasons as well. In order for something to be a 'consensus omnium', it presupposes that the customs, conventions or statutes instigated by certain groups are also based on some approval by other groups, which again presupposes more harmony of interest than a Marxist can admit to. Observe the well-known fact that the inferior races in race-societies, while they may observe many of the rules of those societies, are never quite as committed to them as the superior races and, in the long run, turn against these rules. Even outside of that, however, the example with the racist legislation of the Third Reich demonstrates that 'statute' can exist where no 'convention' exists.

1.4. The Relation of Racism to Capitalism

Finally we proceed to the question of the connexion between the social structure as a whole and this specific racist legislation which seeks to reduce mobility. Is it necessary?

To understand this we must remember that races (i.e. race-groups) are not classes but social groupings which are much more akin to castes in the Indian system or estates in the feudal system. Purely capitalistic 'classes' first appear within the races. The ideal of the system, the point towards which it is always gravitating, is that there should be no classes drawing members from the two race-groups. It is furthermore interesting to note that the relations between the various classes within the same race are regulated in the same manner as the relations between classes in a purely bourgeois society. The law does not prevent the white capitalist from marrying (or fornicating) with the white farm-hand's daughter, and so forth. Indeed, it has often been remarked that there is a certain spirit of egalitarianism within the superior race.

Classes, in the capitalist sense of the word, are generally not defined in binding law. They are held to be equal (which is another reason why there is no need for any definition of class membership in the legal system). They are formally equated before the law, their borders are indefinite. There is a continuum of various classes in a class-society and borders are often arbitrary. There

are ambiguous individuals who have one foot in each class (e.g. the worker who owns shares in the firm, the petty bourgeois). Mobility among classes is not only allowed, it is even considered desirable. We will later (28) quote Marx to the effect that the mobility of the capitalist system is in the interests of the system. One of the main reasons for this is that the size of the various classes can then be managed. When a member of a superior, (let us say) property-holding, class loses his position or property, then he is mercilessly thrown down into the class of wage-earners where he must live off whatever he can get from selling his labour. There is a grave difference between this and the racial order where the unemployed and unemployable white man, precisely because he can never be thrown down into the black race, must be supported in an economic function 'proper to his race' at all costs. And this means: 'at all costs' in the literal sense of the expression, for society pays for this white parasite because the social structure makes no, or little, provision for the transfer of persons from one race to another. All this means that descent is of very little importance in determining a man's class, and, as mobility is allowed and even common, there is absolutely no reason why the various classes may not marry and produce legitimate offspring together, or fornicate and produce illegitimate offspring. Hence there are never any prohibitions on any such activities.

Races are very different. First of all they are discrete entities. There are sharp borders and marginal individuals are disturbing factors because one cannot belong to two races at the same time. Inasmuch as classes are continuous variables there is no reason why class-society suffers from marginal individuals straddling the borderline of the two classes. In fact there are even large groups of such individuals in most modern capitalist societies and, far from being a disturbing factor at the present juncture, they are a convenience for the capitalist system. But such individuals are a disturbing factor in a race-society, hence there is a necessity of preventing their production. As there is no possible mobility between races, either at a given moment or over the generations, it is even more logical that the races should be strictly segregated from each other in matters of connubial community as well.

In both systems the groups are obviously necessary and fulfil some function. In both systems there is a symbiosis in the economic process. The groups must exist. But why does one have races in one society and classes in another? The usual answer is that, in certain countries and for historical reasons, there were people of different skin-colour, hence the 'classes' became races. But this answer is based on a number of ideologic assumptions, the first being that races are to be seen as biological groups, not as social groups. Even Weber (pre-1920) recognised that these things were arbitrary and that it was only under certain conditions that such 'ethnically repulsive symbols' had

any significance. The question is then: under what conditions? The answer generally given is that the dominant white race-group in such societies wants to perpetuate its own superior status and/or ensure this status by eliminating competition. But if the white race reasons such in a race-society, then why does not the capitalist class reason such in a capitalist class-society? Pressed on this point most people would say that the capitalist has no reason to fear competition from the working class, whereas the whites in, say, South Africa have reason to fear the blacks as competition. But this answer is not logical and, to boot, is only valid in marginal situation. In the golden era of the race-system, when whites and blacks still all lived on the 'old farm', the members of the white race had no more reason to fear competition from blacks than a capitalist employer need fear competition from proletarians in our own society. This latter objection presupposes the intrusion of capitalist conditions into a race-society, in other words, it refers to the period of the liquidation of the system. The general problem with all 'explanations' of the race-system which operate with the concepts of 'exploitation' or 'dominance' is that they fail to explain why there is one system of dominance or exploitation in South Africa and another one in Sweden. There is another weakness to these explanations: they cannot explain why there should exist any laws prohibiting interracial marriage or intercourse. 'Exploitation' and 'dominance' characterise capitalist societies as well, but without any such laws. Why, furthermore, should the 'dominant' or 'exploiting' race do not allowed to fornicate with the 'dominated' or 'exploited' race? Is not the capitalist director's mistress usually a working-class girl? Why should the dominant white group in South Africa pass laws forbidding itself to exploit the subjugated non-white races which it exploits in practically all other ways? As brought out later, one of the very problems of this system is that the same system which prohibits this form of exploitation encourages practically all other forms of exploitation, with the result that the system's most convinced adherents are precisely those who violate its most sacred tabus.

The question, scientifically posed, is therefore why this system of exploitation and dominance exists in the countries where it does exist, and why it does not exist elsewhere, in particular, why it does not exist in our societies. There are, first of all, two reasons for expecting racist societies to correspond to a traditional explanation in class terms which, on further analysis, are not valid. The first is the vulgar-Marxist tendency to blame everything on capitalism, thus giving rise to the impression that the capitalists in the United States and South Africa prefer just such a social structure (but then why do not the capitalists in Europe want it here?). The other reason for this is a certain ethnocentric bias in favour of our own type of society. We

live in class-societies, traditional bourgeois societies of the European type. Capitalism has long been our established mode of production; memories of pre-capitalist conditions are already fairly dilute in the public consciousness; to the extent that our societies are in transition, they are not in transition from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist, but rather from a capitalist to a socialist type. The evaluations of a socialist society appear in our own societies in embryonic (and negative) form. Therefore we have a tendency to look at all other societies as if they should be structured in the same manner.

We should not let ourselves be influenced by this belief in the normative character of the late-capitalist social system, because the societies in which racism occurs are not, in fact, even capitalist societies in the traditional sense, even less 'late' capitalistic ones. The system arises before capitalism in societies which underwent a rapid colonisation and development. The capitalist perspective is misleading if applied to such a society. The race-society was only produced by capitalism in a very indirect sense. European expansion, led on by the primitive commercial capitalism of the 17th century, produced a decidedly non-capitalist mode of production in many countries of the European Ultramarine: slavery, or plantation-slavery. As Marx correctly understood (29), the reason why slavery could exist in certain parts of the capitalist world-economy was that it did not exist in the other parts. To the extent that capitalism and racism coincide later on, then only as counterparts in different sections of the same economic unit. Thus the classic situation in the United States: racism and the Negroes concentrated in Mississippi where there was practically no industry and little advanced capitalism, and capitalism concentrated to Detroit and Pittsburgh where there were few Negroes and few signs of racism in the social structure.

But eventually the same capitalist system which indirectly created the racist system from afar then begins to destroy it from close-up. Capitalism and industrialism invaded Mississippi and the Negroes moved to Detroit. At that point the compatibility of the capitalist system and the racist system came to an end. Capitalism and racism proved to be incompatible. Even Weber could see (from a European vantage point) that capitalist 'rationality' was not compatible with the caste-system in India. 'Irrational' - there, in one word, is the capitalist's opinion of the race-system. The antagonistic nature of capitalism and racism also explains certain peculiarities of the political situation in such countries. The inferior race - objectively interested in abolishing the system and the distinction of race altogether - is really obliged to fight the enemies of its enemies.

Was this system necessary? Why this system and not capitalism? Again there is no reason why capitalism should have developed in such primitive count-

ries in previous centuries. As they could not begin their economic histories with capitalism, they had to go through some pre-capitalistic stage. The racist system had the advantage of making it easier to concentrate labour and intensify agriculture, as is developed elsewhere. (30) In certain cases it is a logical successor and partner to the slave-system. Both revolve around the same thing. The economic development of the Southland and of the West Indies would not have been possible without these systems, hence the race-system clearly proceeds from a pre-capitalist social formation which was not without its justification. Even in South Africa, in the Transvaal and in Natal, the whites created a production-apparatus which was far superior to anything which had preceded them and which raised the level of production tremendously. In many of these cases the rationale behind this development was the international market, but it is interesting to note that the least capitalist-influenced form of racism is found in the Transvaal where the rationale of production originally was that of internal consumption and not export. There are other ramifications, one of which is that the system makes it hard, if not impossible, for property to be transferred from one race-group to another. This was one of the points at issue in the debate over the advisability of intermarriage in Surinam in the 18th century, which is discussed elsewhere. (31) Thus in this sense racism was a 'logical' social structure in that it obviously corresponded to a certain level of development. But the inevitable dialectical consequences soon appear: up to a certain point the development of certain countries produced this system, but then all further development tends to undo the very same system.

The system, therefore, was necessary and logical. Was the prohibition on intermarriage and interfornication also necessary and logical? Our answer is yes. First of all, the latter matter is more complicated. As they developed later on, prohibitions on interfornication come about very late and correspond to a higher level of decay in the system. But if we have established that immobility was necessary and logical in order to develop such huge areas in such an (historically) short period of time, and if we have also established that prohibitions on intermarriage and interfornication were methods of preventing mobility, then it logically follows that these peculiarities of the culture and legal system of racist countries are not incidental details. Feudalism in Europe also provided for limitations on mobility, inter alia, via tight control of marriage. It also sought to solve the problem of certain people who might be considered marginal individuals by way of biological descent (i.e. the illegitimate sons of priests), although it did not have to prohibit such fornication. It did in any case try to inhibit it. This was the purpose of the system whereby priests had to pay certain 'fines' to their bishops if their mistresses had

children. The latter were 'marginal individuals' who were a disturbance to the social system (although not for the same reason as mulattoes in a race-society). In general we have tried to stress that tight control of who may marry whom and who may fornicate with whom are quite common, indeed normal in almost all pre-capitalist social formations. A *laissez-faire* attitude of the state in such matters is purely a characteristic of capitalist and post-capitalist stages of social development. Is it a coincidence that in Europe, on the one hand, and in South Africa and the American Southland, on the other, the different pre-capitalist social formations had at least this in common that they regulated and restricted marriage and sexual behaviour in order to prevent certain types of mobility. Feudalism was much more flexible in this regard than slavery or the race-system. Neither is it coincidental that the race-system (proper) first appears after the demise of slavery when capitalism was beginning to make itself felt, just as the traditional 'Ständegesellschaft' appears in the late-feudal period when capitalism was already on the ascendency. It is not coincidental, finally, that capitalism, which mercilessly tore down caste, estate, religious and even linguistic and national barriers in Europe, also tends to weaken and, eventually, tear down the racial barriers in the countries of the Ultramarine.

In regard to the latter we must be wary of explanations of the vulgar-Marxist school where the proponents of such theories have not fully mastered the dialectical method of analysis. The objection is raised that capitalist employers in certain places have made use of the race-system by utilising some of its features to their own advantage. We have rejected this thesis on empirical grounds. (32) The defect here is to confuse marginal situations, in which the race-system is already in conflict with some other social formation, with the essence of the system. This or that employer may combine the two to his own advantage here or there, but the inherent tendency of capitalism is always inimical to racism for a variety of reasons, one being that it tears down racial barriers by degrading everybody to the same level.

Problems first arise if we proceed from this to an analysis of the Third Reich. One problem is that of a proper conceptualisation of affairs. Was the Third Reich a racist society? According to our formal definition it qualifies as such because its legal structure defined different groups as races and regulated their internal relations in accordance herewith. But now another question arises: if the legal system is nothing but a 'reflection of the base', then such similarities in the legal system must reflect similarities in the base. But we know that the socio-economic structures of South Africa and Germany are about as distinct as any could be. Then another problem arises. The petty bourgeois 'power' school of thought in sociology might argue that the social structure can easily be changed by anyone in power. If the fascist ruling élite in Germany

could, simply by their control of the legal system, turn Germany into a country 'similar to South Africa' then it would appear that there are no boundaries to what people 'in power' can accomplish. Even leaving aside the question of why the ruling élite might want to bring about such absurd changes, this school of thought could seize upon this example to demonstrate that those who hold political power could turn a capitalist country into an asiatic-feudal society simply by changing a few relevant laws.

First of all, the National-Socialists were, to a large extent, petty bourgeois and agrarian reactionaries who were put in power to do the dirty work of monopoly-capitalists. One must distinguish here between what the National-Socialists may have done (or wanted to do) qua bagmen for the monopoly-capitalists and what they wanted to do qua declassed scum who had to look out for their own personal aggrandizement. Much of the anti-Jewish legislation simply sought to re-class the many de-classed browns by transferring the property of the former to the latter (hence the stupid expression about 'Aryanisation of real estate'). There is reason to suspect that the capitalists were never that interested in the race-ideology as such. In this sense National-Socialist racism is highly artificial. The ideal of many National-Socialists was a type of latifundarian agrarian society to be erected in Eastern Europe. This is the picture that emerges from reading Alfred Rosenberg and it is here illustrative that the fascist élite which tried to impose racism on a European country had a pre-capitalist social formation as its ideal. The marriage of convenience between the 'gentlemen of industry' and the 'dirty browns from the street' was made possible by the fact that both of these elements had concrete reasons to hate the progressive features which characterised capitalism, while not being opposed to capitalism as such. Hence the admiration of the National-Socialists for a variety of pre-capitalist conditions, one of which had been the existence of barriers between Jews and non-Jews. Capitalism had been progressive in tearing down the walls of the ghetto, hence National-Socialist racism was a reaction against this specific progressive feature of capitalism. Racism had other functions which had nothing to do with Jews. One was to justify and legitimatise the perpetuation of rule by a fascist élite on the grounds that the most racially worthy elements of the population were to make up an order destined to rule in the state. National-Socialist racism in this sense was even more nebulous because these tendencies did not result in very many or very concrete changes in the legal system.

Racism is an ideology of non-assimilation. Wherever assimilation is opposed, this ideology can be useful. But the reasons for opposing assimilation may be different. The preservation of distinct entities of the population may serve the purpose of eliminating one of the race-groups. The latter is what National-Socialist racism did, in which sense it was somewhat auto-destructive.

As the elimination of the 'alien-raced' out-group is the purpose of the race-system, by eliminating that group the system loses its further rationale. It is not our intention to discuss the very problematical character of the National-Socialists' race-ideology or of their practical race-policies, both of which have been gravely misunderstood. It should suffice to show here that the racism of the Third Reich was 'artificial' in the sense that it reflected the peculiar interests of the fascist ruling élite rather than reflecting a basis in the social structure (in the Marxist sense), but that it was perfectly 'logical' and 'appropriate' when one considers its aims. This means simply that it was more vitally and necessarily connected with the position of this ruling élite than with the basis of the social formation, but it was obviously not incompatible with the latter. The anomalous relationship between capitalism and racism is brought out here again. It is a pre-capitalist social formation (even though it may crop up alongside of capitalism like a weed in the rose-bed), it appeals to social classes which have had their inflated position jeopardised or destroyed by capitalism (the petty bourgeois, the de-classed borns in Germany, the lower-class whites in South Africa and the United States), but who are willing, even desirous of having capitalism thrive in some other sector of the economy or some other region. But in both cases it is capitalism's progressive features, primarily its tendency to tear down ethnic barriers, and its progressive ideological doctrines, laissez-faire liberalism, and its progressive tendency to eliminate rural idiotism, which bring it into conflict with these elements. Hence the common tendency of racists, in Europe or the Ultramarine, to look upon the large metropolitan city with its 'racelessness' (Alfred Rosenberg's favourite expression) as the enemy. Hence also its tendency to make 'liberalism' or the French Revolution its *bête noire*. There are striking parallels to be observed here between National-Socialist and contemporary racist propaganda. Thus the complaints about the 'völkerzersetzender Einfluss der rassenlos gewordenen Weltstadt' in the National-Socialist pamphlets; thus also the hysteria about 'one-worldism' and 'equalisation' and 'globaloney' in the South African and Southern pamphlets of more recently. The classes (in the superior race) which oppose capitalism are not always the ones to support a more progressive social formation, as the following example will suffice to show. In 1922 a wave of strikes and disorders occurred in the Transvaal where large numbers of urban white proletarians, primarily in Johannesburg and its environs, seriously disturbed the capitalist system and swore up visions of a Bolshevik revolution. *Inter alia* they marched about with red flags and singing the Internationale. Their demands were: 1) socialism, and 2) the exclusion of non-white workers from the mining industry and guarantees for jobs for whites at the ex-

pense, in necessary, of non-whites. Is this not the same ideology as that of the National 'Socialists'?

CHAPTER TWO : RACISM AND ENDOGAMY

2.1. Legal Prohibitions on Intermarriage

We have elsewhere established that a race-system is nothing more than a social system where the population is divided up into groups qualifying as races. But what further differentiae specificae can we mention? Prejudice? Hatred? Domination? Exploitation? These are hardly peculiar to race-societies as they occur in practically all known social systems. What is, however, peculiar to the race-societies we primarily have in mind is that intermarriage between members of different races is either discouraged, forbidden or penalised and that interformication of at least certain types is criminalised, forbidden or, at least, discouraged and that, further, these societies are characterised by far-reaching segregation patterns which are almost totally unknown elsewhere. In referring to these as peculiarities of the race-system, we must remember further that this society occurs: 1) in the last hundred years or so, in countries 2) ruled by men of white race who like to think of themselves as 'Europeans' while it is 3) precisely in the European countries and the last few centuries that development has been such as to make these peculiarities appear precisely as peculiarities when we compare these race-societies with European society. We will here pass over the question of segregation; having discussed it elsewhere; suffice it to say that it is not unrelated to the afore-mentioned peculiarities.

We therefore turn to those aspects of racism which have their obvious sexual implications. It would be impossible to understand the system without analysing these. Because of the intrusion of the 'prejudice' and xenophobia perspectives into discussions of racism, and because of the resulting tendency to look upon the latter as an extended form of the former, this peculiarity is glossed over. People object that there is nothing unusual about this; many religions forbid or discourage intermarriage; there are in Europe many people who do not like their daughters to marry this or that category of foreigner, there are cases known where upper-class parents disinherit their children for marrying below their class-level, etc. But in these cases it is not society as such which has reacted against such marriage, it is merely a question of certain individuals. Furthermore it is a question of simple disapproval of such intermarriage in individual cases. This differs qualitatively from a society such as that of the State of Indiana which previously criminalised attempts to enter racial intermarriage with a maximum penalty of ten years at hard labour, not only for the immediate contrahents but also for marriage witnesses, officiating officials and even anybody who in any way was an accomplice to this crime. Where does such an extreme fear of intermarriage on the part of society exist in Europe in modern times? There is only one example: National-

Socialist Germany and certain of its satellite states. And these societies were officially devoted to racism as an ideology. They also qualify as racist societies according to our definition. Neither can such laws, even less such drastic laws, be explained by those who would like to see racism as nothing but a quantitative extension of 'prejudice' or xenophobia. It apparently does not occur to these people that one can copulate with others while, at the same time, being 'prejudiced' against their group. Such 'prejudice' should not be any hindrance to intermarriage either.

The racists themselves leave us with no doubts about the importance of this aspect (from their point of view). There are innumerable references to it from any number of countries, the United States' Southland (1), Brazil (2) and even England (3). There is another curiosity which should be mentioned and that is that this matter is so laden with emotions that it invites confusion of different things. This is easily seen in the English word 'miscegenation' which is used to refer to interracial marriages, to the production of persons of mixed race and even to casual intersexuality between members of different races. Few Anglo-Saxons (and this includes sociologists studying the 'race question') seem to distinguish these three meanings because they do not seem to distinguish these three acts and this is what is characteristic of racist (i.e. ideologic) thinking on this subject, common to racists in as otherwise variegated places as South Africa and Sweden (4); as when a leaflet of South African harbour authorities warned visiting sailors about the legal penalties for interfor-nication and then mentioned that marriage between persons of different race was also forbidden. Similar confusion is seen in the case of a racist Swedish psychiatrist who devoted a chapter in his book to the special psychological problems of persons of mixed race and then without explanation began to discuss the debilitating effects which mixed marriages had on their immediate contrahents. From this confusion another thing should become obvious and that is that this entire obsession with 'miscegenation' (in whatever sense) stems from a desire to prevent mixed issue. It is furthermore not hard to go further and perceive this desire to prevent mixed issue partially as a desire to prevent mobility, partially as a desire to prevent alliances between the different races (or members thereof).

In our own societies there is little control of marriage, but in the vast majority of all known social forms, and in all previous European ones, marriage is, or was, rigidly controlled. Marriage is an alliance, not of two people, but of the groups they belong to, hence controlling marriage means controlling alliances. Controlling marriage also means controlling descent and the relative proportions of the population. Societies may encourage or discourage this or that type of intermarriage, depending upon circumstances, and the ways

in which it achieves these aims may be more subtle than simple prohibition. At present few of these tendencies find any expression in the legal systems of European countries. In Eastern Europe there is a tendency to forbid the intermarriage of citizens with foreigners, and in Greece and Spain religious intermarriage is inhibited because the legal system leaves this matter in the hands of ecclesiastical authorities. In neither case is the contracting of a forbidden intermarriage a criminalised act. We can easily find parallels in the past. We can mention the prohibition on the marriage of Hebrews with Canaanites enacted by Ezra the Priest in the Old Testament, the prohibition of intermarriage between Roman women and barbarian soldiers enacted by Theodorich at the dusk of the Roman Empire, the many prohibitions in practically all the older city-states of intermarriage between the citizens of the polis and foreigners or metics; there was a similar prohibition on the intermarriage of the Protestant settlers in sixteenth-century Ulster with the aboriginal inhabitants and there was, finally, Stalin's famous decree of September 1944, prohibiting the marriage of Soviet citizens to foreigners. But, historically, the number of cases where intermarriage was encouraged is probably greater than the number of cases where it was prohibited. It should be pointed out that the prohibition on the marriage of Catholics to non-Catholics comes about very late in European history and that, throughout the many centuries when Christianity gradually insinuated itself into Europe, such intermarriage was permitted and precisely because it helped to expand the corpus fidelium. In the Middle Ages civil law did not prohibit the intermarriage of persons of different estates, but tended to penalise women marrying below their estate by subjecting them to the legal status of their husbands for the duration of the marriage. Thus the *Sachsenspiegel* says that a woman 'enters his condition when she goes to his bed' (*tritt an sein Recht, wenn sie an sein Bett geht*). The marriage could also be discouraged by allowing the children to follow the meaner parent's estate or 'follow the meaner hand' (*der ärgeren Hand folgen*), in the expression of the *Schwabenspiegel*. (5) It might be proper to distinguish such means of discouraging intermarriage with the rule according to which peasants from one manor could not marry onto another manor without the lord's permission (both of these things are referred to as 'formarriage' in French) or even (in some places) laws subjecting the marriages of all such dependent persons to the approval of their lords. These latter regulations have an entirely different rationale (cf. in many countries the requirement that a soldier obtain the permission of his commanding officer to contract a marriage).

Another instance of controlling marriage, which is much more germane to our subject than is perhaps realised, is the celibacy of the Catholic clergy. This system, which was one of the most singularly important social institutions

for centuries, functioned very simply. Priests could not marry and thus could not produce legitimate offspring and persons who were not legitimate could not become priests. This made an hereditary priestly caste impossible. (Incidentally, compare this sociologic explanation with the prohibition on the ordination of persons not of legitimate birth with the psychological explanation which would hold that it was the result of 'prejudice' about illegitimacy).

Regulations prohibiting marriages of certain types are known as marriage impediments and they exist in all legal systems. There are general impediments (forbidding certain people to marry at all) and specific ones (forbidding specific categories of people to marry each other) and the impediment of racial disparity belongs to the latter category. Historically speaking, the entire tendency of European law, civil as well as ecclesiastical, has, since the Reformation and the Renaissance, been to reduce the number of impediments and liberalise the remaining ones. In the Middle Ages the system of marriage impediments was so involved that, as Luther pointed out, the peasants were often at a loss to find anyone whom they could legally marry. It is here that we see how unusual racism is in our terms: in such countries as South Africa and the United States (the 'New World') a specific marriage impediment was added to the legal system precisely during the period when impediments were being rescinded and liberalised in European law. Even more curious is the fact that this occurred in countries which were predominantly Protestant, in some cases with the support of Protestant religions, whereas it was precisely Protestantism which began this process in Europe. Even today Protestant ecclesiastical law contains fewer marriage impediments than the canonic law of the Catholic Church. It is from such comparisons that we see that racism is a type of anachronism in so-called 'Western civilisation'.

Traditionally one also distinguishes between two types of marriage impediments, called *impedimenta dirimentia* and *impedimenta non dirimentia* in Latin. The first renders the marriage 'automatically null and void' (the most commonly employed expression in most Anglo-Saxon legal codes) which means that, should a marriage be contracted despite such an impediment, then it is held to have been non-existent from the very start. *Impedimenta dirimentia* are few in most legal systems, previously existing valid marriages (in monogamous countries), lack of legal capacity (but not in all cases) and close consanguinal relationship are about the only instances where such impediments are applied in modern legal systems. A marriage entered into despite an *impedimentum non dirimens* is held to be 'voidable', that is, can be voided but is valid until such occurs. Such a marriage is generally terminated by annulment (which must be distinguished from divorce). Legal systems differ as to who has the right to request annulment of a voidable marriage, but generally only the immediate contrahents have this

right. Furthermore some systems declare such marriages automatically valid after a specified amount of time or as soon as the reason for such an impediment no longer applies. This distinction has an important implication: in cases of an impedimentum dirimens there can be no legitimacy, whereas, in the opposite case, children conceived before a marriage is annulled are considered legitimate. In racist societies, racial disparity is generally an impedimentum dirimens, again showing how stringent this prohibition is.

In racist societies such marriages can never be contracted legally; even if contracted, they are never valid. Furthermore, entering such a forbidden marriage, or attempting to do so, can also be criminalised. In addition a racist society may refuse to recognise the validity of such a marriage contracted outside its own borders (provided it has some claim to jurisdiction over the contrahents and it may even hold the act to be punishable if committed outside its own borders (under the same circumstances). A few states in the United States also banned the contrahents to such marriages from residing within the state. These then are the legal weapons with which a racist society fights intermarriage. There are, in addition, further non-legal measures of enforcement. One is to let the superior-raced spouse 'sink' to the level of the inferior-raced one, another is to bar, forever, any eventual children from entering the superior race-group.

At the end of the Second World War, when the United States had been instrumental in crushing 'Hitlerian racism', thirty of the (then) forty-eight states prohibited the intermarriage of whites to Negroes (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming). (6) As of 1959 fourteen states also prohibited the marriage of whites to 'Mongolians', nine between whites and 'Malays', six between whites and Amerindians, and three between Negroes and Amerindians, and one between Negroes and 'Malays'. Some of these laws were fairly recent. Arizona's prohibition only dated from 1928. Sometimes prohibitions are hard to explain from a regional point of view. Oregon prohibited the marriage of whites to Negroes, Asians and Amerindians, whereas its neighbour Washington (State) never prohibited intermarriage of any kind. Arizona also prohibited the marriage of whites to Negroes, 'Mongolians' and Amerindians, whereas its neighbour New Mexico, with practically the same demographic basis in its population, never needed any prohibitions of this sort. Outside of this, the list above leaves little doubt that it was mainly the backward, rural and more reactionary states of the Union which had such prohibitions. No state in the North-East ever had such a prohibition since the Civil War. Most of the states declared such marriages 'null and void', although in some cases it is

not clear if this was an impedimentum dirimens or not. In Oregon it appears to have been such only in cases of a white marrying a black. Marriages between whites and Asians or Amerindians were only voidable.

Most had laws punishing those who attempted to enter, or succeeded in entering, such a marriage. In West Virginia only the white partner to such a marriage could be punished; in all other states both contrahents could be punished. In Florida the penalty was imprisonment up to ten years or 1000 dollars fine; in Oklahoma the penalty was imprisonment between one and five years and a fine up to 5000 dollars; in Oregon the penalty was only three months to one year. Curiously enough, the act was only a misdemeanour in South Carolina. Invariably these states also made provision for the punishment of officials issuing the marriage license, officiating at the ceremony, etc., although generally with much milder penalties.

In most of the Southern states such intermarriage was forbidden in the very constitution of the states. Generally there was also subsidiary legislation to the same effect. In some cases the subsidiary laws went further, prohibiting marriages which the state constitution had not necessarily forbidden.

In South Africa, racial intermarriage was generally not forbidden. In the Voortrekker Republics the legal system made no provision for such marriages and would not recognise them if contracted on their own territory, but they apparently recognised the validity of such marriages as were contracted (legally) elsewhere. The prohibition now in force was one of the first acts of the new Nationalist government in 1949. (7) It prohibits intermarriage between 'Europeans' and 'non-Europeans'. Such marriage is only invalid if concluded 'not in good faith' or if some obvious crime has been committed in connexion with it. Otherwise it is merely voidable. Until 1968 any male South African citizen could legally enter such a marriage if he was domiciled abroad. This is no longer so. Outside of South Africa, a female South African citizen may still enter such a mixed union. The reason is that South Africa is a former Commonwealth country and in cases of (legally) mixed marriages in these countries, the woman either assumes the man's citizenship or the children follow the father's citizenship. In such cases of intermarriage, the offspring would not be South African citizens, hence they are not prohibited. A marriage officer offending against this law can be fined 100 Rand. The contrahents themselves can only be punished for perjury, which means that it is possible to punish one and acquit the other.

The relevant intermarriage prohibition in the Third Reich is much too complicated to go into thoroughly here, so that we, for one, will exclude the question of marriages where one contrahent or more was a foreign national. (8) We will remember that there were four categories of persons: Jews, mestizos of

the first degree, mestizos of the second degree and German-blooded persons (popularly known as 'Aryans'). The Blood Protection Law of September 15, 1935 prohibited certain types of intermarriage, allowed others and made certain others dependent upon official permission. A German-blooded person ('Aryan') could not marry a Jew, but he could apply for permission to marry a mestizo of the first degree. Otherwise he was free to marry a mestizo of the second degree. A mestizo of the second degree could not marry another mestizo of the second degree or a Jew, but could with permission marry a mestizo of the first degree, and he was free to marry a German-blooded person without permission. A mestizo of the first degree was not forbidden to marry anyone, but could only marry a German-blooded person with permission. A Jew could not marry a German-blooded person or a mestizo of the second degree, but could marry another Jew or a mestizo of the first degree. All this might, at first glance, appear overly involved but there are a few simple principles behind it. The idea was to provide for the gradual elimination of the intermediate categories. Thus a mestizo of the first degree was given full freedom to marry a Jew, for he would thereby turn himself into one (and his eventual children with him). Similarly, mestizos of the second degree were not allowed to marry each other in order not to perpetuate their own peculiar category, but why they should have been allowed to marry mestizos of the first degree is harder to understand. This way they would produce people who would be five-eighths Jewish descent (racially reckoned). It appears, however, that the original idea was to draw the definite borderline precisely at five-eighths. Anything less would eventually be equated with German-blooded persons. For this reason the marriage of mestizos of the first degree to German-blooded persons was possible with permission, and the offspring would fall on the Aryan side of the line. In cases of marriage between a mestizo of the first degree and one of the second degree, the offspring would apparently fall on the Jewish side of the line. This appears to be the distinction later made in the so-called Wannsee-Protocol with regard to the fate of various types of mestizos. Otherwise we do not know what the exact purpose of this involved system was. In regard to the granting of permission for such intermarriages as required it, an ordinance was eventually issued, but we do not know how many people ever applied for such permission, or received it, or on what grounds applications may have been rejected or granted. The procedure was fairly involved and therefore probably time-consuming. The wording vaguely seems to leave considerable leeway to the authorities to accept or reject requests as they saw fit. As the 'length of the applicant's family's residence in Germany' was a consideration, it is surmisable that half-Jews of older German families were to be favoured.

Entering a forbidden marriage was an impedimentum dirimens. Entering a

marriage which required permission without that permission, on the other hand, was only an impedimentum non dirimens. Attempts to enter such a marriage were criminalised if they fell under German jurisdiction. If contracted abroad they would only be punished if it could be proven that the contrahents deliberately went abroad with the intention of evading German jurisdiction (no case of prosecution is known). This law, like all other race-laws in the Third Reich, did not go into effect in Upper Silesia before January 1937 (for German nationals residing in the former Upper Silesian plebiscite area) and it is interesting to note that a mixed marriage of the type forbidden in the rest of the Reich took place in Beuthen (now Bytom) as late as December 1936. (9)

It was this race-law which, curiously enough, effected the largest part of the common citizenry in the Third Reich. In order to marry, prospective contrahents had to prove that they were not legally barred from doing so for reasons of racial disparity. In order to obtain a marriage license most German people had to prove that they were both German-blooded or that one was German-blooded and the other nothing 'worse' than a mestizo of the second degree. The two contrahents, then, technically speaking, had to prove that seven of their eight grandparents had never belonged to a Jewish religious community. In reality, this functioned in such a way that they could simply produce baptismal certificates (or birth certificates with information about religious affiliation on them, in certain parts of Germany) for seven or eight of their eight joint grandparents and it was then held that they were sufficiently Aryan to marry each other. This posed problems for many people about whose Aryan ancestry no-one could entertain any doubts, for the simple reason that they had trouble obtaining the necessary documents from the public records offices, and so forth. For this reason professional genealogists were often paid to provide such documents.

The National-Socialists did not directly disturb already existing marriages, but they certainly did their utmost to break them up. As early as 1935 a fascist judge in the Landgericht in Berlin refused a request for the restitution of the marital community in the case of a mixed Jewish-Aryan couple then living in separation on the wondrously non-legal grounds that the 'complete alienation between the two parties is in no small measure due to the parties' racial differences' and that 'folkish consciousness' and 'racial consciousness', possibly strengthened by the new Nuremberg Laws, made it impossible for the Aryan wife to return to her Jewish husband. (10) Reputable jurists wrote, in all seriousness, articles in learned journals pointing out ways of breaking up such marriages without declaring them invalidated outright. One suggestion was to grant divorces, refusing to find the Aryan party at fault if he or she had refused to have marital relations with the Jewish spouse on the grounds that 'the

healthy racial consciousness of the German people' disapproved of such an act. (11) In the autumn of 1939 another brown jurist published an article suggesting that racial disparity be made grounds for requesting annulment of marriages, at least until a date sufficiently far away to give people time to avail themselves of this opportunity. 'For he in whom the blood has been victorious will also be able to cast off the intellectual and spiritual entanglements which the influence of Jewry has spun in him,' as he opined. (12) The National-Socialists never solved this problem for even during the war there were too many jurists who were opposed to blanket and involuntary annulments of mixed marriages en masse. About 14,000 Jews survived the entire war in Germany (Altreich) because they continued to live in mixed marriages with Aryans.

2.2. Prohibitions on Interfornication

When we turn to legal prohibitions on interfornication, we will find that they are almost in a class by themselves. Legal systems prohibit intercourse between persons too closely related (incest), or where it might violate the marital rights of another person (adultery), or where it is held to be against nature (homosexuality), but all of these types of prohibitions are quite different from prohibitions on interracial sexuality. Otherwise fornication is only criminalised in a few cases, as when one of the participants is a minor and the other not a minor, or where one party has exploited a dependent person sexually. Fornication in itself has been criminalised in European legal systems, but most of these laws disappeared after 1800. Yet racist prohibitions on interracial fornication fall precisely within the same period and thus represent an anomaly in modern law. The only vague parallels here are certain laws which existed in the Middle Ages, especially in the German-speaking countries and which forbade Christians to copulate with Jews, Moslems and other infidels (13), something which Jewish antisemitologists always cite with indignation in their accusatorial pamphlets, undisturbed by the fact that mediaeval Judaism also forbade the same act. Such fornication, at the height of the Middle Ages, was actually looked upon as heresy and at least a few people are known to have been burnt at the stake as heretics for this. In the words of the Schwabenspiegel, a Christian man having intercourse with a Jewess was held to 'have denied Christian faith'. Later on this crime was reduced to being nothing more than an aggravated form of fornication (which apparently was not enforced very stringently) and the Austrian Theresiana of 1768 was apparently the last legal code to contain it. The rationale behind such prohibitions was by no means that of race, but they were similar to those used in racist societies in that they, partially, tried to keep portions of the population apart that, in the terms of these societies, were not supposed to mix with each other. They are thus related to the laws of segregation in racist societies.

In mediaeval thought, or superstitious religious thought of any kind, there are two ideas connected with such prohibitions. One is that intercourse between a member of the in-group and a member of the out-group is a form of sodomy, as members of the out-group are thought of as animals. But a more important idea is that something dangerous or harmful can happen to members of the in-group because of such intercourse. There are also many superstitions about the possibilities of intercourse with this or that type of person being able to cure this or that type of disease. Not unrelated here is the idea that the devil or less important demons fornicated with human beings, something which was so widely believed at the time that it was even mentioned by Thomas. (14) This is conveniently close enough to racist fears about interfornication so that such dormant superstitions can be sworn up in a more modern, pseudo-scientific form. We will soon see an example of this.

In the United States interracial fornication per se has never been criminalised except in cases of intercourse between a black man and a white woman. Two states, Alabama and Florida, have made such an act punishable. Otherwise the laws were directed at permanent cohabitation (more or less) and not at casual intercourse. In some states, however, the legal codes did not even bother to criminalise this. Tennessee, in its anti-intermarriage law, also prohibited the 'living together as man and wife' of whites and Negroes, which was punishable with up to five years in the state penitentiary, but a court could substitute a fine or a term in the county gaol. Virginia criminalised adultery and fornication, imposing a minimal fine of twenty dollars. Persons convicted of this crime who were, by law, forbidden to marry could be convicted of a misdemeanour and this meant whites and Negroes. Another paragraph of the same law criminalised 'lewd and lascivious cohabitation' and imposed stiffer fines and the possible of gaol sentences in the case of recidivists. (15)

In South Africa's English legalese this 'crime' is known as 'immorality' (Afrikaans: ontug). Technically the relevant law includes many other crimes besides that of interracial sexuality (such as seduction of minors, keeping of brothels, etc.), but in common parlance this word, 'immorality', has come to be so identified with this 'crime' that it is never used to mean anything else. Seen historically, this law, in South African terms, is extremely recent. The Voortrekkers are said to have passed ordinances against it (16), but the official law-books of the Afrikaans Republics did not contain any reference to any such crime. It is significant that the first laws of this sort appear immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, first with a law in the Cape Colony which criminalised intercourse between a white woman and a 'native' for the purpose of gain (i.e. prostitution), and then by a law in the Transvaal criminalising the same act if committed voluntarily by the woman (even outside of prostitution); the Transvaal went

further because it criminalised this act, more or less, with any non-white. Natal, at about the same time, and the Orange River Colony adopted similar laws. (17) These laws introduced the expression 'immorality' as a translation for the Dutch 'onzedelijkheid'. In 1927 the Union Parliament passed a blanket law for the entire country criminalising all interforncication between 'natives' and 'Europeans'. This law received the short title of 'Immorality Act' or 'Ontugwet' (18) by which it is still known today. This now criminalised intercourse between a white male and a 'native' female outside of marriage. But the legal intermarriage of such persons was still not forbidden at that time. In 1950 the new Nationalist government, in one of its earliest apartheid measures, inserted a few words into this law extending the prohibition to intercourse between whites and all non-whites (which now included the 'Coloureds' and the Indians) (19), but this law proved to be so poorly worded that it was scrapped in 1957 and replaced by a so-called consolidation law. (20) It is §16 of this law which specifically prohibits interracial sexuality and it confusingly uses (in the English text) the words 'coloured', although this is defined as all non-whites. If no clarity as to the race of the defendants, or other persons involved, can be obtained, then appearance is decisive. What is criminalised is if a member of the one race has, or attempts to have, unlawful carnal intercourse (ontug) with a member of the opposite racial category and opposite sex, or commits or attempts to commit any 'indecent or immoral act' (onsedelike of onbehoorlike daad), or entices, solicits or importunes to any such acts. The maximum sentence is seven years at compulsory labour. A convicted male under the age of 50 may also be sentenced to up to ten strokes of corporal punishment. The act is not criminalised if committed outside of the Republic of South Africa and South West Africa, even if both participants are South African subjects. In Mbabane, in Swaziland, there are prostitutes (black) who specialise in fornicating with the 'Calvinist' farmers from across the border in the Eastern Transvaal. For involved reasons it is technically possible to convict one of the participants in an immorality offence and the acquit the other.

We can speak much less authoritatively about legal practice, but it would seem that sentences tend to be higher in the Transvaal and lower in the Cape. Otherwise, however, sentences are nowhere as severe as they might be. In the Cape a first offender with no previous criminal record (the average case) can reckon with a four months' sentence, often suspended. A second offence generally draws about a year. But there are cases (from the Transvaal) where first offenders have received as much. We know of no case where corporal punishment has been imposed. Most cases involve a white man and a non-white woman. There is no evidence of any discrepancy in sentences for whites and non-whites. Often both defendants are tried together and given the same sentence. Neither is there

any evidence that intersexuality between a white woman and a non-white man is treated any more severely than the opposite. In South West Africa (an extremely conservative part of the country) a white woman convicted of contravening the law with a black farm-labourer received as little as ninety days in gaol, of which thirty were suspended.

The number of persons charged under §16 of this act has increased greatly over the years and never fails to turn up new surprises, as recently when a whole group of 'Calvinist' farmers in Excelsior (Free State) were charged together with an even greater number of African women. The case threatened to embarrass so many people that charges were dropped. Between 1950 and 1966 there seem to have been 6300 convictions and in 1969 alone 1,189 people were said to have been charged. According to the relevant minister, in the year ending June 30, 1970 there were 1,020 charges, of which 515 led to convictions. (21) It would seem that only between 33% and 51% of all charges end in conviction, a ratio which would be considered abnormally low in European terms. Yet most people believe that only a fraction of all such acts are ever reported to, or investigated by, the police.

For whites the real punishment for this 'crime' lies in the social ostracism that mercilessly descends upon anyone so much as accused of it. This is exacerbated by the fact that there are no laws or regulations on journalistic ethnics in South Africa, so that a charge may be as disastrous as a conviction. Many lose their jobs, are divorced by their wives, etc. Alan Paton's *Too Late the Phalarope* gives a somewhat exaggerated example of such an occurrence, although it is possible that public feeling about this crime has receded somewhat since 1957 when the book was written. It is significant that people discussing such an occurrence in the case of close relatives describe it as comparable to death or even claim that it is worse than death, and this is even true when it is a question of nothing more than a charge without conviction. (22)

What few figures we possess also have interesting things to say about who commits this crime. Originally the Nationalists believed that 'liberals' (which means anyone not as committed to racism as they themselves) tended to be sexual degenerates who fornicated with non-whites all the time; liberals were constantly being derided as loose and accused of fornicating with blacks. (23) But in reality those who are brought to trial and convicted are disproportionately 1) Afrikaners, and 2) farmers, which means that it is the most racist section of the population that tends to commit the crime. But it is precisely this section which demands the law. This is an excellent illustration of how the same society that criminalises an act also produces the criminal to commit it. This is easily seen by an analogy with another race law. Until 1963 most Africans in most parts of South Africa could not legally buy, possess or consume hard liquor.

This immediately led to a type of extra earning possibilities for certain poor whites, mainly Afrikaners. Loitering about the off-licences one could often see these poor whites accosting Africans and offering to buy liquor for them for a small tip or so. It is the same with the criminalisation of interfornication. 'For the men typically convicted of statutory immorality are not liberals openly preaching the importance of racial equality. On the contrary they are men caught in a web of racially prejudiced thought and action; for it is precisely those who habitually treat non-white people as tools to be used for the white man's convenience, who find it natural to use black women for a passing sexual purpose.' (24) This latter sentence succinctly expresses the mentality of the farmers in South Africa, hence their tendency to commit this most shameful of all race-crimes. But there is another category whose criminality is just as much a product of the system: policemen. In 1967 a policeman in the Free State (Afrikaner) was caught who, for about 16 months, had habitually been importuning African women to have intercourse with him or raping them. The details of this case are an excellent commentary on the entire system. First of all, he was able to escape detection for such a long period of time because the African population is terrified of the police and the victims did not dare report his crime. But, from reports in the press, it appears that he had made believe that he was arresting his victims, who thus unquestioningly followed him. Again there are parallels with the since-repealed prohibition on hard liquor. At that time the police would periodically raid the trains in the Johannesburg area and cart off such Africans as they found in possession of liquor. After taking them a safe distance away, the policeman would suddenly turn around and snarl at the African: 'Why are you following me? Didn't I tell you to beat it?' The African, terrified, would then run away. The policeman (and most of them are Afrikaners) would then be entitled to keep the liquor (which he would otherwise have had to turn in). Offending policemen escaped detection because the Africans were least of all inclined to report such things to the authorities (penalty for possession of liquor was several weeks in gaol). The system breeds disrespect on the part of whites, not only for the property and interests of non-whites, but even for their physical integrity. Every once in a while the press reports a case where some farmer brutally beats a non-white to death and is then let off with some symbolic sentence. (25) Under these circumstances there is no reason to expect that racist reservations about the 'sinfulness' or evilness of intersexuality will be respected. After all, if one is allowed to kill a certain category of people, then one should also logically be allowed to rape them. This also became clear in the Third Reich. During the so-called 'Reichskristallnacht', when the authorities instigated violence towards Jews, fourteen Aryans are known to have committed rape against Jewish women, for which reason they were punished. It is not that the

authorities wanted to protect Jews, it is simply that racists look upon this form of aggression as contrary to the interests of the race. In South Africa most cases of immorality seem to be those of white men and non-white servant girls. It is hard to say, in such cases, who is exploiting whom. But what the authorities originally did not think of is that this law puts a weapon in the hands of non-white servants. It is widely believed that certain non-white women entice white men and then blackmail them. There is considerable fear about this. On the other hand, servants often live so intimately with white families that it is a wonder that more cases of immorality are not reported.

In recent years there has been considerable discontent with this law. For one thing the number of charges and convictions has been steadily rising since 1950, another illustration of this same tendency: the more racism becomes firmly entrenched in the legal system, the more people violate the race-laws. For another thing, the police, especially in the Transvaal, have occasionally used African women as decoys to land white men for this crime. In such a case, non-whites (inferiors) are being used to victimise whites (superiors), hence there is great indignation and outcry about the use of these traps. What people resent is that a non-white should be allowed to help the police against a white. Again indicative is the fact that the very same section of the population which demands criminalisation of the act also tends to abhor the practice of using traps. Otherwise, some of the more enlightened Afrikaners are embarrassed by the law, perhaps because so many Afrikaners get caught in it. There have been suggestions that perhaps people who commit such an abnormal act (!) are mentally ill and should be treated as such. Others investigate the possibility that too much intimacy between non-white nurses and little white children may predispose white men to this 'abnormal' act. Here the Nationalists can combine two things, their disapproval of intersexuality and their disapproval of people having too many servants. (26) The government tried to counteract some of these tendencies by suggesting an extension of the law to prohibit sexual relations between 'Coloureds' and Africans, but nothing more was heard of this. (27)

In terms of National-Socialist racism, the 'crime' of intersexuality was known as 'Rassenschande'. This word was first used immediately after the end of the First World War, but Adolf Hitler (28) is apparently the first person to have used it in its later accepted sense. During the 1920's it generally meant mixed marriages between Aryans and Jews. After 1935 it was generally used as a popular appellation for criminalised sexual relations between Aryans and Jews, although some sources such as the Stürmer often used it in a wider sense. It is built on an analogy with 'Blutschande' (lit. blood-shame) which is German for 'incest', but 'schänden' also means to violate or defile, so that this word is generally rendered as 'race-defilement' in English. In 1930 the NSDAP proposed

a law (rejected by the Reichstag) which would have criminalised relations between 'Germans' and Jews and 'members of coloured races'. In 1933 a memorial of the Prussian Minister of Justice also wanted to criminalise the mixing of 'Germans' with 'members of such alien blood-communities or races, whose segregation from the German blood-community has been ordained by law'. Both of these crimes were to be known as 'race-treason' and both of them apparently wanted to extend the prohibition to members of non-white races. The actual prohibition is in §2 of the Blood Protection Law of 1935 (29), whose exact title was: 'Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour'. The Stürmer greeted the new law with a special issue which was not without its quasi-religious content and which compared Adolf Hitler to Ezra in the Bible. The crime consisted of three moments: 1) extra-marital sexual relations, 2) the participation of a Jew, and 3) the participation of a German citizen of German or related blood, or a German citizen mestizo of the second degree. Only the male participant in the crime was punishable. As it has been fashionable to explain National-Socialist behaviour from Freudian premisses, there are a number of sources where one can read that the framers of this law 'believed that women had no will power'. The real reason, however, was that German legal experts easily saw that it would be too hard to obtain damning evidence if both parties were punishable. (30) Intersexuality which took place outside of Germany could only be punished in extremely rare cases (no examples known). Only acts committed within Germany were punishable. Neither was it punishable if the Jewish participant was a German subject domiciled in Upper Silesia (until 1937). Neither was it a crime if the Aryan participant was not a German citizen. It was not a crime for Jews to have intercourse with Aryan women if they were, say, Austrian or French citizens. Similarly, an Austrian or French Aryan could have intercourse with a Jewess on German soil and not be punished. According to this law, mestizos of the first degree were in the enviable position of being able to copulate with either Jews or Aryans. Race-defilement was a crime (Verbrechen) and not simply a misdemeanour. Sentence could be anything from one month in gaol to fifteen years in prison, in addition to which certain extra penal sanctions could also be applied. By November 1936 when the law had been in force for about a year, there had been 299 convictions and another 125 cases were pending. The number of charges apparently rose, for in 1938 in Hamburg alone there are supposed to have been 119 convictions for race-defilement. Of the 299 convictions during the first year, 17.8% of the convicted were Aryans and the rest Jews, a figure which was often quoted in order to show that most interfornication took place between Jewish men and Aryan women. Between 70 and 80% of the cases which came before the courts in the first year - and this according to the National-Socialists' own sources - were cases of people who were legitimate lovers and who had been having a protracted affair but never bothered

to get married before the Blood Protection Law went into effect. Many of them make quite tragic reading.

Although this law was supposed to protect 'German blood', it only did so vis-à-vis Jews. 'German-blooded persons', as they were called, could quite freely fornicate with, or even cohabit with, Negroes, Gipsies, Chinese people and so forth. In 1937 a law student named Egon Rumberg wrote his dissertation on race-defilement, and in it he had the following typical suggestion, expressed in typical brown jargon as well: 'In cases of concubinage between a German-blooded woman and a Negro, the public order is disturbed because folkish racial sensitivity is offended. By police order in accordance with §14.41 PVG the participants can be induced to desist with sexual intercourse under threats of coercion.' (31)

Race-defilement was, as far as one can classify it, a crime against the state (Staatsverbrechen) and not a sexual offence (Sittlichkeitsverbrechen). But when courts first had to deal with race-defilement cases, they tended to treat it as if it were a sexual offence. They frequently meted out mild penalties, motivating them with reference to the fact that the participants in the crime had been old friends or had been having a protracted love-affair. The Stürmer frequently took courts to task for this, as it reasoned that this should fetch the defendant a higher penalty. (32) A newspaper such as the Stürmer would otherwise hardly be a very good source for information of this type, but it is practically the only contemporary publication where one can find more detailed information about race-defilement. From issue No. 14 of 1936 until issue No. 20 of 1937 it carried lists of race-defilement sentences, which appeared every week or so under the heading 'Race-Defilement Without End'. This list gives a total of 133 sentences. 49 were sentences of gaol ranging from four months to two-and-a-half years and averaging out to thirteen months. 84 of the sentences were for prison, which in that period ranged from one year to five years, averaging out to twenty-three-and-a-half months. The cases listed occurred in fifty-eight different places, 65 of the 133 sentences being accounted for by the six large cities of Breslau, Leipzig, Hamburg, Munich, Dresden and Frankfort. In this entire batch there were only two sentences from Berlin. 62 of the 133 sentences were given in places now located in the Federal Republic, of which a few in extremely small towns. The most severe sentences seem to have been given out in Hamburg and Breslau. During 1938 there appears a notable upward trend in the average sentence, at least as far as we can judge from this, our own source. During 1938, a Jewish small entrepreneur in Hamburg received ten years prison, with ten years revocation of civil rights for four attempts and four completed cases of race-defilement. During 1938 there were at least 19 cases in Hamburg where the minimum sentence given was six years in prison. Of the 19 cases, four also received permanent internment (Sicherungsverwahrung), and one received twelve years in

prison (the highest) plus castration and permanent internment. After this there seems to be a falling-off in sentences, although information becomes scant after the outbreak of the War when the Stürmer lost interest in race-defilement. As late as the spring of 1940 one Jew in Breslau received only two-and-a-half years of prison, and another in the same city received three years and a Jew in Wiesbaden received only two-and-a-half years. In September 1940 a Jew in Austria received only two years for race-defilement. This is the last prosecution mentioned by the Stürmer. In 1942 a Jew in Nuremberg was found guilty of race-defilement and, in accordance with a law then operative against 'Volksschädlinge', was sentenced to death. Race-defilement did not itself carry the death penalty; one 'coupled' the crime to another law (in jurist's terminology). (33) What happened to Aryan men who fornicated with Jewesses is something we know much less about, for the Stürmer in the course of several years only mentioned a handful of such cases. Neither do we really know how many charges ended in acquittal (no case reported). It is also hard to judge to what extent the convicted were guilty of the crime. It would appear that the majority of them were (most apparently confessed). Occasionally there appear cases which bear the earmarks of frame-ups (such as the case in Nuremberg in 1943).

The commentaries written on this law in what (originally) were perfectly legitimate legal periodicals and by people who (originally) were probably perfectly respectable jurists make fantastic reading. The famous brown judge, Roland Freisler, once wrote that any affection between Aryans and Jews was 'unnatural in the all-conclusive opinion of the Legislator' (i.e. Hitler) and that therefore courts should not consider permanent love-affairs as a mitigating circumstance. (34) His colleague, Dr. Kuhn from the Reich Ministry of 'Justice' stated authoritatively that 'sexual relations with a person of alien kind is an honourless, treasonable act, an attack on the existence and honour of the German people'. (35) The afore-mentioned law student, Rumberg, felt that 'blood and honour belong to the substantial values of the Nation,' and that 'the penal judge is here guardian and protector of the preservation of the purity of German blood'. According to him, 'An attack on German blood on the Jew's part is race-defilement. The German is supposed to preserve the purity of the blood. His crime is race-treason. His act is a breach of fidelity vis-à-vis the German people'. An intimate relationship with a Jew, he opined, 'provided the basis for the intrusion of Jewish essence', and the German's 'essence is permeated with Jewish spirit', so that he loses 'any kind of folkish sensitivity'. (36) Others said that 'race treason' was apt to destroy the 'blood-foundations of folkish life' (37) or that this crime 'in its reprehensibility approaches the other great crimes against the public corpus, such as high treason and lèse-nation'. (38) Others were more positive in that they felt that 'in the blood-rootedness and blood-connectedness of the

ethnic community, all forces will be put to work to co-create in 'the great folkish tasks and goals,' one of which was the purity of the blood. (39) In fact, Freisler found nothing wrong - idiomatically or otherwise - with the statement that any Aryan fornicating with a Jewess 'commits treason against the very blood circulating in his own body'. He also propagated the expression that the Aryan woman was the 'grail, or vessel of race purity' (Gral der Rassenreinheit).

What the majority of Germans thought of all this is not that clear. It appears that many did not take it seriously. But there are flabbergasting examples of some who did. Several days after the promulgation of the Blood Protection Law in 1935, a small village in Bavaria - Königsdorf am Tegernsee - actually issued an ordinance according to which cows owned by Jews could no longer be serviced by the village bullock! What these peasants were trying to do was to have some sort of subsidiary 'blood-protection' laws relevant to their local conditions and local way of life.

Women who committed race-defilement with Jews were referred to as 'artvergessen'. This peculiar word is formed analogously to 'ehrvergessen' and 'gottvergessen' and is perhaps best rendered as 'kind-fersaken'. The synonym 'rassevergessen' occurred in a few places in the source materials. This word meant that a woman 'had no sense of race'. Such women, although not punishable under any law, were not let off scotfree. Normal concepts of penal law are not readily applicable to a fascist state. For the man, the act was criminalised in the penal code, hence he was tried by a normal court with normal court procedures and sentenced to a normal prison. The woman, as she could not be tried according to the penal code, could therefore be dealt with 'administratively' by the police which means that the police had the right to relegate her to a concentration camp, which was a fate worse than being sent to prison. The Stürmer frequently denounced such women by name.

In regard to race-defilement the Stürmer had three common themes which occurred all the time in its pages. One was that Jewish doctors attacked women patient, another that Jews lent money and then agreed to forgive debts if women would commit race-defilement with them, and the third was that the Jews systematically tried to defile their own house-employees. This latter is the reason why the employment of Aryan women under 45 years of age in Jewish households was forbidden according to the Blood Protection Law. The Stürmer also had a stock of quotations, supposedly from the Talmud, all purporting to show that this latter source obliged Jews to go around defiling the race of other nations. 'Enlightenment' of younger people was not neglected either. In certain schools (but apparently not most) at that time, lessons were given in the 'Jewish question', and a hand-book for teachers of this subject was published by the Stürmer-Verlag in 1938. (40) This booklet states that a woman defiled by a Jew 'never

again gets the poison of the blood of alien kind out of her body', and that she would henceforth only be able to produce children of Jewish race.

A closer analysis of race-defilement stories in the Stürmer reveals other interesting things. In the middle of the thirties this newspaper published between 30 and 40 race-defilement stories which were monotonously similar. The idea which they tried to impart was that, if an Aryan woman had been deflowered by, or at least had intercourse with, a Jew, she then became 'Judaised' ('verjudet', even the form 'angejudet' occurs in one place) and was no longer conscious of her own kind (wurde artvergessen), or kind-forsaken, or that she lost all sense of race (wurde rassenlos). In one story it was even said that, through intercourse with Jews, women became 'deraced and degenerate' (entrasst und entartet). Women 'defiled by the Jew' were often thought to become permanently addicted to Jews. These stories all follow the same general pattern: originally the women are virgins, then a Jewish Don Juan seduces them but he does so with the normal methods of any Don Juan, but when he has deflowered them they become permanently addicted to Jews and henceforth incapable of producing German-raced children. The details of these stories suggest that we are dealing here with vestigial remains of mediaeval witchcraft superstitions. According to the (then) generally accepted theory, dating from the fifteenth century, Christian women became witches when the devil seduced or raped them, or, in any case, had intercourse with them. Witches were seen as 'handmaidens of the devil' (ancillae diaboli) and, in fact, were referred to as such. It is here that the connexion with Jews comes in. Jews have generally been associated with the devil and they were openly identified with the devil by the writers of the Stürmer (which frequently bore captions such as 'The Jew is the devil in human form' or 'He who fights with the Jew struggles with the devil'). The degenerate fascists who wrote for this newspaper also habitually referred to Rosa Luxemburg as a 'Jewish witch'. The explanation for this reappearance of witchcraft superstitions is that fascism turned viciously on bourgeois culture without replacing it with anything better, thus a cultural vacuum arose which allowed long-dormant and moribund superstitions of this sort to resurface for awhile.

2.3. The Function of Such Legislation Within the Framework of the Race-System

Now that we have discussed the laws against intermarriage and inter-fornication, and now that we have analysed all the legal ramifications of the race-system, we begin to see how it functions. Immobility is total among persons living at one time, but also over the generations as well. The separation of the two groups is complete because the system removes all possibilities of consanguinity or conjugal affinity between persons of different race. There can only be biological consanguinity and this is ignored because of the demand for 'purity'

in persons of superior race. According to this system, a white man cannot legally be related to his mulatto child, because the latter could only be produced illegitimately. In our previous talk of race definitions which defined a Negro as, say, one-sixteenth part or more Negro descent, we could have mentioned that this system contains a certain fraud here. If we think of a person who is one thirty-second part black and thirty-one thirty-second parts white, then he is, technically, a white man, but his white ancestry would be in his illegitimate line and the legal presumption would be against him. If a black woman has a mulatto child, then the child legally descends from her husband who, of necessity, must be black, or, if she is not married, or if the child is considered illegitimate, then it follows the mother only and, as both mother and child are Negroes, there could be no more talk of consanguinity across the race-barriers than in the previous case. As long as the 'ultimate crime' can be prevented, racial descent is, in fact, matrilineal. An inferior-raced woman must of necessity give birth to an inferior-raced child. Why then should the superior-raced man be forbidden to fornicate with an inferior-raced woman? First of all, in the American laws it was a question of permanent cohabitation or concubinage. As this smacks of marriage, it is unacceptable. Furthermore, the laws against interracial fornication generally appear very late. These laws have several purposes, but one purpose is to prevent the production of people of mixed (biological) race as they are a disturbing factor to the system. The race-system tries to achieve maximum immobility and therefore does not like borderline cases. The mulatto, after all, is the negation of the system in the very terms and categories created by that system. This system is successful as long as the 'ultimate crime' can be prevented, that is, the fecundation of a superior-raced woman by an inferior-raced man. This is why this is considered so horrible and emotions are so aroused, because the system is particularly threatened here. According to the racist's own ideological explanation of his own behaviour, the black man, in raping the white woman, is attacking the white race. This is an ideologic mystification of the matter. True, this black raper is attacking the white race, but that 'white race' is only a socially relevant entity within a certain social system, the race-system, so that what this black rapist is really doing is trying to attack the race-system. If a white woman is impregnated by a black man and bears a mulatto child, there is, first of all, the problem of separating the mulatto child from the mother. But even more important is the question of descent. The mulatto child is legally the descendant of the woman's husband who, of necessity, must be white. But assuming that she has no husband, or that the child is considered illegitimate, then it only follows the mother and she is white. The mother must be related to the child, the father not necessarily so. In both cases one has consanguinity across the

race-barriers. The same thing happens in the case of the opposite crossing (legitimate marriage between a superior-raced man and an inferior-raced woman) if a race-system is less stabilised, if it is in its developing stages, or in decay, or for other reasons trying to operate without the open support of the legal system. Logically in a society where biological descent-groups make up the most important sub-divisions of the population, the existence of the social system is threatened by the confusion of the two descent groups, or by the existence of individuals who are marginal. Hence the 'crime' or 'disgrace' of 'race-treason' or 'mixing one's blood', which in another society is nothing but an exotic detail. This is also why hysteria about 'miscegenation' appears at certain points in history. In these societies, there have been endogamous groups over long periods of time. In the event of any significant change, or what is thought of as a significant change, in the legal relations between the two groups, fear for the maintenance of the social system expresses itself as fear for race 'purity' which is the sine qua non if the system is to continue. Thus in regard to the period of 'the rule of Exeter Hall' in South Africa, or to Reconstruction in the American Southland, the historical memories of such societies propagate the idea that during these periods evil forces on the outside were trying to foist 'miscegenation' on society. This is also why anyone, in such a society, who is a little less committed to the system than his neighbour, is immediately accused of being a proponent of 'miscegenation', if not actually a practitioner. This is what explains the tendency to defend the system in purely ideologic terms according to which social change of this or that sort 'would lead our daughters to marry blacks' or 'would turn this country into a coffee-coloured nation', etc.

As the race system declines, the superior-raced man's enthusiasm for the sexual exploitation of inferior-raced women is tempered by increasing concern about the race-system's future. It is then that the superior race's propagandists and ideologues develop the idea that the inferior ('impure') race must also be protected, or should also be protected, in its race 'purity'. This can be seen as far back as 1915 in a book entitled *Black and White in the Southern States*, written by a South African Englishman named Evans. This book is also one of the first places where one meets the idea that the ability to have intercourse with persons of another race is evidence of 'lack of race-prejudice'. There are also innumerable references in racist literature to the supposed desire of the inferior race to marry and/or impregnate women of the superior race, or to introduce intermarriage as a social norm. Both the belief that the inferior-raced people want to 'mix their blood' or 'purify their blood' or 'whiten the line', and the belief that enthusiasm for the sexual exploitation of the inferior race's women by the superior race's men means 'freedom from race-prejudice', - both are

ideologic and proceed from the very system. (They proceed 'logically' from that system. Thus they are quite 'rational' in the terms of that system. Of course they are totally silly and irrational in the terms of our own society and its ideology. Hence the tendency to brush off the racist as an irrational bigot whose attachment to his social system is simply the lack of good will and/or scientific understanding). It is, however, to a limited extent true to say that originally the inferior race wanted to 'whiten its line' and improve itself gradually over the generations. It is also true that (biological) miscegenation counteracts the race-system; if engaged in long enough and widely enough it will make it impossible. But much more important than mere biological miscegenation is legal miscegenation, legal intermarriage. (41)

Logically enough, encouragement of intermarriage is one way of smashing the system and there was, in fact, a tendency towards increased white-black marriage in the United States in the late 1960's. Quite fashionable at that time were such exhibitions of 'freedom from race-prejudice' as interracial affairs, mulatto babies, etc. Because members of the inferior race are believed to be threatening society's basis by trying to 'miscegenate' with the superior race, the superior race cannot view the inferior race objectively and tends to impart greater sexuality to it. Thus the stories about the depraved or lascivious character of the members of the inferior race, or their exaggerated sensuality, or their superior talents at love-making, and in this same category belongs the well-known idea about the supposed size of black phalli. (42) On the other hand, certain of the ideas which superior-raced people have about the sensuality of inferior-raced people may be due to actual differences, interpreted in an ethnocentric way to the detriment of the inferior race. In this connexion it should be pointed out that the race-system tends to foster either distorted and hypocritical sexual values, or else prudishness and sexual conservatism. This is not a coincidence. Sexual freedom or healthy sexual values would not be conducive to the preservation of of race purity, which is the over-riding, all-important Moloch in a race-society, hence they may not be permitted. The vital position of the superior-raced woman, on whose segregation from sexual contact with the inferior race the reproduction of the superior race depends, also leads to increased tension between the sexes within the superior race. Other factors contribute to the same effect. Most racists are also misogynists to some extent or other. Alfred Rosenberg's *Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* is an excellent example of this combination (by no means coincidental).

That this view of the inferior race (oversexed, masculine, prone to sexual aggression) directly follows from the entire ideology is shown by the fact that it suddenly appeared in racist antisemitism in Europe. In the United States or South Africa one can always advance other explanations for this stereo-

type which would not be relevant in the case of the European Jews. In this sense the specifically racist propaganda which the National-Socialists engaged in, generally after the Machtergreifung, reversed an earlier stereotype about Jews. As early as the time of Eugen Dühring (1880) and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1896), German antisemitism had decided that Jews were debilitating the racial quality of the German nation by marrying into it. But neither of these people had suggested that Jews did so deliberately and consciously, and this for a very good reason. In older German culture the stereotype of the Aryan-Jewish mixed marriage had always been that of an Aryan marrying a Jewess. In German culture one spoke of Jewish grandmothers and not grandfathers. It was a frequently heard expression at one time. Hitler, in *Mein Kampf* (1923), followed this older stereotype. (43) The difference is significant. In the earlier stereotype one could not logically claim that Jews deliberately or systematically fostered intermarriage, even less race-defilement, in order to bastardise or weaken the 'Aryan race'. An Aryan man marrying, or fornicating with, a Jewish woman did not in any way endanger the 'Aryan race'. Thus the Stürmer once expressed a type of pseudo-naive amazement over a race-defilement case where an Aryan man had fornicated with a Jewess. (44) It claimed to see no logic in such behaviour on the part of an Aryan. The first source to change this stereotype was Artur Dinter's *Sünde wider das Blut*, an antisemitic pot-boiler which was first published in 1919 and sold about 25,000 copies in a few years (a best-seller in the terms of the time). Stylistic similarities between certain passages in Dinter and certain passages in *Mein Kampf* (relative to race-defilement) suggest either that Hitler had read this book, or that both authors had had a common source.

Hitler's argument was that, for one, Jews fostered prostitution with the purpose of debilitating the Aryan race. A similar goal was being pursued by the Frankfurter Zeitung, he went on to say, which was trying to divorce people from nature. Hitler then discussed the inability of the Weimar Republic to stop the 'Jewish intelligentsia-press' from divorcing people from nature, and 'thus could the poison unimpededly intrude into the blood-stream of our people and take effect', which is a significant remark because in the very next paragraph he went on to accuse the Republic of being unable to stop the spread of syphilis. The reason for this inability of the state to cope with syphilis lay in what he called the 'prostitution of love', but the reader must now remember that he had previously established that Jewry was fostering prostitution. Shortly thereafter he spoke of 'this Judaisation of our psychic lives and this mammonisation of our mating drives' and how this would be detrimental to the race in the future. At the end of this passage he went on to discuss National-Socialist ideals of love and marriage! The chain of associations is significant. In all this we have Jews attempting to destroy Aryan society by sexual means, but without defiling the race directly. This is found in another part of *Mein Kampf*. The transitional

character of this work is seen in the fact that Hitler still sees Aryan-Jewish intermarriage basically as a mixture of an Aryan man and a Jewish woman (he specifically slights the nobility in this respect in the relevant passage). Ten pages later occurs the famous passage where he speaks of the 'lurking Jew' (der lauern-de Jude) who, 'just as he himself systematically ruins women and girls, does not shrink from tearing down the blood-barriers for others', inter alia by 'bringing Negroes to the Rhine'. 'Thus he tries systematically to sink the level of the race by permanently poisoning individuals'. It is in this passage and the one about to be mentioned, that one sees such strong stylistic similarities with certain passages in Dinter's *Sünde wider das Blut*. In another passage he speaks of how 'systematically these dark-featured parasites-on-the-peoples defile our inexperienced young blonde girls', in which the latter stereotype appears, fully developed. In the relevant passage he begins to discuss Jews defiling the 'Aryan' race, then he passes to the question of churches and eventually he ends up by speaking of God, the Divine Will and expressing himself in a quasi-religious manner. Again the chain of associations is particularly telling.

The Stürmer articles about race-defilement represent nothing but a further elaboration of this. There a conscious, coherent policy of 'race-defilement' is imparted to Jewry and Judaism, supposedly in accordance with instructions found in the Talmud. In the Stürmer the older stereotype of intermarriage between Aryan men and Jewish women does not even show up in vestigial remains, it having been completely superseded by the new stereotype of the opposite. Hence there is a tendency in all this (later, National-Socialist) anti-semitic literature to portray Jews as masculine, if for no other reason than that no-one ever mentions Jewish females. In Dinter's book, which dealt almost exclusively with Jews, there was not a single Jewish female character and the main female in the story, a woman of half-Jewish descent, was treated in a rather ambivalent manner. Dinter could not easily envision Jews in the form of women. This tendency to portray Jews as masculine and the stereotype of the Aryan-Jewish intermarriage as being between a Jewish man and an Aryan woman has apparently stuck as the result of National-Socialist propaganda, at least on the Continent, because it now reappears in philosemitic pulp-literature, the best example of which is Peyrefitte's *Les Juifs*. (46)

2.4. Exogamophobia and Segregation

We have previously established that the race-system rests on the endogamy of the racial groups vis-à-vis each other. Therefore exogamy is a threat to the system. Consequently exogamy is feared and must be prevented. This leads to a phenomenon which we here refer to as exogamophobia. Society is permeated by a fear of this eventuality, something which has any number of implications

for daily living. Society must take prophylactic measures to discourage inter-marriage. Even where legal prohibitions are in force, other measures are used. We have already discussed the legal ones. Another one is to mercilessly condemn any superior-raced person to the inferior race for marrying a member of the latter race. Thus the Group Areas Act in South Africa degrades to the classification of 'Bantu' any white man who is legally married to a 'Bantu' woman. But the general phenomenon of exogamophobia occurs outside of race-societies as well, one of the commonest rationales (historically speaking) being religion. It was also well in evidence in Algeria in the French period, that is, in a society which cannot be called a racial society in the true sense of the word. It has been common among conservative Catholics in Southern Germany and can be observed among irreligious 'assimilated' Jews in the United States. In many cases the element of race is not present, and yet the measures taken to prevent exogamy are rather similar. This presupposes, however, a modern or vaguely modern society. In more primitive societies marriage can be controlled directly, thus there would be little need for extra measures. This is especially the case where the immediate contrahents do not have any say, or have little say, in the choice of a marriage partner. Many aspects of exogamophobia will also be lacking in societies where the sexes are stringently segregated from each other, or where women are granted little freedom. Similarly, the problem of preventing intermarriage only occurs in modern times. Previously group endogamy was often achieved spontaneously, unconsciously and without exertion on anyone's part.

The prophylactic side of exogamophobia is to restrict all unnecessary contact, especially of a social nature, between persons of opposite race. This is one reason for the extreme bitterness with which school integration and bussing have been battled out in the United States. Fear that it might predispose whites to intermarriage with blacks has always been, and is probably still now, one ramification of school segregation of extreme importance. Another prophylactic weapon is the family itself. There is always a reciprocal relationship between exogamophobia and the family-life fetish. They mutually reinforce each other. In South Africa there is much talk about 'Christian family life', an expression which, in Afrikaans, even includes clan-feeling! In such a society nobody is supposed to degrade the family name by passing it on to a non-white. Often a person who does marry outside of his own race-group is looked upon as if he were no longer a member of his own family. (47) There are innumerable ways in which the family can be forged into a weapon for preventing intermarriage, the most obvious of which is the possibility of disinheriting children who marry outside the permitted circle. (48) For this reason in racial societies there is strict segregation in all things concerning family life, although different societies may have different ideas as to what is connected with the family or

not. Different race-groups must avoid each other to an abnormal degree. Whites and coloureds in Martinique, for example, have 'public' but not 'private' relations. They see each other in church, in business, at official and semi-official gatherings, but they do not mix at weddings, baptisms or even first communions and they do not visit in each other's homes. (49) The two groups are, in such a situation, what is generally referred to as 'clannish' in English, and this is also one reason why the Jews in the United States are seen as the prototypes of 'clannish' people, that is, because they are extremely exogamophobic. In such cases where there is 1) tension and ill-feeling between groups ('prejudice'), and 2) opposition to intermarriage on the part of at least one of the groups, the prevailing perspective in the social sciences seems to say that persons of different groups decline to marry each other, or try to prevent others from intermarrying, because they are 'prejudiced'. In other words, 1) causes 2). We see no reason why it should not be the opposite. First one has the desire to prevent exogamy, whence comes much of the mutual tension. The purpose of this tension and ill-feeling ('prejudice') is precisely to reduce the possibilities of intermarriage. Fear of intermarriage poisons the atmosphere in general, which is one reason why exogamophobia should be combated in cities with large contingents of (coloured) immigrant workers.

In a certain sense, however, this exogamophobia makes intermarriage the ultimate weapon in the hands of a child who is interested in taking revenge on his own family. In the 1960's it was particularly 'in' in the United States to marry across the race-barrier. In the case of many bourgeois students (especially), intermarriage - previously considered so degrading - was the ultimate way they had of burning their bridges behind them and proving once and for all that they were irrevocably lost to bourgeois suburbia.

Besides avoiding direct contact between families of endogamous groups, exogamophobia leads one group to deprecate individuals of the other group as regards those characteristics which are considered most important in a spouse, or else it tends to ignore their existence as persons with any type of a family. Much of the talk in the United States about the 'broken Negro family' is also supposed to deprecate blacks as potential marriage partners for whites. Tales of how cruel Arabs were to their wives (commonly heard among the colons in Algeria) were supposed to have the same effect. There is a reference to something similar in Passage to India.

The reader might think it would only be necessary to segregate persons of opposite group and opposite sex where the possibility of intermarriage might be considered extremely great. This might exclude married people. Why, for example, may not married people of different races associate socially in such a society? They are already married, thus not out searching for mates. The reason is

that tendencies to segregate, which admitted start where the possibility of intermarriage is extremely great, are soon extended beyond all reasonable bounds so that eventually even the most transient and peripheral contact must be discouraged. The segregation we find in outright race-societies performs this function, among others. Among the segregation measures which also perform this function is the prohibition of commensality, something which is very important. A white South Africa would not mind having a non-white in his presence while he is eating if that non-white is, say, a waiter. In fact, most waiters are non-whites. But he would not like to eat in the same room with a non-white who was also eating there. Traditionally it has been held that such 'prejudice' was irrational and that it was perfectly possible to eat with people and not intermarry with them, but the idea of prohibiting commensality for the purpose of preventing intermarriage is very common and very old. Thus the mediaeval Mosaic philosopher Ibn-Maimun explained his religion's prohibition of commensality: 'There are other things which the Sages have forbidden...having been decreed by them in order to keep the people away from the heathens, so that Israelites might not mingle with them, lest such commingling lead to intermarriage,' and he mentions precisely eating and the drinking of wine. (50) Eating together implies intimacy and is often an integral part of ritual. In (classical) Roman law, the patrician marriage ceremony was called 'eating together' (confarreatio) and the divorce ceremony was 'eating apart' (diffareatio). In a race-society commensality might be tolerated if it occurs under less intimate circumstances, or if only one sex is present. However, in extreme cases, such as South Africa, even such things as snack-bars are segregated. In the United States Armed Forces white and black soldiers originally ate in separate messes (even though only one sex was present).

The segregation imposed by the race-system may be a way for that system to dig its own grave. If commensality has been strictly forbidden and people have grown up for many generations without being able to eat with another category of persons, the sudden dropping of all such barriers might just disorient them and predispose them to intermarriage for all we know. Within the last ten years, the previously mandatory segregation measures in the Southland have largely been disposed of. One cannot say what effect this will have on culture in the future. Undoubtedly newer and more subtle prophylactic measures for the prevention of intermarriage will be evolved in the course of time, but in the meantime this sudden disposal of the colour-bar may have unexpected effects on the region's culture.

Exogamophobia leads to other de-civilising effects. One is the ambivalent attitude taken towards women. The superior-raced woman is worshipped be-

cause she represents the preservation of the race and its purity, but she has to be suppressed precisely because these things depend upon her. There have been any number of people to comment upon the gynaeolatry of the American South, especially of its upper-class culture, but what they fail to see is that there is a type of misogyny behind it too. (51) Another outgrowth of exogamophobia is a tendency towards prudishness and sexual conservatism. The relationship between racism and sexual conservatism has been nicely misunderstood by Gilberto Freyre when he states that: 'We Brazilians liberated ourselves more quickly from racial prejudices than those of sex'. (52) His mistake is to conceive of both as guided by 'prejudices' or their absence. The reason for the greater liberality in regard to race - if it be true - would be because of the more backward position of women. This is stated more directly in one racist pamphlet where it is argued that, in the old days, when women were kept under control, the 'present amount of race mixing' would not have been dangerous, but with the 'loose morals now common in the United States,' it supposedly is. (53) This is what we alluded to when we said that this fear is the result of a certain discrepancy: a sufficient amount of modernity to allow some freedom to women, etc., but with conservatism about racial intermarriage. In an extremely backward society, with rigid segregation of the sexes, it would not be necessary.

That many segregation measures and other exogamophobic reactions on the part of racist societies have precisely to do with fear of intermarriage is brought out by the fact that, where contacts between persons of widely differing race occur more transiently, these segregation measures are not resorted to. Leiris (54) noticed in Martinique that Metropolitans were more liberal in their contacts with blacks because the question on intermarriage was irrelevant to them. In a colony of European technicians in Liberia, one can observe 1) the considerable freedom and ease with which whites and blacks associate, and 2) the existence, on the part of the whites, of negative attitudes to blacks which do not differ very much from those found in a race-society. This combination would appear paradoxical from the 'race-prejudice' perspective, but is explained by the transient character of the colony where whites sojourn for a few years without any need to fear intermarriage.

Prohibitions on interfornication in racist societies serve the function of preventing the production of persons of mixed descent. But this is not their only function. In addition, such laws are used as an excuse to carry out far-reaching measures of segregation. Members of different races are scared away from much social intercourse out of fear that they might be accused of contravening these laws. This is clearly seen in two places, 1) the Third Reich, and 2) the Cape since 1950. In the Cape, fear of the Immorality Act inhibits social intercourse between white and brown people, groups which did associate with each

other on much freer terms before the 1950's. In the Third Reich the Blood Protection Law had similar effects. There it was a question of dis-entwining two groups highly entwined in each other, where social intercourse had always been common and no 'race-barrier' had ever existed.

Another reason for these prohibitions is that too much sexual interaction between the races lessens the prestige which the superior race is supposed to have in the eyes of the inferior race. The inferiors would not in the long run be able to look upon white men as superior if the latter behave undignifiedly with women of inferior race.

The combination of a man of superior race and a woman of inferior race will always be more tolerated than the opposite, be it a question of marriage, cohabitation or simple fornication. This is because men are held to be socially superior to women so that such a combination will be in balance (or 'status-congruent'). This will not be the case with a man of inferior race and a woman of superior race. In most racist societies it is held that the lowest member of the superior race is still superior to the highest member of the inferior race. In South Africa this is a principle and is stated in so many words. This is also why, in racist societies, one finds conservative sexual values, especially in regard to sexual equality. This would not be in the interests of the race-system, hence it is attacked and openly identified as a plot to free women of the superior race so that they might mate with men of the inferior race. Laws against interfornication and interracial cohabitation also seek to prevent affectionate relationships between members of different races who are supposed to be so far away from each other in development that such relationships, and such emotions, are theoretically supposed to be impossible. Much less disapproved of is such sexual interaction as, far from implying any equality, takes place under such forms as underline the subjugation of the one group by the other. This is encouraged by the general exploitation of the one race-group by the other and this is also one reason why there is so much mistrust of women of the superior race in this respect. Here again we see that the system produces tendencies which it is then forced to criminalise. Superior-raced men may exploit inferior-raced women, but the same is true for the superior-raced woman. This contradiction appears very early, namely during slavery. White masters could legally force Negro slave-women to copulate with them, but white mistresses could do the same with black slave-men. We see in much of this the same contradiction. The system puts power in the hands of the superior-raced individual which can be used 'to the detriment of the race' (which is a mystification for 'detrimental to the system').

CHAPTER THREE : THE HISTORICAL GENESIS OF RACISM

3.1.Slavery as a Social Institution.

First of all, the one distinction to be made is between those types of slavery or subjugation where the physical body of the subjugated person belongs to the person or institution holding rights over him, and those forms of slavery or subjugation where this is not the case, remembering that complete freedom to dispose of one's own body is almost non-existent. Another important consideration is whether or not the person or institution holding rights over another also has *ius vitae ac necis*, the right of sexual disposition or the right to alienate the slave to others. There are forms of 'slavery' where these rights are not present. Another form of 'slavery' to be distinguished is where a person is subjugated to an institution which, in turn, is subjugated to another person. This has been the traditional interpretation of serfdom. One said that the serf was 'glebae conscriptus' and that the feudal lord had rights over the soil, and only through this over the serf. This has more recently been criticised as being too simple, but there have been such forms of serfdom. This interpretation is valid for Russian serfdom. It can also be pointed out that 'servitude' in classical jurisprudence and in certain Continental languages also refers to the encumbrance of immovable property. Another important distinction to be made is between simple patriarchal slavery and the very cruel and more impersonal form of plantation slavery. The latter existed in Hellas and Rome and more recently in the Ultramarine, and it is this form of slavery (originally evolving out of patriarchal slavery) which is important to us here, although it is historically rarer. In such forms of slavery, the slave is generally considered nothing but a piece of property and most akin to a beast of draught or burden.

After approximately two pages spent in developing his concept of 'slavery', the British anthropologist Edmund Leach gives us these further guidelines for discussing the subject:

Let me sum up. Class, Caste, Slavery...each of these words is liable to carry overtones which suggest the exploitation of the underprivileged by the overprivileged. In the context of this symposium we need be on our guard against initial prejudices of this sort. Marxism has so infected our thinking that we not only take it for granted that it is the nature of modern society that there should be a class struggle but we are also inclined to believe that unqualified equality, unqualified freedom and the utopia of a classless society are sensible political goals for all right-thinking men. May I urge you most strongly to draw a distinction between political slogans and sociological categories? Freedom and classlessness are political ideas; they have no place in sociological analysis, which must necessarily be concerned with social constraints and status differences. The word slavery (as we use it today) suggests that we can readily distinguish between social constraints which are morally justifiable and those which are not. I deny this. (1)

We, in our turn, would like to deny that Marxism has infected their thinking in the way they suppose, for his conception of Marxism shows that he is using the word in the traditional journalistic sense and not in the sociological sense (referring to a method of social analysis). We might take the opportunity, as Marxists, to apologise to Leach for the fact that our philosophy has infected his thinking. At any rate, the reader not adverse to having his thinking 'infected' by Marxism might be reminded that Marx never ceased to emphasise the close historical connexion between slavery and the family. 'The modern family contains the germ, not only of slavery (servitus) but of serfdom as well, as it had to do with agricultural work from the very beginning. It contains in miniature all the contradictions which later develop more fully in society and its state'. (2) Aristotle, in fact, generally spoke of women and slaves in the same breath. The connexion between slavery and the family is well-known to every etymologist. Our word 'family' comes from Latin familia. The latter did not refer to what we call a family, but rather to what we call a household. This is seen in the expression 'pater familias', where familia meant everything in the household except the pater himself. That is, it consisted of: his wife, unmarried daughters, possibly also unmarried sisters or his widowed mother, his unmarried sons, and the various classes of slaves. Thus when Cato said: 'familiae ut bene sit provideto, ne algeat, ne escuriat,' he was mainly thinking of the slaves. Latin famulus originally meant a house-slave. The word is still used in a figurative sense in the Germanic languages. This connexion between slavery and the family is also seen in the German word Gesinde, which is related to Old English gesid and very early occurs in the Latin form gasinda. Originally it meant those who travelled together, or companions, eventually however Gesinde came to refer to a farmer's labourers (Arbeitsgesinde). The word eventually came to mean family in Dutch (gezin). The most commonly used Hebrew word for a female slave is shifkha which is related to mishpakha (family). Even the English word hind (i.e. agricultural labourer) is said to come from an Old English root (higan or hiwan) having to do with the family.

Among sociologists slavery is generally discussed from the 'race domination' perspective which is completely inapplicable. For one thing this assumes that the races existed before the slave-system came about and, in fact, does not bother about the difficulties inherent in trying to explain how races do come about. It assumes that they are natural groupings by confusing biological races with social ones. But, for another thing, slavery is also a legal institution. As such there are laws and legal commentaries to study from which we can glean its essence. The first form of slavery to mention is the oldest known one, namely patriarchal slavery, which is nearest akin to the family. We can best describe this institution by saying that it was a mild form of slavery but a cruel form of family life (in our modern terms). The distinction between slaves and other

subordinates within the family was not that great. All were in the power of the patriarch. The Roman pater familias had the right to kill any member of his familia, his wife and his children no less than his slaves. Furthermore, slavery is a type of 'ius in personam' (3) and we should not forget that rights of one person over another may also exist within the family. Rights of one person to another have not been entirely abolished in modern society if these people are members of the same family. In earlier societies they were even crasser. Thus the title of the fifth chapter of the second book of De iure belli ac pacis is: 'De acquisitione originaria iuris in personas; ubi de iure parentum; de matrimoniis; de collegiis; de iure in subditos; servos'. Thus for Grotius slavery was not an entirely 'peculiar institution' at all, rather he starts out quite correctly by associating the rights of the slave-owner over the slave by referring to the rights of parents over children. In the Middle Ages these rights were considerable. We need only think of the castrati. Selling of children was permitted by law at that time. Indeed Catholic thinking even today tends to regard at least minors as the property of their parents. This all had important consequences. Slavery has always been justified on the grounds that slaves were captured in war, but then Grotius had some further doubts about why this should necessarily pass on to posterity:

1. De his qui ex servis nascuntur difficilior inspectio est. Romano iure et iure gentium circa captivos, ut dixeris alibi, ut in bestiis, ita in servilis conditionis hominibus partus matrem sequitur, quod tamen iuri naturali non satis congruit, ubi pater aliqua ratione sufficiente cognosci potest, nam cum in mutis animantibus patres non minus quam matres foetuum curam gerant, hoc ipso ostenditur foetum utriusque esse communem. Sic ergo si lex civilis hac de re tacuisset, partus non minus patrem sequeretur quam matrem. Ponamus ergo, quo minor sit difficultas, utrumque parentem servitute servire; et videamus an naturaliter partus servilis futurus sit conditionis. Certa si alia nulla fuerit ratio educandi partum, potuerunt parentes prolem sibi nascituram in servitute secum addicere; quippe cum tali ex causa etiam in libertate natos vendere parentibus liceat.

2. Sed cum hoc ius naturaliter ortum ducat ex ipsa necessitate, extra eam non est ius parentibus prolem suam cuiquam addicere, quare ius dominorum in prolem servilem hoc casu nascetur, ex ipsa alimentorum et eorum quae vitae necessaria sunt praebitione; ac proinde cum diu alendi fuerint ex servis nati, antequam opera eorum domino utilis esse possit, et sequentes operae sui temporis alimentis respondeant; effugere ita natis servitute non licebit, nisi pro alimentis quantum satis est reddant. Certe si immanis sit domini saevitia, servos illos etiam qui ipso se in servitute dederunt, fuga consulere sibi posse probabilis sententia est. Nam quod Apostoli et antiqui canones servis edicunt ne se dominis subtrahant, generale est, et eorum errori oppositum qui omnem subiectionem, tam privatam quam publicam reiciebant, ut pugnantem cum Christiana libertate. (4)

This is extremely telling because of his desire, on the one hand, to justify the slavery of parents over children while, on the other hand, trying to mitigate this with certain concepts from the realm of Christian hypocrisy ('Christiana libertas'). What is significant here is also the remark 'ut in bestiis, ita in servilis conditionis hominibus, partus matrem sequitur'. This expression is a common prin-

ciple of law and was, in the Middle Ages, also known in the form: 'partus ventrem sequitur' (i.e. follows the belly). It can be pointed out that Grotius had some influence on his compatriots in this respect, at least in the beginning. Until about 1700 this was the official position of the O.I.C. in Indonesia and the Cape: slave children of a free father was supposed to be manumitted after a certain age.

A slave furthermore has no legal capacity. As such he stands outside of the institution of marriage. Consequently there is no such thing as descent in his case. In classical Roman law Ulpianus stated: 'Lex naturae haec est, ut qui nascitur sine legitimo matrimonio matrem sequatur'. This is still, roughly speaking, true of European law. As legitimate birth is impossible with slaves (the institution of marriage being non-existent), it logically follows that a slave woman always produces a child of the same condition (5) and the owner of the slave woman is automatically the owner of the slave child.

Neque vero ipsi tantum servi fiunt, sed et posterius in perpetuum, nempe qui ex matre serva post servitutem nascuntur. Et hoc est quod iure gentium servos nostros fieri dixit Martianus qui ex ancillis nostris nascuntur. Servitio subiectum uterum dixit Tacitus, agens de Germani ducis uxore. (6)

This, and not 'prejudice', is one of the origins of the race-system. We have previously seen (7) that in a race-system a person who is born of one superior-raced person and one inferior-raced one is either a member of an intermediate race or an inferior one, but never of a superior race, and this is true even if this person is legitimately born of a father who belongs to the superior race. Thus in the United States a crossing between a white and a Negro invariably produces a person who is a Negro according to the unwritten social definition. This is how a race-system operates in its fully developed form, but its origin is here in this principle of law: partus matrem sequitur. (8)

Furthermore, in patriarchal slave societies the slave woman belongs to the patriarch for the purpose of his sexual gratification and for the purpose of producing descendants. An excellent example of this is the story of Bilha and Zilpa in Genesis. Bilha was originally Rachel's slave-woman, however eventually she gave Bilha to Jacob in order to produce descendants.

And she said, Behold my maid Bilhah, go in unto her; and she shall bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her.
And she gave Bilhah her handmaid to wife; and Jacob went into her.
And Bilhah conceived, and bare Jacob a son.
And Rachel said, God hath judged me, and hath also heard my voice, and hath given me a son: therefore called she his name Dan. (9)

This shows that in a patriarchal society conceptions of descent and family relations are entirely different from what they are in ours. The passage suggests that the descendants would somehow be Rachel's because Bilha had belonged to her. The reference to 'bearing upon my knees' alludes to the fact that in more

primitive societies women bore children in a kneeling position. In a chapter shortly thereafter a similar thing occurs with a slave-woman named Zilpa (Dan, Naftali, Gad and Asher were descendants of such slave-women). A departure from these customs comes later on in the Koran which advises people not to force slave-women into intercourse and the bearing of children.

Force not females under your control into unchastity by restraining them from marriage should they desire to safeguard their chastity through marriage, in order that you add to your worldly gains through their labour. If anyone forces them into unchastity by restraining them from marriage, surely Allah will, thereafter, be towards them Most Forgiving, Merciful. (10)

The ancient Nordics had their slave concubines as well. These are referred to as 'frillor' in Swedish and their children as 'frillobarn'. Similarly the Continental Germanics had their 'Kebsweiber' and a distinction between a man's legitimate and illegitimate children is illustrated in the German saying 'mit Kind und Kegel'. Kegel originally meant illegitimate child. The real difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate son was that, while both were subservient to the father, the legitimate one would one day inherit him and become a patriarch himself, which the illegitimate one could not do. But there are systems where the illegitimate sons automatically succeeded to their fathers' rights and property if he had no legitimate ones. When slavery began to die out in Scandinavia, custom began to mitigate the condition of children by slave-women. Thus the Law of Östgöta stated that if a peasant had any children by his slave-woman, he could not sell them or hold them as slaves. The Code Noir in the French colonies later stipulated the same thing. Because of this connexion between slavery and the family, and because slaves are always used to provide the slave-owner with sexual gratification and descendants, slavery is always a form of polygamy to some extent or other. Thus in the Antebellum South and in Brazil a form of polygamy existed. But as the racial system began to develop, the original relationship between slavery and the family was lost in the consciousness of the slave-owning classes. Thus we see, almost everywhere, in Brazil as well as in the Anglo-Saxon colonies, that the sons of the slave-owners would whore with their mulatto half-sisters, or that the master would whore with his own mulatto daughters, without any realisation that this could be looked upon as incest. The gap between the two racial groups was so wide that they were looked upon as being totally unrelated, although in reality many times an individual in the one group was biologically related to an individual in the other one. Such customs also make very interesting commentary upon the 'Christian' character of the devout Baptists and pious Methodists in the Old South.

In patriarchal slavery the relations between the slave-father and his slaves were very similar to his relations with his own children. If anyone objects that the slave-owner had the right to commit all sorts of cruelties against

his slaves, he need only be reminded that the slave-owner had the right to do the same with his own legitimate children. Patriarchs and parents were very cruel to their children in previous centuries (by modern-day standards). There was little difference between slaves and children. Technically the Roman pater had the right to kill his children without answering to anyone for it. Otherwise one occasionally finds references to very familiar relations between masters and slaves. It is said that Cato's wife nursed the slave-children as well as her own, and that the slaves sat at the same table with the pater. Just as we have a proverb about a man's home being his castle, the Romans could well have said 'a man's villa is his republic'. The Roman villa was a largely independent economic unit, producing its own bread and wine and this is why Cicero once slighted an opponent with the remark: 'The bread he eats comes from the market, the wine he drinks he buys at the inn.' Such a friendly patriarchal attitude towards slaves was reflected by the hypocrite Seneca when he said: 'Our ancestors thought their house was a little republic' (11), or when Plinius said: 'For the slaves, the house is also their republic and their civitas'. Elsewhere Seneca indulged in some more hypocrisy: 'They are slaves but even more they are people. They are slaves, but even more they are companions. They are slaves, but even more they are humble friends. They are slaves, but even more they are fellow-slaves' (12). The last part means 'we are all slaves in this world' and was an expression of the Stoic mentality. This attitude was brought into Christianity by Augustinus, if it was not there to begin with. According to him, the loving pater familias would bring up his slaves as Christians; that he lived off their labour was not necessarily un-Christian. (13)

But with the development of society, the institution of simple patriarchal slavery gave way to crueler and more complex forms of exploitation. This can be seen in Roman history. Cato preserved many of the customs and attitudes of the older patrician society which later disappeared. Consequently the mild and familiar relations ceased. The same Seneca who piously refers to slaves as 'contubernali' and 'conservi' also says: 'totidem hostes esse, quod servos'. Analogously the Mishna says: 'the more slaves, the more thievery; the more slave-women, the more licentiousness', something which had hardly been the case in the days of Jacob the Patriarch. In the Ultramarine we see that slavery modified, if it did not weaken, the European-type family. But when speaking of how slavery had debilitating effects on the family as a social institution, one must remember that it is a specific type of slavery and a specific type of family which were not, apparently, compatible with each other.

Throughout all slavery there is a tendency to think of slaves as being pieces of property. But it is only under the crasser forms of slavery that this principle is taken to its furthest consequences. Nevertheless, even the ancient

Nordics equated slaves with movable property, as in the older Law of Östgöta: 'nu vil bonde þræl sin sælia: han skal mæ þ vin ok vitni kôpa sum hæst'. (14)

In classical jurisprudence a slave was a piece of property most akin to an animal. Even Aristotle refers to an ox as 'the poorman's slave'. Because of certain more humanitarian legal restrictions on the right to treat slaves in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, it is argued by some historians and sociologists that, for the Spanish and Portuguese Catholics, 'a slave was not just a piece of property'. Such people hardly realise that according to Catholicism children are practically pieces of property. The fact remains that in Portuguese and Spanish law, in the Metropolitan as well as in the Ultramarine, a slave was a piece of property. Mitigating regulations restricting the owner's rights to his property does not negative the slave's character as a piece of property. In most European countries there are laws preventing cruelty to animals. This does not mean that animals are human beings in law. Thus slaves are property, more specifically movable property and the famous Code Noir begins with the words: 'déclarons les esclaves être meubles, et comme tel entre en la communauté'.

Another consideration to take up, in discussing slavery, is that which the Romans referred to as 'vitae necisque potestas' but which we more commonly know by the mediaeval expression 'ius vitae ac necis'. This means that the holder of rights over another person also has the unlimited right to kill him. This was not the case with serfdom in the Middle Ages. The Old Testament and the Koran do not grant an absolute right to the slave-owner to kill slaves, one reason for this being that human sacrifice was no longer practiced in those societies. In ancient Nordic society, where human sacrifice was still practiced, the free right to kill slaves was never restricted. Of all the Ultramarine societies, none gave slave-owners an unlimited right to kill slaves, but the English colonies went the farthest in this direction, especially in such places as Jamaica and the United States. In many cases the owner did not have such a right in theory but exercised it in practice. In all the slave-holding societies of the Ultramarine slave-owners could kill their own slaves with considerable impunity. From this same *ius vitae ac necis* derive all minor rights to the bodies of slaves, one of which was the right to subject them to corporal punishment (generally unlimited) or the right to maim them. Similarly the right of sexual disposition derives from the same source. In many milder forms of slavery slaves are not totally equated with property and *ius vitae ac necis* is not granted. Mediaeval feudalism was such a case. Another question in judging different forms of slavery is to what extent the slave has any legal capacity. In classical jurisprudence he had none at all and in the Ultramarine he had almost none. In the latter type of slavery he generally had a small amount of legal capacity, at least vis-à-vis other slaves. But as the system looked upon a slave as a

piece of property, he was legally not a human being, hence he had no legal capacity. This again was not present in mediaeval serfdom. Serfdom different in two important respects from the slavery of Antiquity or of the Ultramarine. For one thing serfs were descended from each other just as any other class of persons, and secondly they had legal capacity and could and did own property (they were part-owners in the common). (15). Another question is to what extent marriage and kinship are relevant concepts for slaves. Edmund Leach shows to what extent his thinking has been 'infected' by Marxism when he states: 'In many social systems a good working definition of a slave would be "a man or woman who has no recognised kin outside his owner's family (familia)"'. (16)

In fact, in most societies there is no legal marriage between slaves, or the institution of marriage among slaves is so different as to warrant a separate term. In Latin the marriage of one slave to another was simply called contubernium, while the marriage of free persons was called matrimonium or connubium. Leach does not indicate why all this should be so, but perhaps because he was not sufficiently 'infected' by Marxism. We have already explained one reason for this. Slaves have no legal capacity and marriage is a legal act. A person without legal capacity cannot engage in a legal act. But furthermore, as a slave is a piece of property, he holds no property, thus he cannot inherit property or leave it to others. Thus one of the main reasons for marriage is simply non-existent in the case of a slave. As he has no legal capacity, he has no status (in the narrower sense of the word), therefore he has no status to inherit or leave to others. For these reasons the legal institution of marriage is totally irrelevant and inapplicable to a slave. Leach again shows to what extent his thinking has been 'infected' by Marxism - how could it be otherwise in the twentieth century? - when he states: 'And as an anthropologist I would urge my sociological colleagues to pay more attention to endogamy and less to economic factors when they are considering these matters'. (17) This position is almost a Marxist one, which not immediately be clear because Marxism has unfortunately not 'infected' Leach's thinking when it comes to clarity. It is not clear to us what Leach means with endogamy. If with endogamy he means sexual relations or fornication outside of legal marriage, then he is clearly wrong. But if he is referring here to the legal institution of marriage, then he is here on solidly Marxist-infected ground. The legal institution of marriage - in contra-distinction to the simple custom of cohabitation - has very much to do with property and inheritance of property (as well as of status). In general, Leach is involved in a type of contradiction when he says that we should 'pay attention to endogamy and not economic factors', for marriage is an economic institution and therefore endogamy and exogamy have their economic aspects.

3.2.Slavery in Recent Times in the European Ultramarine

A significant difference between European countries and the countries of the Ultramarine is that the social system preceding capitalism in both was not the same. One must not, therefore, confuse slavery with feudalism and it is not without significance for the later history of these countries that the pre-capitalistic social structures were different. If it were not for the question of Negro slavery which engendered the race-system, it could be argued that it would have been more progressive to have started with slavery than to have started with feudalism. At any rate the traditional interpretation of the serf's status was that he was 'glebae conscriptus', although this has been disputed and would, in any case, be a simplification. What should be above issue is that European feudalism revolved more around authority over and control of land than around the control of human beings at its base, so that with authority over land one could obtain dependent labour or the ability of attracting it. 'Dem sol ez allez dienen, die liute und ouch diu land,' thus a serf was basically an accessory to immovable property (in our terms). Slavery flourished in societies where the situation was the opposite. Land was plentiful and it was often alienated by the Crown for a pittance, occasionally it was given away for nothing. In some places the amount of land doled out was allotted in proportion to the number of slaves which the potential land-owner was able to import. Thus Carolina in 1663 enacted that the amount of land to be granted was to be in proportion to the number of slaves which the applicant had imported. Even if the serf was not entirely 'bound to the soil' in Western Europe (in Russian serfdom he, in fact, was), he still stood in some relation to the land, while Negroes were completely unrelated to any specific piece of land and could be moved around from place to place. In fact they were frequently moved because, in cases of death or bankruptcy, they were the easiest pieces of property for the heirs or the bankruptcy-officer to cart away. That slavery had nothing to do with feudalism is shown by the fact that in American law there is only one form of property ownership and different forms of land-ownership as still exist in certain European countries as a relict of feudalism are totally unknown in American law. Furthermore feudalism by its very nature led to a dividing-up of the land into smaller and smaller units in Europe, whereas plantation slavery led to a concentration of larger and larger holdings, Scholars such as the American Oscar Handlin have tried to derive slavery from the institution of villeinage which still existed in Scotland when the United States was first settled. This seems extremely doubtful as it would be hard to explain why villeinage alone should have been adopted without adopting the wider social structure of which it had been part. In any case this explanation has no validity outside of the English colonies. Slavery existed in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies long before it existed in the United States or Jamaica and it is much more correct to see slavery in the United States as an imitation of the same

thing in countries further south. (18)

By the same token one must not confuse slavery with capitalism, as has been done. However there does exist a connexion. For a number of bourgeois thinkers, especially Kathedersozialisten, capitalism is simply any economic system characterised by greed and has nothing to do with any specific mode of production. Consequently some people were induced to write books about 'capitalism and slavery' mainly to confuse the issue. The unrefined thinking of some of these people is well brought-out in the remark that, 'In a bourgeois community where the Negro is either an item of property or an equal human being, a free Negro under conditions of slavery is an enormous paradox. How can an object of property be "free"? Or if he can be free, it must be human and hence all Negroes must be free' (19). What is an even greater paradox to us is how one can refer to a society as 'bourgeois' if slavery exists in it. Nevertheless as the original accumulation of capital had much to do with the slave-trade and as merchant-capitalism had to forego production-capitalism, the first capitalists in European history (obviously merchant-capitalists) were also heavily engaged in the slave-trade and also in plantation slave-production. Slavery and the slave-trade came to be regarded in European thinking as the source of enormous and legendary riches. It must, however, be remembered that the capitalism of the time was merchant-capitalism and not-production-capitalism, and furthermore that the slave-trade and the slave-plantations provided for the accumulation of capital for production-capitalism in a number of parts of Europe, particularly in harbour cities such as Liverpool. The city of Amsterdam (official motto: 'heldhaftig, vastberaden, barmhartig') also owned stock in the W.I.C. and hence derived a good deal of its original accumulation from Suriname and the slave-trade. 'The discovery of the gold and silver lands in America, the extermination, enslavement and burying of the native population in the mines, the beginning conquest and pillage of the East Indies, the metamorphosis of Africa into a wild-life preserve for the commercial hunting of black-skins - these things mark the dawn of the era of capitalistic production. These idyllic processes are main moments in the original accumulation of capitalism'. (20) At any rate, one of the prerequisites of a capitalist production-system is that the worker sells his labour-power to the capitalist. But in order to be able to sell his labour-power, he has to be a free person, in other words, an owner of his own labour-power, for he cannot sell what he does not own. A man selling himself into slavery turns himself from a possessor of merchandise into an article of merchandise. Hence, 'The slave no more sells his labour-power to his owner than the ox sells his labour to the peasant. The slave and his labour-power is altogether, once and for all, sold to the owner. He is an article of merchandise which can change hands among different owners. He is an article of

merchandise, but labour-power is not his article of merchandise. The serf sells only part of his labour-power. It is not he who received a wage from the owner of the land, rather the owner of the land received a tribute from him.' (21) Furthermore in slavery money invested in buying slaves is generally reckoned as part of the fixed capital and has nothing to do with the circulating capital which is that part of the capital with which the modern capitalist pays his workers. Finally, 'But the slave-system as well - as long as it is the predominant form of productive labour in agriculture, manufacturing or shipping, etc., as in the advanced states of Hellas and Rome - retains an element of natural economy in itself. The slave-market itself continually receives its supply of labour-power - an article of merchandise - via war or piracy, etc., and this piracy is not part of a process of circulation but the expropriation in natura of others' labour via direct physical coërcion. Even in the United States, after the border areas between the salary-labour states of the North and the slave-states of the South were turned into an area of slave-breeding, where the slave thrown onto the market is himself part of the annual production, - even this was for a long time insufficient and as long as possible the African slave-trade was carried on to supplement the market.' (22) There are, in fact, other elements of 'natural economy' to be seen in connexion with slavery. In Surinam, originally, there hardly existed any currency and there are innumerable documents from the old days attesting to fines being doled out in so-and-so-many pounds of sugar, estates being assessed in the same 'currency' and so forth. There are other differences. The reader will remember the classic remark that the wage which the capitalist pays must be sufficient to allow the worker to reproduce his own kind so that he can produce a new generation of workers to replace him when he himself leaves the labour-market through death or old age. Originally - and this is alluded to in the above quotation - slavery was even crueller because it was not based on such a calculation. Indeed it was more profitable for the slave-owner to buy fresh slaves from Africa, work them to death in seven to ten years (this was the general average, from Jamaica to Brazil) and then buy new ones. In Jamaica it took the plantation owners a hundred years before the production of new slaves through the reproduction of old ones superceded the amount of slaves being brought in fresh from Africa. (23) After two world wars and all that has happened in the Twentieth Century, this colossal spoliation of human life still seems to us to be of a degree which is hard to conceive. Another distinction between capitalism and slavery lies in the very nature of the colonial lands and is seen in other colonial societies where there was no slavery. Capitalism's development was hindered there by the fact that the majority of the population possessed its own conditions of work and, instead of enriching the capitalists with their work, they enriched themselves. This is

alluded to by Marx (24) when he quoted E. J. Wakefield, the apostle of 'systematic colonisation' who mentioned that, where 'land is very cheap and all men are free, and everyone who so pleases can easily obtain a piece of land for himself, not only is labour very dear, as respects the labourer's share of the produce, but the difficulty is to obtain it at any price'. And, in fact, if we are not mistaken, somewhere in Adam Smith the reader will find the remark that in countries where land is plentiful and free, 'the population must either live in barbarism or part of it must live in slavery'. This is now recognised by American sociologists as well, as Elkins (an historian) has pointed out that compulsory slavery was necessary in developing these countries as there was much free, uninhabited land and, if not kept in bondage, a slave could have walked off and occupied his own piece of land. (25) The slave-trade and colonies like Surinam and Jamaica therefore provided the original accumulation for European capitalism, and with this accumulation it passed from its primitive merchant-capitalist stage to a more advanced production-capitalist stage. This being done, capitalism suddenly turned on the institution of slavery and found it to be 'immoral'. Marx frequently remarked on the hypocrisy of the British bourgeoisie in this respect.

3.3. Miscegenation in the Slave Societies of the Ultramarine

Outside of, or before, the slave-period miscegenation largely remains a socially insignificant phenomenon. It is only in slavery that this begins to have a significance which is important for understanding the development of the race-system. The racial system actually starts with miscegenation because if the two races in a society were two different species which could not produce offspring then the entire system would never have been necessary. On the other hand, we also know that miscegenation in later periods undoes the system, or weakens it, or disturbs it, which is why it is feared and eventually discouraged, calumniated and, in some cases, even criminalised. With miscegenation we mean the production of offspring whose two immediate parents belong to different races, as socially or biologically defined (as the case may be). This may take place inside or outside of marriage. Marriage between persons belonging to two different races can either be called racial intermarriage or, simply, intermarriage. Generally the word 'miscegenation' in English covers both these phenomena, which represents an unrefined way of thinking. Because of the emotionalism attached to this subject the word is sometimes used simply to mean copulation between people who belong to different races. It is in this sense that Myrdal remarks that 'most miscegenation nowadays is probably infertile,' a statement which is totally illogical if one defines the term as we do (but which attests eloquently to Myrdal's degree of Americanisation). Traditionally it has been held that the different nations of Europe have different tendencies towards miscegenation. According to the

common stereotype, the Spanish and Portuguese were great miscegenators, whereas the English and the Dutch were more interested in 'keeping their blood pure'. Much less is said about the French, but sometimes they are held to have been mid-way between. This idea is fairly old, it was mentioned by Tocqueville (26) and also by Gobineau, who did not fail to interpret it in accordance with his own ideology. It appears later on in Anglo-Saxon sources. As early as 1916 one South African, Evans, even went as far as deciding that the tendency to 'mix one's own blood' might be made the acid test for 'race prejudice'. In the 1920's an American named Nash seems to have popularised the idea that the Portuguese were particularly given to miscegenation. This idea was originally much less favourable to the Portuguese than later interpretations would seem to suggest. Originally the idea was that the Portuguese were not entirely white themselves, consequently they did not feel (*vis-à-vis* the so-called inferior races) the same degree of 'race pride' which Northern Europeans were said to feel. And this for the simple reason that they were racially inferior to Northern Europeans. Hence the tendency to dwell on the supposed willingness of the Portuguese to 'mix their blood'. It can be mentioned, incidentally, that Gobineau employed a similar reasoning when he decided that the French colonists in Canada (Bretons!) had not been opposed to 'mixing their blood' with the Indians, because he argued that they had some racial affinities with the latter in the first place. At any rate, the idea that the Portuguese were especially given to miscegenation was taken over by Freyre who interpreted it in a positive light as he believed that this tendency had coincided very nicely with the interests of the Portuguese state in producing a large population of assimilated or semi-assimilated people for Brazil. Later this idea was taken over by Portuguese propagandists who have been using it to defend their country's colonial crimes. Serious scientific thinkers have been wary of it. Magnus Mörner cautions people not to 'confuse the satisfaction of a natural instinct (with) social and aesthetic values' (27) and Boxer, a professor of Portuguese at Cambridge, has in several different works been careful not to support this Portuguese myth:

The Portuguese man was permitted to marry a Negro woman - slave or free, and he did so; considering the great shortage of white women in Angola he was almost forced, if he married at all, to marry a mulatto or (less frequently) a Negro. But from this willingness to marry a coloured woman it does not follow that Portuguese men had no racial prejudice, as is often claimed by modern proponents of this school. (28)

Even sillier is the idea of confusing the question of 'miscegenation' with that of transient copulation between persons of different race. The extent to which this will take place is dependent upon many factors and says nothing about miscegenation in the proper sense because fertility is determined by many other

factors as well. Regarding differential tendencies on the part of white men of different European nations to indulge in transient copulation with non-white women, it is silly to think that aesthetic considerations about the beauty or ugliness of this or that non-white race had anything to do with it. If it really can be proven that there are different tendencies in this regard, such could probably be better explained by many other factors than this one. Many of the white men who 'mixed their blood' in transient relations with non-white women were sailors whose profession necessitated long periods of sexual abstinence. In previous centuries it was a two months' journey to Brazil and three months' to the Cape (to Indonesia was another three months). We find it hard to believe that a sailor who had been forced into abstinence for two or three months would under any conditions decline to copulate with the first non-white woman he could get his hands on simply because of some aesthetic reservations about her beauty. The distinction between the two extremes (the Iberian peoples and the Northern European ones) with regard to 'miscegenation' has sometimes been interpreted in cultural or quasi-racial terms as a dichotomy between 'Latins' and 'Teutonics', sometimes in religious terms as a dichotomy between Catholics and Protestants. In the United States some people once seriously believed that Protestants, being 'puritans' or 'Puritans', may have had stronger tendencies to shy away from copulating with non-white women and the lack of 'miscegenation' may have resulted from this. Our own extensive reading of the Dutch materials convinces us that there is no empiric basis for the contention that the Dutch copulated with non-whites of any type any less than any other Europeans would or could have been expected to. In the Ultramarine the Dutch seem to have been as equally debauched as the Portuguese were in Brazil - if this really be so much to a nation's credit as Freyre and his school would seem to think. In one of the Dutch sources we came across a charming anecdote which, we feel, outdoes anything that the Luso-tropico-mystics could come up with. The governor of Surinam, one van Sommelsdijk, having pacified the so-called Bush-Negroes (i.e. maroons of the interior), came to a peace-agreement with them, but the latter refused to consider the agreement as final until he had married one of their wives (as was their custom). Van Sommelsdijk took her as a concubine and long after his death she was still left living in the governor's residence in Paramaribo. Certainly the most flabbergasting defence of miscegenation is found in an anti-abolitionist pamphlet of one Jacobus van der Smitsen, published in Amsterdam in 1849. This character consistently refers to Negroes as 'natuurgenoten' and makes the bald claim that they originally had no sexual morality but were gradually learning some, thanks to the blessings of slavery, one of which was extra-marital miscegenation (the logic!). His

argumentation was, inter alia, that slavery had its positive aspects, one of which was that the whites were miscegenating with the slaves, thus improving their race. He speaks of the 'edification of posterity, including that of the primitive man, towards higher perfection' (opleiden van de nakomelingschap, ook van de natuurmensen, tot hoger volmaking), or about the gradual betterment of the Negroes who were becoming 'from generation to generation increasingly susceptible to higher morality' (van geslacht tot geslacht steeds voor hoger zedelijkheid vatbaar) because they were being whitened. The following excerpts speak for themselves.

One has only to go through the history of our colony in order to judge if - with regard to the illicit intercourse between Europeans and the slave-women - the conditions obtaining in the colony could have been otherwise, or if they should have been otherwise, and (see) if one cannot discern herein the hand of Divine guidance, whereby - in nature in general, as well as with human beings - the crossing of widely separated races of the same species cannot be put to work in the production of a nobler race of men.

Two causes contributed to this during the colonial settlement, firstly forced labour and secondly mixing with the nobler race. The latter helped to soften the oppression of slavery for the slave. It made him love the master, whose yoke had imposed an odious coercion on him, as well as to fear him. Illicit relations, far from being immoral or degrading for the so far lower standing human being raised the slave-woman in the eyes of her no more civilised fellows and was an honour for her to be the concubine (bijzit) of the European and to have a posterity which traced its origins to a European progenitor. Any why should it be otherwise than because she was imbued with a natural feeling that in this way her posterity was maturing for higher civilisation? And was this feeling any different from that which is depicted in mythology in the union of superior beings with humans, which is always portrayed as illicit? (29)

As to the tendencies of persons of English stock to copulate with non-whites, we are not in a position to speak authoritatively, but until some pedant produces convincing evidence to the contrary, we draw the conclusion that it was probably not very different. After all, if disorderly and promiscuous sexual exploitation of non-whites is evidence of 'freedom from race prejudice', then Orlando Patterson's *Sociology of Slavery* would seem to indicate that the white trash which worked on the Jamaican plantations in the 18th century was the least race-prejudiced group of people history has ever recorded. We could further mention the history of one John Dunn, a low-grade white trader in Natal in the last century. He had become friendly with the Zulu, was eventually admitted into their tribe, was made a chieftain and spent the remainder of his life amidst a harem appropriate to his position. The local bishop, the Bible-scholar John William Colenso, was greatly scandalised by this and futilely tried to get the authorities to ban Dunn. At one point he approached Dunn with Christian admonitions to solemnise his bonds with one of the wives and get rid of the rest, whereupon Dunn cited the well-known fact that the Old Testament contains

any number of patriarchs who had more than one wife.

Documents from all Dutch colonial possessions with the exception of South Africa show that legal marriage between persons of different race, or permanent illegal unions (equated in some respects in Dutch law), were not less common than in Brazil but probably more common for the simple reason that there were fewer white women. At the Cape it was by no means unusual during the Dutch period. We have elsewhere mentioned the institution known as 'huwelijk op zijn Surinaams'. (30) In Indonesia such intermarriage was the rule. There is no case of any Dutch family-line in Indonesia which could be traced back more than one or two generations in the country without some intermarriage. Strictures against such intermarriage were generally based on religion and if this disparity was removed there was no great inhibition about it. At one time there were strictures of a more interesting character. From the first half of the 17th century Godée-Molsbergen quotes an ordinance from Batavia discouraging such intermarriage, which might appear at first glance to be an instance of 'race prejudice', but let us wait and listen to the reasoning. 'And thus,' the preamble reads, 'as we are informed that the afore-mentioned Portuguese language is very much increasing, because many Netherlanders come to marry native women who understand no Netherlands..,' the ordinance henceforth forbade such marriages until the brides could go before a commission on marriage matters and give evidence of sufficient knowledge of Dutch. (31) At the Cape there were some marriages between white men and manumitted slave women, even though not that many. When whites had children by slave-women, they often bought the children and the mother free. One man in the 17th century even bought his mother-in-law free from the slave-lodge. Many of these baptised and manumitted slave-women were married to white men and were on an equal footing with the white colonists. The only prohibitions on intermarriage in Curacao occur between 1758 and 1781 and simply stated that Christians could not marry 'savage women' or 'black-ies' before the latter had been properly instructed and baptised. (32) As early as 1698 and 1699 the marriage records in Surinam record the marriages of white men to a 'young maiden of Gaudeloupe' or a 'young maiden of St. Thomas Island', which are obvious references to manumitted slave-women. (33) If it can be shown that the English did not intermarry or permanently cohabit with non-white women in their colonies to the same extent, it most probably is due to other factors than 'race prejudice'. Discussions of this matter often ignore the important factor of the different proportions of the races in the general population. One reason why Anglo-Saxons may have had a low frequency of miscegenation in the Ultramarine is that they have tended to colonise sparsely-populated continents inhabited by aboriginal peoples that were particularly primitive. Furthermore, outside of miscegenation with Negroes in slave-colonies

there was, in fact, miscegenation between Anglo-Saxons and non-whites in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and even Australia. If there appears to be little evidence of this nowadays it is really because these lines have whitened themselves out in succeeding generations and disappeared into the white population. Furthermore the proportions of whites to non-whites was always relatively high in the Anglo-Saxon colonies, hence there were fewer non-whites to miscegenate with. Claims made in earlier English-language sources that the Anglo-Saxons did not 'mix their blood' with women of the so-called inferior races to the same extent as, say, the Portuguese result from nothing but prudishness. In such racist countries as South Africa one can meet people who like to claim that they are not sexually attracted to non-white women, but nobody in his right mind should take such talk seriously. The act of interfornication is criminalised, it is also considered scandalous and sordid, hence the tendency of people to claim that they would not be interested in indulging in it under any circumstances. Remarks of this sort are simply not to be taken seriously. In earlier generations (and even at present to a certain extent) miscegenation was considered 'dirty' in the Anglo-Saxon mind, which probably best explains the exaggeratedly sweeping statements to the effect that Anglo-Saxons 'do not mix their blood'. Toynbee may also be responsible for popularising this belief as he has generally leaned to the theory that the Northern European or 'Teutonic' peoples have greater 'race prejudice'.

A good deal of the miscegenation which occurred during slavery occurred between the slave-owners (or their white employees) and the subjugated slave population. Slavery no doubt leads to a certain amount of promiscuity between the two categories, though hardly for the reasons generally advanced. First of all, relationships of dependence lead to sexual exploitation. Excessive amounts of wine, women and song have always been among the extra emoluments of those who rule over others. Consequently excessive degrees of alcoholism, syphilis and upper-class idiocy have also been among the usual debilities of these classes, thus necessitating a certain circulation of élites. Engels himself remarked that 'the droit du seigneur emphasises *hommage du corps* in the literal sense of the word'. (34) Even lesser forms of dependency such as those between employers and employees often lead to sexual exploitation, for which reason there are, in most European countries, laws against 'fornication with dependents', which is sometimes limited to minor dependents, but otherwise this refers to the sexual exploitation of pupils by school-teachers, shop-girls by shop-owners, and so forth. The same thing has been true of house-servants when and where they existed in Europe. There is a charming passage in *Die Bekenntnisse des Hochstaplers Felix Krull* where the latter begins his sexual career with the house-maid, and the latter was not entirely unwilling because - as Thomas Mann phrased it - 'this in

a certain sense meant a union with the upper-class for her'. (35) In slavery, however, all tendencies in this direction became nothing less than absolute because the slave-owner had the right of sexual disposition over his slaves. Technically this meant that he could order them to mate with each other in order to have children as, incidentally, slave-women were also obliged to bear children for their masters. But he also had the right to force them to have intercourse with himself or with any other white man. Interracial promiscuity was only encouraged by the intimacy in which the two classes of people lived, by which we mean the spatial proximity. The reason why intersexuality declined in frequency after abolition is that the two races then began to live apart from each other. Slave-plantations were all dens of iniquity to some degree or another and in the more disorderly colonies this promiscuity was not simply tolerated by apparently encouraged quite deliberately. (36) Abolitionist propaganda, either in the European countries or in the North of the United States, invariably made much of this (and this explains van der Smissen's remarks above) and in the United States the prevailing view at that time was that it was mainly the masters who had produced their own mulattoes; and abolitionists talked about how common it was that 'the overseer cracks his whip over the backs of the master's half-breed children' and so forth. This was originally done to denigrate the reputation of the slave-owning class depict them as debauched and heartless. The Southerners in later decades countered this by claiming that any eventual mulattoes had either been sired by overseers ('who were generally Northerners' they tell us) or by the Union Army. This right of sexual disposition also explains the great sensitivity always shown in these colonies about white women mating with black men. The same factors which tended to encourage promiscuity between white men and black women also tended to encourage it between white women and black men. Hence it was necessary to develop very strong prejudices, if not actually enact legal measures, against this precisely because the system encouraged it. Just as the white slave-master could legally force a black slave-woman to copulate with him, so the white slave-mistress had the same rights over the black male slave. It was generally held, earlier, that this propensity to 'fornicate with the staff' was in the economic interests of the masters because it could increase his stock. This was alluded to in the quotation from Mentzel (footnote 33) from the Cape and Freyre once claimed the same thing. But we can by no means agree with this. Promiscuity does not necessarily encourage fertility. In Jamaica and Brazil we have definite reason to believe that it had the opposite effect because the excessive promiscuity characteristic of these places spread syphilis among the slaves, which reduced their fertility and damaged their physical condition (which was by no means in the economic interests of the masters). Even without this, there was no need for the master to be his own stud, for in all these places

there was a huge preponderance of men over women among the slaves. There were, furthermore, even weighty economic reasons for not miscegenating. For one thing it was always more common to manumit mulatto slaves than to manumit purely black ones. The Dutch especially did this and, in certain cases, this was obligatory according to law. One reason why the officials in Indonesia and the Cape originally discouraged fornication between freemen (not necessarily whites) and slave-women was that slave-children sired by freemen had to be given their freedom upon reaching a certain age, which did not apply to children sired by slave fathers, who could be held in bondage for their entire life. A possible economic interest in miscegenation might stem from the fact that mulattoes fetched higher prices on the market in some places. Almost universally mulattoes were considered superior from the aesthetic point of view, hence they were often preferred as house-slaves and concubines. On the other hand, breeding slaves who were too light was not in the economic interests of the master, because the lighter a slave was, the easier his chances of escaping and passing himself off as a freeman. In the United States the presumption of slave-status was against the black man, but in favour of a white man. In one case it would appear that masters deliberately encouraged the production of lighter slaves for economic reasons. The writer of a pamphlet, published at the Cape in 1828, asserted that, as slaves of mixed blood were more valuable than the rest, masters encouraged the intercourse of slave-women with whites, the writer mentioning the case of one master who employed an Irishman 'for no other purpose than to improve his stock' (cum grano salis).⁽³⁷⁾ This was another common point of attack from abolitionists, namely that the slave-owners were mistreating and even selling their own flesh and blood. Longfellow's poem 'The Quadroon Girl' is a typical example of abolitionist propaganda. Analogously the manumission of half-raced children by slave-owners was generally looked upon as an act of decency on his part, or 'atoning for his sins' in the terminology of the time. This was particularly true in Surinam where mulatto sons, at least, were generally provided for, educated and settled in some urban occupation in Paramaribo, sometimes even sent to Holland. This was the custom of both the Reformed and the Israelite plantation-owners.

If we look at the first 'anti-miscegenatory' ordinances and laws from the period of slavery, we will quickly see that they were not, in fact, based on any 'racist' premisses. Nowadays interfornication is forbidden and criminalised in South Africa in order to prevent the production of mixed issue. But during the days of slavery, ordinances against interfornication did not have this purpose, as is seen from their construction. A possible exception is the Cape ordinance of 1685 which, as already explained, tried to stop habits which were economically inconvenient to the O.I.C. and the private slave-owners. Otherwise religious motives may have been behind this. In 1699 a case occurred in a Dutch factory on the

Western Coast of Africa where a 'mestizo Christian maiden' ('mestizo' probably means quadroon) was impregnated by an African employee of the company who was a 'heathen'. The latter was punished, the motivation reading 'it being an abominable thing for a heathen to mix with a Christian, and it violates Divine and human laws...and should be punished as a deterrant and example for others'. (38) Here it was a question of a 'heathen' and a Christian woman and - nota bene - the latter was not entirely white. As early as 1630 one unfortunate Englishman in Virginia was 'soundly whipped before an assembly of Negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonour of God and shame of Christians by defiling his body in lying with a Negro.' (39) In such cases it is not clear what laws or ordinances were invoked, if any, and it would seem that the motives may merely have been religious prejudices about fornication between Christians and 'heathens'. Furthermore slavery is not directly important in these instances. In 1685 the Cape government issued an ordinance forbidding freemen to fornicate with the Company's slave-women, something which is invariably cited by the adherents of apartheid as attesting to the age of their 'South African traditions', but such is not the case for this ordinance had nothing to do with race. 'Freemen' did not necessarily mean 'white' and at that time the majority of the freemen in Cape Town were probably not white in our sense of the word, in fact the very governor who issued this ordinance was not a pure white man. Outside of the economic reasons already mentioned, it would appear that this ordinance was issued because such fornication was becoming a public scandal, and also for reasons of discipline. The prevention of mixed issue is not necessarily the main consideration here, and, at any rate, it has nothing to do with 'race' as the categories to which it applied were legally and not racially defined. And neither did they correlate with any racial categories. In Surinam the first plantation code of 1686, that of van Sommelsdijk, prohibited 'all inhabitants' from commingling with 'Negresses or free Indian women' or from committing 'carnal conversation' with them, but the wording suggests that this ordinance was more interested in preventing such fornication with the free Indian women. Furthermore it did not prevent slave-owners from 'fornicating with the staff' and, at any rate, the ordinance was never observed. (40) An ordinance of 1711 held that a white woman having intercourse with a Negro would be tortured and bannished from the colony, and that a married woman offending would also be branded. For the black partner in such crimes the penalty was to be death. The wording indicates that this was the result of several recent scandals in the colony, two white women having given birth to mulatto babies. (41) This would now qualify as a race-law because it is not here a question of slaves and free, but of black and white. Other sources indicate that a few crossings between black men and white women had occurred in the history of the colony, but we do not know when or under

what circumstances. (42) Later on in the 18th century ordinances were enacted forbidding manumitted persons to marry or fornicate with slaves, even providing for re-enslavement in cases of habitual offence. Again this is not a race-law, the purpose being to keep the free coloured and the slave population away from each other in order to prevent collusion. The free coloured population was even forbidden to attend dances on the plantations. The slave-code of 1761 expressly prohibited 'all inhabitants, employees of plantations as well as artisans, no-one excluded, under any conditions to commingle with slave-women,' which wording again suggests that it could not be applied to the masters. (43) This ordinance was apparently never interpreted as meaning that the slave-owners or their representatives could not do what they wanted with their slaves and in 1784 the wording was changed to read 'if disorders arise herefrom'. These laws simply tried to prevent outsiders from making improper use of slaves and to keep the urban population and the transient sailors off the plantations. After all, slaves are somebody's property, and just as one may not ride around on another man's horse without his permission, one may analogously not ride his slave-woman either. At any rate it is hard to discern any 'racist' motives in all these ordinances, with the important exception of the ordinance prohibiting intersexuality between black men and white women, an act which very early came to be stringently prohibited. This prohibition fully qualifies as 'racist'. (44) In the 18th century the laws of Virginia tried to prevent such by enacting that a white woman bearing a mulatto child would forfeit it to the parish which could then sell it into bondage for a period of thirty years. This is interesting because the wording suggests that it could also be a free white woman, in which case slavery was slowly becoming dependent, not upon the condition of the mother, but on a multilinear reckoning of descent. It is, however, not clear if this is a pure case, for the mulatto child would have to be manumitted after thirty years', which would not have been the case with the child of a slave woman. The first prohibition on intermarriage that we know of comes from Virginia in 1705 where it was enacted that racial intermarriage be forbidden and that clergymen performing the ceremony be put into prison, with the motivation: 'for a further prevention of that abominable and spurious issue, which hereafter may increase in this Her Majesty's colony and dominion, as well as by English and other white men and women intermarrying with negroes or mulattoes as by their unlawful coition with them...' This shows that the racial system in Virginia crystallised at a very early stage for we have all the classic marks here. The ordinance legally equated Negroes and mulattoes and said nothing about slaves, implying that this also applied to such as were free. Furthermore it would seem to apply to such white men and women as were indentured servants at the time, although this latter matter is much less clear. (45) This 'spurious issue' which they

were trying to prevent was all the more dangerous because it could also be legitimate. In Surinam things were more complicated. The first case we hear about occurred in 1764. A certain free Negress named Elizabeth Samson was a plantation-owner and slave-owner with an annual income of at least fl. 80,000. It is surmised that she was the concubine of a Sephardic planter who had manumitted her and left her his fortune. At any rate in this year she, being fifty years old, appeared before the Commission on Marriage Matters with a thirty-year-old organist in the Reformed church by the name of Polycarpus Brabandt. But the commissioners seemed to remember that governor van Sommelsdijk had forbidden such marriages and referred the case to the Court of Policy. Its members, in turn, were so undecided that they decided to refer the matter to the Society of Surinam in Amsterdam, but they advised against permitting the request. 'Reasons for disallowing such a marriage are that it is repugnant and abhorrent and most highly shameful for a white man that he enter such a marriage, be it from misplaced lust or for food (i.e. from economic necessity), as such has always been despised here. It is also certain that we are favoured by a feeling that the Negroes have of our preëminence over them, that we are members of a better and nobler nature (sic, the word 'race' was not the current in the language) than they, and living in the midst of such a false and foul sort we must assert ourselves with our essential power and what will they think of that excellent nature (i.e. race) when they see that they need only be free in order to ally themselves with us through a solemnised bond of matrimony and that their children will thus be pair à compagnon with ours. Should the lacheusiteit (? loosenes or cowardice?) of whites who degrade themselves not be criticised?' They also felt that her money would eventually pass over to the whites, which they felt would be good because there should not be too many rich and powerful people among the free coloured, 'because this alone gives our slaves an idea that they can clime as high as we can. This Elizabeth Samson, leaving her property to her family, it will remain among Negroes...' This, in their opinion was a reason for allowing the marriage, but it was out-weighed by other objections, one of which was that this example might make people more apt to accept mixed marriages between black men and white women, something which they referred to as 'naturally incestuous' and they thus declared themselves against the marriage and asked the directors in the Netherlands to agree to laws forbidding such a thing in the future. She also carried appeal to the directors who, being Europeans and not understanding a slave-society very well, simply found that there was no legal impediment to such a marriage and ordered its solemnisation. Consequently in 1766 she married another white man - the first pretender seems to have died in the mean time - and in 1773 another white man married into her family. Her whole family seems to have been socially equal to the white planters

for they were very rich. (46) In the Dutch colonies, in general; marriage was only prohibited between free and slave, including between free blacks and black slaves, but never between free whites and free blacks. Most of these laws were not, therefore, race-laws and attempts to enact legal measures based on race met with the opposition of the directors in the Netherlands who could not understand the social ideology of such a society and/or who had no reasons for encouraging these tendencies. Both intermarriage between white men and free coloured women and free associations between the same categories were encouraged by the fact that there were always more women than men among the free coloured, and the free coloured were always more plentiful than the free whites. In Surinam the prevention of mixed descendants may not have been a very important concern as regards the free population because this preponderance of coloured women over coloured men in the free population resulted from the fact that these women were often manumitted slave-women over the age of forty who could no longer bear children (which is why they were manumitted). In Jamaica racial intermarriage per se was never forbidden, although there seem to have been definite social strictures against it. (47)

In a certain sense we can say that the race-system with its legal prevention of intermarriage and interfornication does not arise until after slavery has been destroyed, but the first signs of its coming can be seen towards the end of the period of slavery. It is here that mixed issue becomes a disturbing factor, hence the prejudices about the 'bad mulatto' which appear very late, only in the 19th century. Earlier colonial and slave-societies very definitely preferred mulattoes, and all available documentation leaves no doubt but that the latter were preferred by the whites to pure Negroes. These societies were highly unjust in our terms, and some of these countries still have primitive and unjust social structures, but they also contained (or contain) two peoples within the same population, originally because the difference between the free and the slaves was so great. But the two groups are not inhabitants of two parts of the same country as is the case in Belgium or Czechoslovakia, but were interspersed without being mixed. Sooner or later these populations will mix and miscegenation, especially where it occurs very early in slavery, facilitates this natural process. What was (or is) needed is a bridge or intermediate group which is the logical place to start unification of the two groups at a later stage of development. The mulatto or mestizo or 'toepas' (in Indonesia) was the logical place to start. The mulatto and the quadroon are, within the very terms that the system establishes, its own negation, hence in the long run a threat to the sharp distinctions which the system strives to impose. The legislators of racial orders realise this, hence after a while they begin to forbid the production of new persons of mixed race. The equation of

persons of mixed race with those of pure inferior race is another way of trying to stop the dissolution of the system by hiding its negation.

3.4. The Development of the Race System within the Framework of Slavery

The system starts with some considerable social distance between the two groups, freemen and slaves. This social distance was greater than any such distance in Europe at the time, not because equality was the rule in Europe but simply because the absence of slavery as an institution made any inequality of this degree impossible. Where foreign lands were colonised without much slavery, social distance between whites and non-whites was much less, and the same was true in places where another non-white but non-enslavable group was present (with regard to this latter group). This social distance derived, not from 'prejudice' but from very concrete legal distinctions between these two categories of persons and it is almost unintelligible to us in modern terms and its effects can hardly be underestimated. 'One of the reconciling features of slavery is the fact that it raises white men to the same general level, that it dignifies and exalts white men by the presence of the lower race'. (48) Originally, however, things were more complex as there existed persons in a type of servitude and these were known as indentured servants in the Anglo-Saxon colonies and degradados in Brazil and forcés in the French possessions. In the Dutch colonies this confusing factor was not present. These people were sentenced to transportation and servitude for a certain period, generally without the right to return to the Metropolitan, but their period of servitude was generally much shorter in the French colonies (maximum three years) than in the Anglo-Saxon countries where it sometimes went up to seven years (almost the average lifetime of a slave). These servants could be transferred from master to master but it would appear that they possessed legal capacity, hence they were never on the same level as the African slaves. Theoretically, at least, everyone in Europe was endowed with legal capacity except for minors and imbeciles and it does not appear to us that courts of law, in those centuries, could, within the framework of their respective legal systems, sentence people to the deprivation of such legal capacity. It is hard to judge what the reality was in practice for sources are not entirely clear on this point; but as regards the Anglo-Saxon colonies they do not indicate that these indentured servants lacked any legal capacity. Hence they were never on the same footing with the Negroes. Plantation-slavery was introduced into these countries for pressing economic reasons and also in imitation of the Spanish and Portuguese (whose legal system provided for the enslavement of white people as well), who had utilised it before them and who had also started the slave-trade. Originally the slave-system was very underdeveloped

in the Anglo-Saxon and Dutch colonies and there was considerable uncertainty as to the legal status of the slaves vis-à-vis other groups in the population. Eventually, however, the rule grew up that only blacks were enslavable. There were different justifications for this, one being that they were not Christians, another being that they were already in this condition when first purchased by Europeans. The right of Europeans to enslave free people for reasons of religion was disputed by European jurists and theologians and, in fact, was eventually rejected. The Indians in the United States, Brazil and Surinam could not be enslaved legally, although a few were in practice. The real reasons for this were partially strategic. It was inadvisable to enslave the aboriginal population of the country; anyway they did not make very good slaves and a huge supply of Africans was available. Originally the European-born subjects of European states could not be enslaved, for there was no provision in English, Dutch or French law for any such thing. The fact that there was a provision for such enslavement in Spanish and Portuguese law and that it was not applied either shows very eminently the real reason, namely that such a policy of enslaving white people would have led to disorganisation and other undesirable consequences in the interior of European society. Furthermore it is doubtful that such a huge supply of slaves could ever have been obtained from Europe without damaging the European countries from which they would have had to be taken, hence these states did not try to enslave their own native populations for work on slave-plantations and analogously they did not try to enslave other Europeans. White slaves would have been harder to control. It is often pointed out that indentured servants or forcés were also used but, but their numbers were few when compared to the African slaves. Europe simply did not have any excess population of the size necessary to provide for the settlement of the Ultramarine in those centuries. In addition it can be pointed out that this system, for the first fifty years or so, would never have been profitable if one had used white people from Europe as slaves. The cheapness of Negro labour resulted from the fact that an almost inexhaustible supply of adult male Negroes could be easily stolen or cheaply purchased from Africa. The cost of producing the slaves and maintaining them until they were old enough to be good labour were borne by the African peoples from whom they were purchased or stolen. As European subjects of these states could not be enslaved, their white descendants in the colonies could not be enslaved either. The European countries were very cautious not to allow the reintroduction of slavery into Europe, not even when the slaves were Negroes. Even allowing the enslavement of whites in the colonies might have reextended itself to the Metropolitan. If whites from Europe could be enslaved it would have led to conflict among European nations for each other's populations. At any rate there was no huge supply. Furthermore, if the whites living in the colonies

had been enslavable they would have been much harder to control. Fear of being enslaved would have been a serious threat to their security and might have driven them to desperation. As it was, they were hard enough to rule from such a distance and it is no coincidence that in most of these colonies there was much greater 'freedom of opportunity' than in bad Old Europe and the white colonists were given much more rope than they would have gotten away with in the Metropolitan.

This undoubtedly led to a group-egoistic attitude on the part of the non-enslavable inhabitants of the colonies. For the real distinction, with the passage of time, was not between free and slave, but between enslavable and non-enslavable. Pirenne has pointed to a similar group-egoistic attitude on the part of the bourgeoisie in the mediaeval cities. 'Whatever the difference and even the contrasts which wealth establishes among men, all are of equal civil status. Die Stadtluft macht frei, says a German proverb and this truth was observed in all climes. Freedom was of old the monopoly of the nobility; the common man did not enjoy it except by way of exception. With the cities it reassumes its place in society as a natural attribute of the citizen. It suffices henceforth to reside permanently on urban soil in order to attain it.' (49) He then points out that this feeling of equality towards the interior went with all sorts of crass egoistic attitudes towards the exterior, particularly towards the rural districts which these cities often controlled, as well as towards the world in general. He mentions several Flemish and Italian cities and we can add an even better example, namely that of Visby on the island of Gothland. The same attitude is seen in the colonies, except that it does not grow up against the background of declining serfdom, but against the background of an ascending slave-system. This led to egalitarian but group-egoistic attitudes on the part of the non-enslavable towards the free-but-enslavable and the slaves. It also led to the same attitudes towards authority and the Metropolitan in Europe. Almost all colonies had unsavoury reputations for rebelliousness and disobedience or 'greater opportunities for freedom' as the Americans like to call it. This group-egoistic attitude on the part of the embryonic bourgeoisie in the mediaeval cities was the clarion of a progressive development, it restored the ideal of freedom for all members of society, even though the class which produced this revolutionary ideal could never fulfil it. In the so-called 'New World' it was part of a retrogression into a type of inhuman barbarity long since surpassed in the bad 'Old World'. This is the difference, although it is not necessarily the fault of the peoples who settled these countries, rather of conditions which they neither understood nor controlled. The rise of the bourgeoisie brought freedom to the Metropolitan to an extent theretofore unknown, but the rise of this bourgeoisie also brought the slave-trade and plantation-slavery to many of the colonies, laying the foundations for a race system later on. Pas d'antagonisme, pas de progrès!

Originally miscegenation took such forms as to make slavery dependent on a racially reckoned ancestry (multilineal ancestry). Slaves could not marry, hence miscegenation with slaves was via extramarital fornication. White men were allowed greater freedom in this because men are always allowed greater freedom. In the case of the slaves (originally black) this had no relevancy. They were slaves, hence they stood outside the system of marriage and consanguinity. As they could not marry all their procreation was extramarital. In a crossing between a white man and a slave-woman a mulatto slave was produced, a person who followed his mother's slave status according to the rule of 'partus ventrem sequitur'. Similarly the mating of a white man with a mulatto slave-woman produced a quadroon who was also legally a slave. Sources sometimes mention (from the United States, but at a very late date) that there were slaves who were almost, or completely, indistinguishable from pure whites. Nature made its contribution to the system's development. A black man was easily identifiable by his unchangeable physical traits and this made it harder for him to escape his slave-status. A white or near-white slave could. The presumption in American law was originally based on appearance (as it is in South African law at present). Because of the great difference in status and because of the great fear of the slave masses, it was desirable to draw a line and this led to tendencies to separate white and free coloured as well. This was not done so much out of 'prejudice' against free blacks and mulattoes rather it was done out of fear of the consequences which any other policy might have had on the slaves. The system attempted to imprint upon their minds the idea that whites are superior and free and Negroes doomed to eternal servitude. The fact that their posterity was also doomed to the same thing only tended to increase the impression in everybody's mind that this whole arrangement was natural. The vast majority of the slaves probably accepted this order as natural in its time, just as the vast majority of the victims of any unjust social order accept their status as natural over long periods of time, just as our ancestors once thought that their condition of oppression was natural. But furthermore the policy of elevating the mulatto slightly over the Negro increased the tendency of the slaves to look upon white people as superior. Negro slaves, like certain 18th-century philosophers followed their natural human instincts to look upon the extant as the natural (or the 'real as rational'). In the beginning of this process it was far from certain on which side the mulatto would fall and this depended on different circumstances in different places. Inter-marriage, inter-fornication and manumission of mulattoes were all quite common in the beginning. Originally slaves once manumitted could not be enslaved again, but the legal system was very vague on this point. In the early years many of these manumitted Negro slaves apparently achieved full legal and social equality and could also own

blacks as slaves. (vide now the story of Elizabeth Samson in Surinam). But, as time went on, restrictions against manumission appeared for a variety of reasons and eventually possibilities were introduced for the re-enslavement of manumitted slaves, especially for debt, vagrancy or crime. Eventually in some places this was then extended to the free-born non-whites, hence the system shifted from being one of legal status to being one of race (multilineally reckoned biological ancestry). In the Anglo-Saxon colonies a black was presumed to be a slave, hence a manumitted slave always ran the risk of being falsely claimed by some white as his run-away slave, and the burden of the proof that he was manumitted was on the black. Equiano tells how he narrowly escaped this fate himself on one occasion. We generally see that the position of the freeman of colour (often a mulatto or quadroon) worsens as slavery draws to its conclusion and this occurs in a variety of different countries. The most extreme example was Haiti where severe discriminations against mulattoes only start after 1750, and it was just such free mulattoes who started the revolt which ended in independence. In the United States free coloureds were not, in fact, citizens and were subjected to all sorts of discriminations, legal and social (50). In certain places these tendencies were only accelerated by more transient causes, thus tendencies towards a deterioration in the legal status of free coloureds in Louisiana coincided with the annexation of that colony by the 'Land of the Free'. However, the fate of the mulatto was never entirely certain. In certain places, such as Cuba, a slave-owning class of mulattoes arose early enough and was sufficiently large, thus frustrating attempts to bring this system to its logical conclusions.

The same system also made non-whites undesirable as marriage partners because children born by them could be enslaved. A white man's children by a white woman were white and therefore not enslavable by law. His children by a free Negress or free mulatress were enslavable in most cases, at least in later years in the United States. At any rate, his descendants would lose their distance to the slave group which he, as a white man, felt. At the Cape marriage between freemen and full-blooded slaves (when manumitted) was eventually forbidden. In the Dutch colonies the distance from the free to the slave population was pushed one generation farther forward by a system which made the following distinctions. A Surinam ordinance of 1775 began to make a distinction between free-born persons of colour and those manumitted as well as between Negroes and mulattoes. A free-born Negro was equated with a manumitted mulatto. The legal hierarchy was thus the following:

1. Free-born Negro, manumitted mulatto, free-born mulatto, free-born quadroon or free-born white man (all equal).
2. Manumitted Negro.
3. Negro slave, mulatto slave (equal). (51)

Here a white was equal to a free-born Negro but not to a manumitted Negro.

Otherwise colour was of no legal significance, except that it should be pointed out that the law made it possible to re-enslave manumitted persons of whatever colour but not free-born persons. Even in places where there was no formal legal distinction, social sensitivity often produced approximately the same results in the unofficial realm. Where the exact borderline was to be drawn in each particular place was something which was dependent upon many different factors. In later generations, particularly after the abolition of slavery, it was a 'touch of the tar-brush' which was abhorred as a reminder of at least some slave ancestry, but originally these distinctions were made to impress the idea of immobility, not on the free coloured so much as on the remaining slave population. This is one reason why these distinctions were totally ignored in the legal systems of the European Metropolitan. All this was rationalised in the minds of people of that century as an 'indelible blemish', a phrase which occurs several times in French documents about 18th-century Haiti.

L'intérêt et la sûreté veulent que nous accablions la race des noirs d'un si grand mépris que quiconque en descend jusqu'à la sixième génération soit couvert d'une tache ineffaçable. (52)

The above appeared in a pamphlet written by a colonist in 1775. The expression appears to go back to a decision of the Minister of the Marine from 1766 justifying certain discriminations in Haiti.

Tous les nègres ont été transportés aux colonies comme esclaves. L'esclavage a imprimé une tache ineffaçable sur leur posterité et par conséquent ceux qui en descendent ne peuvent jamais entrer dans la classe des blancs. S'il était un temps où ils pourraient être réputés blancs, ils pourraient prétendre comme eux à toutes les places ou dignités, ce qui serait absolument contraire aux constitutions des colonies. (53)

Tendencies of this type are to be discerned in the Spanish colonies and in Brazil as well. If it be true, as has been claimed, that Catholicism or 'Spanish humanism' may have alleviated this or checked tendencies in this direction, it did not stop them altogether. Kleir himself mentions discriminations against free blacks and mulattoes which is even more remarkable because in Cuba there existed a slave-owning class of mulattoes.

This social system developments only in the course of time; all sorts of factors influenced it and it only got to its logical conclusions in a few places. Originally the white settlers on foreign shores had to marry non-white women because there were few white women to be had. Generally they tended to marry such non-whites as were not slaves or they manumitted slave-women for the purpose of marrying them. Even much later there was a huge preponderance of men over women in both the free and slave groups. White women seem to have fetched a high price on the marriage market, perhaps because they were rarer, perhaps because they were more expensive (they had to be shipped from Europe), but no doubt aesthetic considerations also influenced this tendency. In all of

these countries there are stories of orphan girls being sent out from the Metropolitan and, quite literally, being snatched up at the boats by their prospective husbands. In Indonesia, where white women were extremely rare, they commanded a high price on the marriage market which, indeed, was their market and they often remarried very quickly after being widowed. In 1621 an O.I.C. servant was refused permission to marry a widow because her former husband had not yet been dead for six weeks (!) and as late as around 1800 we hear further tales of the remarriage of widows within three months. (54) Van der Wall's *Vrouwen uit den Compagnie's Tijd* contains the biographies of well-known colonial women, and invariably they were married several times. In such a society there is no doubt that the better-off whites had a better chance at snatching up the few white women who were to be found. It is sometimes said that the sudden deterioration in the legal position of the mulattoes in Haiti in the 1750's was brought about by the arrival of masses of 'marriage maidens' sent out from the Metropolitan, the explanation being that competition ensued between pure-white but poor girls (orphans) and mulatto women with dowries, supposedly leading to 'intense racial feelings'. (55) This factor continued to have effect even later on, although it was never again as determinative. In the 19th century we have definite evidence from Brazil and the Dutch West Indies that white men and women from Europe were deliberately sought out as marriage partners by creole families that were nervous about the 'tar-brush' or by families that wished to 'whiten the line'. Certainly this factor was operative in the Transvaal towards the turn of the century when there was a huge preponderance of white men over white women in the population.

The racial system only developed by degrees and over the course of time. We can follow its development in different places. Maryland in 1663 enacted that Negroes were enslavable regardless of their status at birth. In 1671 it was declared that conversion to Christianity did not free a Negro slave or change his status in any way. In 1681 it was enacted that children of white servant mothers and Negro slaves would be free, hence the rule of maternal descent (of status) applied here too, which represents a step in the opposite direction. (56) Thus the development was not always logical. In 1663 a law noted that 'diverse free-born English women' had forgotten their status and begun marrying Negroes (slaves), and then enslaved their children. (57) These laws go in the direction of a multilinear determination of status. The same general situation seems to have been arrived at by 1774 in Jamaica. (58) In Virginia we can follow the same development in greater detail. Originally Negro slaves from Africa were treated analogously to indentured servants from England; they were only enslaved for a certain period of time. One step towards

making their servitude permanent was to make life-servitude a punishment for Negro servants who ran away while white servants merely had a certain number of years added to their servitude for the same offence. A testament from 1643 shows that Negro children were valued higher by far than whites, thus leading to the assumption that one pretended to a longer period of servitude in their case, although it is not certain that this necessarily meant for life. The last known case of a Negro being granted his freedom as a former indentured servant occurred in 1773. The word 'slave' first occurs in 1655 in reference to children purchased from the Indians, the first use of 'Negro slave' occurs in 1660. By 1662 slavery seems definitely to have been transferred to posterity: 'Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman shall be a slave or free, Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present grand Assembly, that all children borne in this country shall be held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother...' An act of 1670 provided that 'all servants not being Christians' should be slaves for life, but the act was carefully worded so as not to include Indians. An act of 1682 enacted that persons '...whether Negroes...Mulattoes or Indians, who or whose parentage and native country are not Christian at the time of first purchase of such servants by some Christian, although afterwards, and before such their importation...they shall be converted to the Christian faith...shall be judged, deemed and taken to be slaves...', meaning that conversion was no longer grounds for manumission. Laws from 1668 about the wilful killing of Negroes and the enactment of 1698 that slaves were no longer to be given trial by jury attest to the fact that the slave at this point no longer had any legal personality. In the 17th century Virginia had still had Negro planters, meaning that Negroes as such were not legally unequal to whites if free. By 1670 a law forbids Negroes to purchase white Christian servants and an ordinance of 1680 stated that 'if any negro, mulatto...bond or free, shall at any time, lift his or her hand, in opposition against any Christians, not being negro, mulatto or Indian, he or she offending shall...' be punished, showing that free Negroes or mulattoes were not the legal equals of whites. This is almost a purely racial law because the Indians were distinguished from white Christians. Legal marriage between persons of different race, whatever their legal status, was prohibited by law as early as 1705. At this point Negroes and mulattoes were prohibited from being witnesses at court and in 1723 they were excluded from the right to vote. (59) Thus the system was in flux for some time and by 1723 the system is there with all its usual ramifications. It should, however, be mentioned that this is an extreme case.

The race-system generally developed in the bosom of the slave-system and its original rationale was to prevent mobility. This not only applied to

social mobility but to spatial mobility as well. In all these countries we see that there were definite tendencies for the population to spread out into the interior, to revert to patriarchal and largely self-sufficient, semi-civilised ways of life, especially as cattle-farmers or hunters or trappers. All of these countries were sparsely populated at that time. These disintegrating tendencies necessarily led to a rather primitive level of civilisation. The Afrikaners of the 18th century were much more primitive than is now realised. People went about clothed in sheep-skins or ox-skins, houses had earthen floors smeared with dung, many houses were not permanent (i.e. movable), many had straw roofing, and so forth. The development of an intensive agriculture was only possible with slavery, but slavery only developed where such agriculture was possible, given the climate and the character of the soil (hence slavery in South Africa was less important in the interior). And it was this, and not the ability of blacks to tolerate 'tropical' climates which explains why it developed mainly in warmer climes. It developed really in extremely fertile regions which, of necessity, were warmer.

This system starts with a type of exclusivism tending to hold enslavable non-whites outside of 'society' because they were needed as a labour force. Compulsory slavery was necessary for developing these countries for there was much free land and, if not kept in bondage, slaves would have walked off and occupied their own land. Indeed some did, for in some countries there were 'maroons' with their own settlements, such as the original ones of that name in Jamaica, the Bush-Negroes in Surinam and the Negroes of Palmares in Brazil, and so forth. (60) But these exclusivist tendencies were subject to many different considerations. The reproduction of the white or almost-white (hence non-enslavable) group was dependent upon the presence and fertility of white women and not of white men. The problem was that there were few white women. The white group would have grown too small if white women had been allowed to marry or mate with blacks, for in this way they could not produce white children. The white man originally produced his pure white offspring with his white wife, but he also impregnated black women on the side. These would be slaves and their children would be slaves because they followed the status of the mother, but they were also not pure whites, hence enslavable. For, in addition, they were often enslavable (even when manumitted) because they had been born in bondage. All of this does not mean that these tendencies could be allowed to proceed in this direction to the point of infinity, as the proportions could not become too unreasonable. An excess of slaves over non-slaves favoured the free non-whites for they were needed to help govern the slaves. Even if they were not given full legal and social equality with the pure whites, they were necessary and had to be accommodated. The opposite policy was followed in Haiti with dis-

astrous results for the ruling class. In the British West Indies there appear to have been about ten slaves for every freeman, in the French colonies there were fourteen to one and in Surinam there were 23 slaves to every freeman. The latter figure is not to be confused with the proportion of non-whites to whites, but refers to the legal categories of slave and free. The preponderance of non-whites over whites must have been even more staggering. This is one reason why the Anglo-Saxons were more exclusivist with regard to persons of colour, that is because they could afford to be. Throughout all colonial and imperialist periods England had, in fact, a much greater population to donate to the Ultramarine than any other colonial country and two countries, Portugal and the Netherlands, were unable to provide any population of any size for their colonies. The success of British colonisation in the Ultramarine may be due to the fact that Britannia ruled the waves, but it must also be due in no small measure to the fact that Britain could invest population in these foreign endeavours. But our sociologists draw the conclusion that Anglo-Saxons are invested with greater amounts of this mystic substance known as 'race prejudice'. This also explains why the least tendencies towards such a system are seen in three places, to wit: Indonesia, Mozambique and Angola. In the 19th century, with improved methods of transportation and communication, and with a much larger stock of whites available for the colonies, all European colonial powers began to administer huge territories in Africa. But in the 17th century Indonesia, Angola and Mozambique were the only really large colonies in Africa or Asia. (61) Colonies in the Western Hemisphere had small, often extremely small, aboriginal populations. In the three cases of Indonesia, Mozambique and Angola the European conquerors laid claim to the control of exaggeratedly large areas of land over which they did not, in fact, really exercise control. But the preponderance of the aboriginal inhabitants over the new rulers and their immediate assistants and allies were so fantastic that exclusivism was simply impossible. Hence the legendary 'Luso-tropical' freedom from 'race prejudice' which was exactly paralleled by the Dutch in Indonesia. In the slave colonies of the West, in this period, the free Negro or mulatto was a disturbing factor, but he was also necessary. As time went on and the white population grew proportionately to the non-white population, or the free in proportion to the slave, the free blacks and free mulattoes were still a disturbing factor but they were now much less necessary. This is probably one reason why the American race-system very early became so exclusivist. Before the Civil War slaves made up 57% of the population in South Carolina, 55% in Mississippi, 47% in Louisiana, 45% in Alabama and Florida, 44% of the population in Georgia, 33% in North Carolina, 31% in Virginia, 30% in Texas, 26% in Arkansas, 25% in Tennessee, 20% in Kentucky, 13% in Maryland, 10% in Missouri and only 1.5% in Delaware. Incidentally these figures

clearly show that slavery was in decay. But compare now these figures with those of the West Indian colonies at the height of their economic importance, in the 18th century, and you have the reason why the position of the free coloured was much better there, or why systems which tried to discriminate too severely against the free coloureds ended in disaster. With the decline in the slave population and the decline in the importance of slavery, the position of the free coloureds declined because they were now more expendable. This is when 'systematic colonisation' and 'this is a white man's country' become popular ideals. In the 16th and 17th centuries, or even in the 18th century, no one in his right mind would have professed them - there were simply no European populations of that size available for the colonies. Tendencies towards exclusivism are always modified if the group is too small, as was realised in Antiquity.

But in many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male and female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens. (62)

Therefore in the latter part of the 18th century in most places this tendency can be observed because the white population was beginning to become too insignificant in proportion to the slave population; the opposite happens in Surinam because the proportions were already pressed to the limit. In the 1780's the governor-general, Wichers, was faced with the problem of absenteeism and emigration to Europe because of the financial crisis which ended the golden era of the colony and he began to think of admitting more coloureds to fill the gap. He therefore issued an ordinance saying that mulattoes born of white masters by slave-women would have to be set free. We see here again that this idea, that persons whose fathers were free were entitled to freedom (even if illegitimate), begins to reassert itself in the Dutch colonies. Here we must not confuse 'cause' and 'origin'. The origin of this idea lies somewhere in the legal system then employed (Roman-Dutch law), but the idea nevertheless got lost when there was no special need for free coloured population, but as this need re-arose, the idea was re-excavated from its obscurity. The same ordinance ordered that no mestizos born thereafter were to be held as slaves but considered free at birth ('mestizo' in Dutch means a quadroon). Some of these plans came to nothing because the masters were opposed, and also because finances were lacking to recompense the owners, but the problem also became less acute because slaves were thereafter exported from the colony, so that the slave population was cut to a fraction of what it originally had been. (63) In most of these colonies we also see laws enacted tending to stipulate that the proportions of the free and slave population did

not get out of hand. Mostly this was done at the level of the plantation where it was generally the rule that there was supposed to be one overseer for every ten slaves, but this was not generally enforced in Jamaica and Surinam. Elsewhere we also see laws trying to prevent the further importation of Negroes, generally by taxing it, whereas at an earlier stage of development these colonies were so desperate for Negro slaves that they doled out crown land in accordance with the number of slaves imported. By now our discussion of this alludes to problems which we will shortly see appearing at a later stage of the game. Originally the slave population was recruited directly from Africa, the slaves dying without significant offspring after a certain number of years, and then being replaced by fresh ones. Eventually however the natural reproduction of the slave population becomes more and more important, eventually it becomes the only legal source and towards the end of the system the importation of fresh slaves was reduced to a minor detail. In the earlier periods when the general population was also lower, unwieldy proportions between the two groups could be controlled simply by controlling the importation of further slaves and, as slavery obtained in many colonies throughout the whole general area, slaves could be gotten rid of by being sold to a neighbouring colony. As the slave-system decays and is abolished in one colony after another, these possibilities no longer obtained. By that time the recruitment of slaves was almost entirely through the natural increase of the slave population which could not be stopped or discouraged through taxation as could originally the direct importation of slaves from Africa.

Plantation-slavery declined. It had helped to provide the original capital accumulation for the development of European capitalism, but having done this, European capitalists no longer needed it and eventually they became inimical to it. Thus towards the end of the 18th century the more progressive bourgeois economists develop the habit of deprecating slavery as an economic system, pointing to its weaknesses and disadvantages and also depicting the slave-owners as debauched and uncouth parasites. In Marx' writings one can find innumerable remarks running in the same direction. The slave-owners in the colonies and in the South of the United States fought abolition tooth and nail like any other reactionary and declining class but they invariably helped to accelerate their own demise. It appears that, as time went on, an abnormal number of slaves were taken out of important production and put to work in totally parasitic activities and this commences very early - it appears to have exacerbated the economic depression in Surinam in the 18th century (mentioned above) and in both Dutch West Indian colonies one can follow in detail the long and gradual process by which the aristocratic and parasitic habits of the slave-owning class led to their own impoverishment and to the economic decline of their colonies.

By the time of the industrial revolution the fantastic fortunes of West Indian plantations had paled to nothingness when compared with the new industrial fortunes being built up in Europe. It should, however, be pointed out that there is a case known of abolitionism while slavery was still profitable. At one point in 1794 the radical bourgeois of the Convention became so carried away with their own talk about the rights of man that they abolished slavery (64) though it was reinstituted during the Napoleonic era. One reason for the close identification between the radical bourgeois and the slaves in the colonies (besides the fact that slavery was no longer of any use to them) may have been that the word 'slavery' was often used by the bourgeois at that time to refer to their own condition in the 'feudal' period. A coherent abolitionist movement existed in England in the time of George III but seems to have lain dormant during the commotion at the turn of the century. After the Napoleonic Wars this movement arises in all countries having slave-colonies and progressive Europeans tend to voice sympathies with abolitionism. Poets such as Robert Burns and Heinrich Heine wrote poems about slaves, as did Longfellow in the United States. Abolitionism is connected with the name of Wilberforce in England, with the name of a certain Baron van Hoëvell in the Netherlands and with one Schoelcher in France. (65) Nowadays their names are rarely mentioned in history books. Least of all in such books as are used in schools. In the Netherlands and France school-books do not mention the existence of slavery in the erstwhile colonies until it is abolished. Generally all pupils learn about it is the date on which it ceased to exist and is, for most, just another date to learn for exams. The relevant dates are the following. Abolition was enacted in England in 1833 and took effect the following year, it was enacted in France in 1848 and took effect immediately. In the Netherlands it was enacted in 1862 and took effect on the 1st January 1863 (the same day on which the Emancipation Proclamation took effect). In the United States the same thing basically happened, except within the same country. The Northern capitalists derived their original capital accumulation from the slave-system in the Southland and the Caribbean, directly or indirectly, and particularly important was the shipping trade in New England, connected with the slave-trade and commerce in the West Indies, and this even provided the stimulus for a ship-building trade in New England (something which would not otherwise have happened). Furthermore cotton from the South stimulated the textile industry in New England no less than it had done in Old England. However with the passage of time Northern capitalism had long since surpassed Southern slavery, hence it crushed it in a violent civil war. What is significant about abolition in the United States is that the slave-owners were not indemnified in any way and came very close to having their land confiscated as well. (66) It is at the time of the American War of Independence that the first signs of opposition to slavery appear.

At this time most New England states become inimical to this institution and from this period on political life in the United States is dominated by the enmity between New England and the South which grew up on the question of slavery. This original opposition to slavery may have been connected with the popularity of certain ideas about freedom and equality which had been imported to the United States from the more advanced Western European countries. Thus we have the paradox of Thomas Jefferson (originally quite Francophile) who, in certain of his earlier writings threw stones at the British, claiming that they had blocked all colonial attempts to end the slave-trade and even lashing out at the King of England for 'his war against human nature itself'. (67) It is our opinion that at this point Jefferson was really more opposed to the slave-trade than to slavery, but otherwise the paradoxical situation of a slave-owner thinking of abolishing the slave-system might just be due to revolutionary enthusiasm; after all some members of the First Estate also gathered in the Tennis Court to demand the abolition of their own privileges. What, however, is more significant about Jefferson is that these tendencies toward a critical view of the slave-system all fall within his earlier years and in later life he seems to have lost all interest in opposition to slavery, except for one lucid moment when he went on record as saying that he did not think it could last forever. In his later political career he was an agrarian reactionary and, in fact, was only elected to the presidency with the support of the Southern states.

With the fall of slavery we see the race-system emerge as a social phenomenon in its own right.

3.5. Another Model: South Africa

In South Africa's case the situation is somewhat different. The most rebellious Afrikaners were those who lived on the frontier. These people were in conflict with independent non-white tribes as early as the 1780's and their descendants have been in conflict with blacks ever since. They took a hard line about emancipation, vagrancy laws, about the legal status of non-whites, and so forth. They were not slave-owners on the whole. They were also among the most inimical to missionaries. These people moved off from the Cape Colony during the Great Trek and founded the two Boer Republics which are now the two Northern Provinces and they have always been more conservative and more absolute about the colour-bar. For one thing, their entire thinking tends to equate all non-whites. Now the general explanation - and this explanation is accepted both by English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking students of the phenomenon, and also equally by opponents and adherents of apartheid - is that this situation of conflict, especially on the frontier in the old days, gave rise to an exaggerated 'colour consciousness' which is supposed to explain their high degree of 'racism'. We do not

entirely agree with this.

'Race relations' in South Africa began under the most auspicious of all possible circumstances. The country was colonised by the O.I.C. which was generally colour-blind. In the 1690's the colonists were not all that averse to accepting as their governor one Simon van der Stel, whose mother, it seems, was a manumitted slave-woman from Bengal. His son, in turn, later succeeded him in this position. Thus 'colour consciousness' at the time seems to have been about nil. Persons of colour were known to have existed among the free colonists well into the 1700's. Slavery was rather mild and the plantations were extremely small and their slave populations were never great. Absenteeism was unknown. The legal code generally required the manumission of half-castes, of whom there seem to have been many in the beginning. Many of the officials of the Company were not entire white. The Cape was subordinated to Djakarta, whence many of them came. Furthermore the slaves at the Cape were not all Negroes but included a number of Indo-Pakistanis and Indonesians, persons of racial stocks with whom Europeans have always intermarried rather readily. The history of the South Western Cape proceeds more or less along the same lines as that of other plantation-slave societies except that development was somewhat retarded there. The city of Cape Town was largely non-white and largely colour-blind, and about half of the white population lived in it during the Dutch period. In fact the slave-holding areas near Cape Town had a history which did not appreciably differ from that of, say, Curacao. The abolition of slavery in 1834 led to a gradual rapprochement between the whites and the coloureds in this part of South Africa, who were in a very slow process of assimilation for about a hundred years. The Hottentots were pacified very quickly and they were also very quickly assimilated. The older contemporary sources often speak with some admiration of their quick linguistic assimilation. Although their generic name has become a synonym for an uncivilised person in most languages, they got along fairly well with the white colonists and they were economically integrated at a very early date.

But there were other factors which did not bode well for the future. First of all, the economic development of South Africa is highly abnormal in all respects. White settlement started from Cape Town and it happens that the immediately surrounding area is good agricultural land. Nevertheless, the greatest part of South Africa's present territory is made up of earth which is relatively poor and the water-supply is insufficient and unreliable everywhere. This huge land was originally settled from Cape Town by a monopolistic mercantilistic company which distorted the economy by setting prices and the people in the interior had no other economic outlet than the ships in Cape Town. Grain and wine were exported to Indonesia, otherwise the only industry for export was meat for the ships. This is one reason why farmers in the interior reverted to a self-sufficient

patriarchal economy. An excellent illustration of the distorted conditions in this economy lies in the following figures. As early as 1673 there were farmers with herds of 600 sheep, in 1682 there were farmers with over 1000 head of sheep, in 1689 there was one with 2,600 and in 1697 one Henning Huising reported his stock of sheep at 5,300. These are all underestimates as the farmers were taxed on the size of their flocks and did not report the correct totals. It should be pointed out that flocks of this size would have been considered a fortune at that time in Europe, but they were no fortune at the Cape and these farmers were generally poor. The reason for this was that they had only one outlet for their products and the price was controlled by the Company. In 1710 the colony, then hardly over sixty years old, contained a population of 131,000 sheep and 20,000 cattle which fell on a human population of only 656 adult males. This means 2000 sheep and 30 head of cattle per family, again showing the same tendency.

(70) The population began to grow after 1700 and there was a tendency to leave agriculture and turn to animal-farming and consequently the population was pushed off into the interior very quickly. Land-holding (right of use) was recognised by the Company for a pittance and this immediately led to a very large average farm-size. An extremely small population thus extended over a huge expanse of land. The myth has grown up about the Afrikaans people that they have always tended to be highly independent. This is a joke. They had little need of civilisation, but they had great need of labour. With 6000 sheep the farmer and his immediate family can hardly cope with all the work. The need of labour for animal-farming is exacerbated in South Africa because land is poor and hence the animals must graze apart. Because the water-supply is so unreliable, they are also forced to move around. Seasonal migration was normal. All this only increased the farmers' dependence on outside labour. In other colonies the aboriginal inhabitants were of very little use to the white invaders, consequently persons imported from outside were always used on slave-plantations. The Indians in the United States were scarce and the attempts of the Spanish and the Portuguese (or for that matter of the Anglo-Saxons) to enslave Indians were not very successful. The difference, however, lies in something else. Imported slaves, especially Negro ones, have generally been used on slave-plantations, but wherever we see cattle-farming, it is mainly the aboriginal inhabitants who have been used as the labour-force. In the Western Hemisphere this meant Amerindians; in South Africa it meant Hottentots. The Afrikaners, however, had started with traditions of slavery in the Western Cape. They took legal possession or factual possession of land with small populations of non-whites on it or near it. As Hottentot society collapsed under the impact of white settlement and they lost their cattle, they thus became dependent upon employment with the farmers. These Hottentots were now pressed into service in a type of economic dependence which

was later developed more logically in the Transvaal. The Hottentots were legally a foreign nation in the eyes of the O.I.C. and consequently not subject to it directly. This motivated against them in the long run, for they could not establish legal title to the land. The white population was extremely small. In 1679 there were 259 colonists (87 men, 55 women and 117 children - nota bene the sex and age structure!). In 1703 there were 1,652 colonists (571 men, 280 women, 349 boys, 363 girls and 89 male servants). In 1706 the total population was 1,736, in 1742 it was 3,806, in 1770 it was 8,088 and in 1793 13,830 and in 1805 it was only 25,757. (71) This refers to the number of people classified as colonists or 'burgers', not all of whom were white. Perhaps the majority of them were white people, but otherwise we do not know how to interpret these figures for they were not collected or sifted on a racial basis or in accordance with current concepts of 'white' and 'non-white'. The Hottentots were basically shepherds and worked for food and clothing (perhaps some tobacco) for the farmers. Hardly any cash circulated in the interior and the economy was very primitive. Their position was not that easy to distinguish from that of slavery, and it appears that the Afrikaners have never really understood the difference between slavery and other forms of dependent labour, at least as far as concerns non-whites. This goes back to their heritage of slavery from the more settled districts of the Western Cape. Even today an Afrikaans farmer basically looks upon non-whites as having been put on earth to work for some white or other. This was elsewhere alluded to in discussing the novel Boplaas. (72) There exists at present a law from 1967 according to which all coloured males between the ages of 18 and 24 have to register, and those not in permanent employment are put in 'training'. This is nothing but an old apprenticeship law of the type obtaining in South Africa in the beginning of the 19th century and in Europe at the beginning of the 18th century. (73) The custom early developed (it eventually became law) of a type of 'apprenticeship' on non-white labour to farmers. These tendencies all began in the Western Cape and they started upon a basis of Hottentot labour. There, in the old days, there were slave-owning agricultural farmers who also made use of Hottentots as 'apprentices'; as one went further afield into the interior one found more animal-farming and less agriculture, less slaves and more Hottentots until one got to the very frontier where there were very few slaves. The distinction between slaves and Hottentots was also partially erased because of miscegenation. The original population had about six slave-men to every slave-woman and there were thus many crossings between slaves and Hottentots. There was also some miscegenation between the white colonists and the Hottentots and some of the colonists were themselves not entirely white (probably of partial Asian descent) and the status of half-castes was originally quite unclear. There were groups of half-castes among the colo-

nists and these are included in the figures given above (and which the South Africans like to claim as 'white' population figures). Those coloureds known as the Griquas arose in this period. The entire matter is confused because not everybody was married, all marriages having to be contracted in Cape Town. Pure whites or those who were relatively pure remained secure in their status as free subjects of the Company or 'burgers' (74) and they had the right to possess land and were liable to certain taxes and a type of military duty. There also lived Hottentots who were not subjects of the Company and thus not liable to military duty or taxes, neither could they legally possess land. In between there were originally at least some half-castes whose position was the same as that of the white 'burgers'. It was in the interests of the frontiersmen to degrade at least some of these half-castes to the position of Hottentots as they could then lay claim on their labour. According to MacCrone who studied the matter in great detail, the final division into 'white' and 'non-white' occurred around 1775. According to this explanation, as colour assumed more importance those light enough to pass did so and the rest were relegated to the coloured section of the population. About this time a traveller to the interior noted the existence of a man who was a quadroon (or something similar) but who appeared to be almost white. The white farmers accepted him as an equal even though he had never been baptised. One of the first cases of pure 'colour prejudice' occurs in 1788 when the farmers were mustering for some military practice at Cape Town. Two of them refused to serve under a certain corporal 'as the latter was of blackish colour and descended from heathens'. (75) According to MacCrone, this was the 'prejudice' of frontiersmen, but the two people making this complaint came from the Western Cape and not from the Eastern frontier. It is our opinion that the trend was admittedly going in this direction, but still fairly confused as late as the 1820's.

In the minds of the Afrikaners this was all justified in terms of 'Christians' and 'heathens'. And in this period - towards the end of the 18th century - we observe an increasing use of precisely these expressions as well as an increasing amount of talk about the Divine in South African documents, especially as concerns the farmers' doings with the non-whites. This was their way of expressing the difference and MacCrone's example (above) bears this out because the person who was white or largely white was a 'Christian' even if he was not baptised. This usage became quite common and can be found in the correspondence of the officials of the Batavian Republic who were Europeans. When missionaries later appeared on the scene and tried to convert the non-whites (including the slaves) this struck at the very basis of the farmers' ideology, as their own superiority over the latter supposedly rested on their being 'Christians' and the latter being 'heathens'. Consequently they resented attempts at conversion very much and they also resented missionaries very much.

Nevertheless this should not be interpreted as the 'cause' of their 'prejudice' as it was only their way of expressing it. Note the fact that the Cape Coloured have since been Christianised, almost completely, and, all the same, attitudes to them have not changed that much. When one took away the possibility of referring to the other group as 'heathens', they simply began to call them something else and the same structure was rationalised in terms of race pure and simple. (76) After 1792 authority began to reassert itself on the semi-civilised farmers in the interior. This continues during the first British period (1795-1803), during the time of the Batavian Republic (1803-1806) and after the final British take-over. Previously their impressment of Hottentot and other non-white labour had been largely without the support of any specific law. Official authority in those years attempted to establish legal practices with regard hereto, making into recognised law what had always been the customs of the farmers, but authority also insisted on certain principles which were supposed to stop the worst abuses and mistreatment of non-white farm-labour. Everything in South African history, from the conflict of the frontier-farmers with magistrate Maynier in Graaff-Reinet in 1792 until the 'Black Circuit' in 1815, revolved around this. To make matters worse, missionaries appeared on the scene and began collecting Hottentots on missionary stations for the purpose of Christianising them, thus crimping the farmers' labour supply. The policies of the authorities impeded the farmers from obtaining as much labour as they wanted and under those terms which they would have preferred, but the authorities were never entirely successful in enforcing their own policy and they least of all dreamed of taking away this supply of labour. Indeed, they provided the legal basis for what had always been customary in the past. It is only true that they tried to protect, to some extent, the non-white labourers from the white farmers and this the latter resented because it undermined their authority over their labour-force. During the first occupation of the Cape, the British, who had very pressing military problems to worry about, thought nothing of using Hottentots as soldiers and again this threatened the security of the farmers whose superiority over the Hottentots rested on the fact that the latter were not armed with guns (as a whole). The end of this entire development comes in 1828 with something known as 'Ordinance 50' according to which the legal concept 'Hottentot' was abolished altogether, whereafter people previously known as such simply became subjects of the Sovereign like anyone else. This is far from saying that they were made 'equal' to the white farmers socially.

Now the conflict theory has more to do with the situation on the Eastern frontier. It was held that conflict on this frontier 'strengthened colour prejudice'. The first aspect mentioned is sometimes the Bushmen, an extremely primitive race (even more primitive than the Australian Negroes) who were ex-

tremely small and ugly. They lived basically all over South Africa but were not very populous. For the first twenty-five years of settlement the whites could not tell the difference between the Hottentots and the Bushmen and later on one thought of them as a specific type of Hottentot. The expression 'Bushman-Hottentots' is found in the sources as late as the 1830's. As the farmers moved into the interior the nomadic Bushmen began to attack their cattle and, occasionally, the farmers as well. When Stellenbosch was first settled in the 1670's the farmers had to sleep with their guns at their sides (!) out of fear of the Bushmen. This was remembered long afterward, because it was alluded to in *Die Dagboek van Louis Trichardt*, written some 160 years later. As they moved into an area with a greater population of Bushmen after the 1750's, the Afrikaners killed off a good number of them, but they made others into servants. Their conflict with the Bushmen found its proper religious expression as well for they were under the mistaken impression that the Bushmen worshipped the praying mantis, something which they considered abominable. Eventually after 1800 the Bushmen were pacified by the practice of collecting cattle and giving some to them (something also practiced in Australia). However it is to be doubted that this conflict with the Bushmen really had any influence on their attitudes towards other non-whites as the Bushmen did not resemble the other races in the country. Neither were they associated with any other group of non-whites. That this should have affected 'attitudes towards colour' in any significant degree can also be discouraged on grounds shortly to be discussed. It is, however, often mentioned in the sources that the frontier-farmers in their time were quite 'race prejudiced' about Bushmen and often spoke of them as if they were animals and 'the traditional early took root among the men of the frontier that the Bushmen were no better than animals and that it was justifiable to exterminate them like so much vermin'. (77) A further factor to be mentioned is that there never was any fear of miscegenation with the Bushmen.

Now the real conflict was with Negroid Africans, the Bantu-speaking peoples who have always lived in certain parts of the interior of South Africa but were, then as now, more densely settled nearer the coasts. White colonisation started in that part of present-day South Africa which has never been inhabited by these Africans. The whites expanded partially towards the North-West, partially towards the North and partially towards the North-East. They first came into contact with the Hottentots and Bushmen. The Hottentots had not been very numerous either, their tribes very early lost their coherence as the result of contact with whites, they were assimilated and became a servant class. The Bantu-speaking inhabitants originally lived about 600 miles to the east of Cape Town (as well as in the other provinces). They lived far away and for the first hundred years or so their existence was ignored by the whites, hence the theories

about their not being native to South Africa (mentioned by almost all South African pamphleteers). Unlike the Hottentots, they were too numerous and their culture was too advanced for them to be broken up as the whites had done with the Hottentots. Furthermore they had the same economic basis as the white farmers: they were basically cattle-breeders who also engaged in some agriculture on the side. Originally their population density was much higher than that of the white farmers (and it still is). They lived on relatively fertile lands (the bulk of these lands are now the Transkei, but originally they lived much further to the west as well). What happened can easily be seen if we note that the whites, in the first 130 years of the colony's history, spread out to about the place where Grahamstown now lies (620 miles from Cape Town), whereas, during the next hundred years, they advanced in the same direction only to about where the present border of the Transkei is (720 miles from Cape Town), whereafter they stopped advancing in that direction. White expansion into the interior necessitated larger and larger farms, and their entire system of farming necessitated a fairly rapid expansion into areas where there was plenty of land. The Africans could subsist on less land, and this is one reason why their culture never collapsed in the face of white expansion, even when large areas of land had been stolen from them. There is another important difference. The whites lived in a type of symbiosis with the Hottentots (now detribalised) and the slaves. There was originally no basis for such a symbiosis with the Bantu-speaking Africans. They engaged in precisely the same occupations as the white farmers. The two groups found it convenient to trade a little of this and a little of that, but the Africans had no need to enter the employ of the white farmers. Consequently they had to be forced into this labour market. Real contact with the Bantu-speaking peoples began in 1780 when the whites first began moving into the area where the Xhosa lived. This started a chain of 'Kaffir Wars' - which are now called 'Frontier Wars' - of which there were about eight or nine, the last one occurring in 1878. It is said that all this violent conflict left the Afrikaners with 'deep-seated colour prejudice', but it can then be asked why this did not happen in other countries. The Indians in the United States and Brazil were often in conflict with the white colonists, but even where there was conflict it was generally succeeded by absorption and mixing. One reason why this did not happen in South Africa was that the whites were too small in number and the blacks maintained their coherence, consequently the two groups did not mix and conflict continued. The whites in South Africa could not absorb the blacks on their own terms, hence they did not absorb them at all. But the question can be asked why this should have strengthened their prejudices about 'colour'. The colonists meeting the Xhosa were not all whites as they also had Hottentot servants and half-castes among them. These all stood

on the side of the white farmers. It is possible that their conflict with the Xhosa led the white farmers to fear that the Hottentots might side with the former, as did happen on a few occasions. But on most occasions it did not happen and, anyway, drawing sharp borderlines between 'whites' and all others under such circumstances would hardly seem to be a strategically viable or logical answer to their problem. Furthermore there is the question of the half-castes who were also 'burgers' and who had the same basic interests as the white Afrikaners vis-à-vis the Xhosa. At any rate, all this should not be interpreted as saying that all these white Afrikaners had the same 'race prejudice' as the contemporary ones. Semi-civilised frontiersmen on the Eastern border as late as the 1820's thought nothing wrong with cohabitating with Hottentot women and having half-caste children with them. (78) On top of this, the conflict which originally evolved has been greatly exaggerated. The white view goes something to the effect that the 'heathen Kaffirs, having no concept of mine and thine, stole cattle from the peaceful and unoffending whites, attacked them viciously and unprovokedly and made constant war on them', and all of these 'Kaffir Wars' are described in history books as having been extremely bitter and ferocious. This is silly. The first 'Kaffir Wars' until the 1820's have a very mild character. An outsider is most impressed by the low number of persons killed. They, in fact, resemble mutual forays into each other's territory for the purpose of taking cattle rather than 'wars' in our sense of the word. As soon as peace was restored, the two groups would reassume trading and associating with each other. They were fighting over the land between them, but they also found it convenient to engage in friendly relations in other matters. Neither were the farmers all on such poor terms with the Xhosa originally. Louis Trichardt himself settled on Xhosa and lived there for many years with the permission of the local chief (he was an outlaw from the colony at that time). Furthermore these 'wars' were not originally fought over cattle-thefts but over grazing land, Cattle-thefts, or arguments arising from accusations about it, are common among all peoples who breed cattle; compare the 'cattle-rustlers' in the Wild West or the clan-feuds in ancient Ireland (which generally revolved around cattle-raids). The 'Kaffir Wars' begin to take on an uglier colour as time goes on, especially as an organised and efficient British military begins to participate. Previously the fighting was done by so-called 'burger-commandos' whose destructive potential was rather limited. It can also be mentioned that it was in the British period that the government began to support this trend. The 'wars' now took on a different character and the main purpose, from the white point of view, was to burn the crops of the Xhosa, confiscate some of their cattle and, generally, some of their land as well. The purpose of all this was to impoverish them and force them to enter the labour-market and work for the white farmers. It

can be mentioned that the free Hottentots and the half-castes took part in this process originally. These latter categories were not too numerous and their significance declined after the start of systematic English settlement (concentrated in precisely this part of the country). They too were eventually pushed off their land. The division on the Eastern frontier becomes now, legally, one between colonists and Africans. After 1828 the Hottentots were simply subjects of His Majesty; after 1834 the emancipated slaves were that as well. In the other parts of the Cape Colony a race-system operated without much support in the legal system because there were no longer any definable legal categories. Racial discrimination pure and simple (which was referred to as 'class legislation') was not advisable because it could not be done on purely racial lines. The franchise was limited on economic criteria and this successfully left the non-white farm-workers without any political influence, but it also left many whites without any political influence. But the 'Natives' or 'Kaffirs' were always considered a foreign nation. Even when they were included as subjects, as gradually happened, they were always considered a separate legal category. From this point (1820's) on, every 'Kaffir war' ended in a large influx of black workers into the white market. The 'Cattle-Killing Delusion' of 1856 was the last significant event in this development. This was a 'cargo-cult' reaction among the Xhosa which had disastrous results. It should be pointed out that not all of their cattle was killed in preparation for the appearance of divine intervention. Some cattle was sold to the white farmers for as little as 5 shillings a head!

(79) The population of (then) British Kaffraria is said to have shrunk from 104,000 to 37,000 because of the ensuing starvation.

While these things happened, something else occurred, namely that event which later became known as the Great Trek. The basic cause of this movement was simply that the land was becoming scarce for the type of farming that the whites specialised in and extremely scarce for the type of farming they had always dreamed of. Their motivations were, however, many and they included disaffection and disagreement with British rule in the Cape, but not all of these had to do with 'race relations'. They were also opposed to the government for economic reasons. Furthermore the natural advance of white settlement had been eastward and fairly close to the coastal line, but this had run into the hindrance of a solid and fairly dense population of Xhosa, hence the Great Trek represents a sudden northward turning of the same general movement which had been going on since about 1700. Improvements in the legal position of the non-white labour-force brought about in 1828 and 1834 - and these 'improvements' are not to be exaggerated - made many of these farmers fear for their position vis-à-vis the former. The Voortrekkers, as they are called by historians, went to Natal but eventually founded the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free

State. They conquered the Zulu at the battle of Blood River, the memorial date of which is now a national holiday, and it is this famous battle which changed the course of South Africa's history. It was the only really large battle between whites and blacks in the entire history of Southern Africa. History might have been very different if the Voortrekkers had not won it, and more recent interpretations tend to suggest that their victory did indeed hang on a thread. Its immediate result, however, was that they wrenched the central portion of Natal from the Zulu people, but this did them little good because it ended up as a British colony and its white population is nowadays solidly English-speaking. Later on they also wrenched large portions of what is now the Free State from the Sotho people and the Transvaal was also conquered from its original inhabitants (also Sotho-speaking, collectively referred to as Northern Sotho). One group of Africans moved northward because of this white incursion, but the rest stayed where they were. The Transvaal was also very sparsely populated by blacks (compared to the coastal regions) and its population became even sparser when this defeated tribe moved away to the North. Furthermore the African population of the interior had been artificially reduced a few years before the Great Trek by something called the 'mfecane' (an African word), inter-tribal warfare in which a large number of Africans are known to have perished. South African sources often claim that a million people were killed in this 'mfecane' (some even say two million) and that, if the Africans had been left to themselves, they would have exterminated each other, consequently the coming of the whites to the region brought peace. However, this does not stop them from claiming, simultaneously, that the land was uninhabited! At any rate, it is doubtful if such a large number of people could have been killed. Coming now to the Northern provinces, especially the Transvaal, the Afrikaners began to repeat the economic history of the Cape Colony in an even less appropriate setting. Originally it had been a question of a few thousand head of sheep, farmed on a few thousand hectares. In the Northern Provinces farms of 15,000 hectares soon became the rule and today there are even farms of as much as 30,000 hectares in these provinces. In South West Africa the proportions are even more unwieldy. All of this only increased their need of labour for all this land was worthless without labour. They thus developed here a type of feudalism. They could defeat the Africans militarily (no great feat), but they could not expel them. Indeed it would have been silly to expel them for they could not use the land without non-white labour and they needed more and more labour because their farms and stocks grew larger and larger and with the passage of time they began to shift to agriculture. 'The first concern for the new immigrants was to get coloured labour', as Paul Kruger later wrote. The victor-

ious Afrikaners now had almost unlimited amounts of land at their disposal and they laid claim to a huge expanse which they could not really control, much less settle and build up. Their government now started dissipating its legal title to the land which, then as before, was still inhabited by Africans, namely by apportioning several farms to each Voortrekker. What they did basically was to conquer the African tribes, thereby laying claim to land already inhabited, and to demand tribute from the inhabitants in the form of labour. 'Acquisition of land by Europeans (i.e. whites) was quite frequently a method of annexing labour as well. Since the earliest days it was a frequent practice for farmers to buy land, not for the land's sake, but in order to command the labour of the Natives upon it.' (80) Relicts of this system exist up to the present time. Patrick Duncan mentions (1963) an African servant in one of the cities of the Transvaal who had to return to the farm where his parents squatted for six months of every year. The explanation for this is the following. The Africans squat on the land, in return for which they must deliver up a certain amount of labour for the farmer, but their children are also encompassed by this agreement. 'Some of these squatters are compelled by law to work for six months, they and their wives and children, for the farmer for nothing except the right to occupy their homes, and perhaps their plots too. Even if they go to a town and take up other work they are compelled to return each year to the farm to work for the farmer for nothing.' (81) The Voortrekkers did not need slavery for they got along better with a system like this, or by using farm-servants who worked for more or less nothing. They therefore lived in less intimacy with the non-whites and therefore did not acculturate them, as their ancestors had done with the Hottentots and the slaves in the Cape. Traditionally in the Transvaal it was the farmer who spoke the African's language and not the opposite. Also the proportions were different: the preponderance of non-whites over whites was greater than it had been in the old colony. There was little miscegenation, if any, because the non-whites were not slaves and also because the races lived spatially separated from each other. The Afrikaners in the Northern Provinces seem to have practiced what they preached and illicit miscegenation was never common there as it was elsewhere. Many coloureds who emigrated to the Transvaal at the time of the Great Trek either left their descendants in the African population or left no descendants at all. Statistics do not show a rate of growth which could be expected of their population. There are very few coloureds today in the Northern Provinces. The Voortrekkers also enacted reactionary and patriarchal laws about 'the proper relations between masters and servants' and legally all servants and African serfs were completely at the mercy of the white farmers. They excluded all non-whites from citizenship in a famous law which spoke of 'bastards until the tenth generation'. The question now arises: At whom was

this directed? Partially it was directed at the servants, those non-whites they had brought with them, for - technically speaking - these had been legally equated with them in the Cape Colony. They had feared the legal equality of their servants in the old colony and did not want to have it in their new societies. Nevertheless one should not exaggerate the significance of this motive, as the coloureds in the Western Cape were legally equal to their white employers throughout this entire period and this did not necessarily lead to 'democracy', nor did it improve their social position that much. This clause was certainly not directed at the Africans who were a separate legal and social category and, while the Voortrekkers would never grant Africans equality, they would never have thought it necessary to state so (as no-one would ever have suggested such a bizarre thing in those days). They had never been considered equal in the Cape and nothing indicates that the Voortrekkers could have imagined any other system. Partly it may have been enacted to prevent intermarriage, as it would tend to discourage such. But, even so, the Voortrekkers did not at that time equate the non-white servants from the Cape Colony with the Africans. Non-white servants from the Cape had taken part in the Great Trek and they had also been armed and they had also fought in all the battles (including Blood River). They had gone along voluntarily. This is seen in Die Dagboek van Louis Trichardt. Trichardt evidences considerable 'social distance' to one Albach, a white man who was married to a non-white woman, and the latter's half-caste children. But this by no means signifies that he made no distinction between them and Africans. It is our opinion that this clause about 'no equality' with the 'bastards until the tenth generation' was directed at a group of free, independent, half-caste farmers who were frequently mentioned in the documents from this period. They are referred to as 'the bastards'. They lived around the North-Eastern border of the Cape Colony, an area which was frequently referred to as the 'bastard-land'. These were half-castes who had congregated there on the northern extremity of the Cape Colony and the southern extremity of the Free State. They were moving in the same direction as the Voortrekkers and for the same reasons; they were colonists of almost the same type. They had guns and they fought in the same manner. Some of these, the ones known as the Griquas, long disputed part of the Free State with the whites. It was this part of the Free State where the diamonds were later found. It is true that the Voortrekkers were opposed to legal equality with their own servants, with their labour-force, but this was not their main worry. They feared non-white farmers as equals. This law also had other effects: land was dissipated to all 'citizens' which meant almost any white who wanted to come. At first there was plenty of free land. Consequently by refusing to admit to 'citizenship' anyone who was not a white in their opinion

they could exclude the latter from the ownership of land. The same thing is seen here as with slavery: if their own servants were also 'citizens', then they could start claiming their own land and stop working for the white farmers. With this system, non-whites of all types were at the mercy of the Voortrekkers, nevertheless their control over their own territory was tenuous and there were constant 'commandos' throughout the first fifty years of their history. In the 1860's and 1870's it was not always easy to subdue the Africans. Originally they were easy to subdue because they had never fought with white men before, but as they gained more experience they became more efficient. Eventually they began to obtain guns, which did not do them any good but made them harder to control. In the late 1860's the Africans, for awhile, drove the whites out of the Soutpansberg (the extreme North of Transvaal). With the passage of time their population increased, their economy improved and they gained greater control, but towards 1880 they were still a fairly weak state.

The British laid claim to Natal when the Voortrekkers went there and they eventually annexed it in 1843, which is why the Voortrekkers turned around and went back into the interior. This colony received a large immigration in the 1840's and it is even today a solidly English-speaking province. The land is much more fertile than other parts of South Africa, it is mainly agricultural land and in some places even sugar is grown. The British settlers, however, began using the same methods which the Voortrekkers had used: they got the land but they took the labour with it. About this time the British in the Eastern Cape and Natal began a practice which was imitated all over Africa in later periods and this was the custom of imposing a 'poll-tax' or 'hut-tax' on Africans. The main purpose was to force them out into the white sector of the economy. It was later imitated in the Orange Free State. Natal was also the first to practice something else which later became standard operating procedure for the whites, and this latter is connected with the name of one Theophilus Shepstone. He was the son of a Wesleyan missionary and had grown up on the Eastern frontier. He spoke fluent Zulu and was well acquainted with the culture of that people. He gained considerable influence over the Zulu and brought them under government control because they originally mistook him for a friend. He had a great hand in despoiling them of much of their territory. It should be remembered, however, that the province of Natal did not then include that part which is now known as Kwazulu and, in the following discussion, Natal means only a small corridor of land south of Kwazulu. Despite white colonisation, Zulu population could not be controlled because it was too large: white settlement was nothing but a sparsely populated thin corridor with large populations of Zulu on both sides. Shepstone therefore began to herd Zulu into large reservations (called 'locations') which were spread out but located on territory belong to the colony, that is controlled directly by the

whites, and on these reservations they were left under the control and jurisdiction of tribal chiefs whom Shepstone, in turn, could control (technically he, as commissioner of native affairs, appointed them). At the time the farmers hated this system for a variety of reasons. They looked upon it as strategically dangerous and it took their labour force away from them, or so they reasoned. This was originally necessary in Natal where the African population was extremely large (in proportion to the whites), but it soon became the custom all over South Africa. 'Reservation' is now a common concept in South Africa and Rhodesia. Shepstone was hated in his own time by the farmers in Natal and by the Afrikaners as well - for it was he who led the police-force which annexed the Transvaal in 1877 - but he is now claimed as a far-sighted forerunner of apartheid by the Nationalists who are so desperate for historical precedents to support their lunacy that they tend to scrape the bottom of history's barrel and see things in this way. Things in Natal became more complicated in the 1860's when the sugar industry grew up. Large numbers of Indo-Pakistanis were imported as indentured labourers for short periods of time after which they were supposed to be returned to their country of origin, but, as usually happens, one became so dependent upon their labour that their numbers actually increased. This soon started a huge immigration of Indo-Pakistanis, many of whom immigrated voluntarily. By 1885 there were as many Indians as whites in Natal, and their numbers have ever since then exceeded the white population there. At first the whites could keep them under control by denying them most civil and legal rights, but they were never entirely equated with the Africans. They were excluded from the franchise which was limited to those 'who had enjoyed it in their country of origin', showing the common English habit of enacting measures of racial discrimination without stating bluntly what they are aiming at (cf. more recently 'persons of Asian origin' or 'patrials'). It can be wondered if the Cockney settlers in Natal really had enjoyed any franchise in their country of origin.

(82) Most Indians were illiterate lower-caste or caste-less individuals but they came from a fairly sophisticated society. Their history has been no different from that of the Indians in East Africa or Guiana or Surinam. Starting out from their miserable position, they soon moved into petty trading and commerce and took it over. Some of them are fairly well-off under the circumstances and there are today even a few millionaires among them. As elsewhere they have not mixed with the other parts of the population and have maintained their languages, even though most of them speak fluent English. When the Transvaal was part of the British Empire in the 1880's they began spilling over into that province and, in particular, they were drawn to the Rand when this region first developed. Indirectly this movement of population was encouraged by British imperialism

which was then trying to weaken the Transvaal. Nowadays they there, as well as in Natal, perform the useful service of being a buffer-group (the coloureds are very few in these provinces) between the whites and the Africans and consequently the Africans often vent their resentment on the Indians. During this period the Orange Free State was completely independent and was therefore able to keep them out of its territory. Even today there are hardly any Indians in the Free State and a census of Bloemfontein's population several years ago showed that it contained all of 2 Indians. They are not even allowed to enter it for purposes of travel. (83) There was some dispute about their legal status in the Transvaal at first, the British suggesting that they might just be equated with immigrant whites in order to threaten the South African Republic (after denying them the franchise in Natal!). In the 1890's a court in the Transvaal ruled that the word 'gekleurd' in an earlier law meant all non-whites, thus the Indians too became completely subjugated to the whites. Until 1960 the official attitude of the South African government was that they were not really citizens, or even natives, of South Africa and were to be repatriated to India at some time in the future. This hope has since been given up.

Originally the English in Natal provided for the legal assimilation of coloureds, and this here meant persons who were half-white and half-African. But there were never many of them. They also enfranchised Africans who met certain high qualifications and at one time there were, we seem to recall, as many as six such Africans on the voters' rolls. This technical legal equality of coloureds and 'civilised natives' has long since been rescinded. In the three Northern Provinces (we include Natal here) the situation has basically been this: there is a white oligarchy which had all the power and all non-whites were excluded from citizenship and all legal and civil rights. Intermarriage was not originally forbidden or criminalised but the legal codes in these states originally made no provision for it. There were, however, strong strictures against it, especially in the Transvaal. The equation of all persons with any amount of non-white ancestry with a totally non-white person meant that anyone marrying a non-white would condemn his descendants to be deprived of all rights. It should not be forgotten, on the other hand, that the question of intermarriage and miscegenation was rather academic at the time. There was no great possibility of any significant tendency in this direction under any conditions. There seems to have been some illicit miscegenation in the 1880's and 1890's by the so-called uitlanders in the Northern Provinces because of the abnormal preponderance of white males over white females (1000 to 762 at one time - a demographic rarity). Segregation has always been common in towns and villages and the 'location' originally came about partially for strategic reasons. The non-whites have been kept apart from the whites in almost every sphere. This partially lies in the nature of agriculture as practiced here. On farms there were a few non-white houser-servants,

otherwise the whites and the non-whites live apart from each other, scattered about on what are different parts of the same farm. The largest part of the African population on each farm consists of squatters or workers strewn about here and there. The policy of the Voortrekkers was also to break up the tribal system and bring blacks into the white economy as atoms, therefore they originally discouraged reservations and tried to gobble up independent black areas. The South African Republic even controlled Swaziland for awhile, and the Orange Free State even tried to annex what is now called Lesotho. Both of these kingdoms were eventually taken by the British precisely to keep them from being annexed by the Afrikaans republics. Another thing to be mentioned is that the Voortrekkers originally opposed any recognition of African law in contrast to the attitude which the British took in the Cape and in Natal. There are old treaties extant, for example one between the Free State and the Sotho, where the Afrikaners wedged in passages about the abolition of polygamy and other 'heathen' customs. As to the Christianisation of the Africans, it was an entirely different story. Their attitude has always been rather ambivalent on this subject. Technically they have been in favour of it, but they never (until recently) did much about it. They did not mind harmless missionaries of certain types, but they disliked independent ones. Their more recent interest in missions is mainly done to prevent the success of other denominations (some of which are supported and controlled from abroad) because these latter are all opposed to apartheid to some extent or other. The Afrikaners never proselytised among their servants and workers, though they occasionally obliged them to abide by certain religious customs or to take part in certain religious ceremonies. All of this is more or less the opposite of the present apartheid system and ideology. Their basic drive was consistently that of driving the blacks into the white farm-labour market. Reservations were only meant as strategically necessary enclaves for those Africans who could not yet be brought into the market.

3.6. The Development of the Race-System in the American Southland 1865-1914

The immediate background to the race-system in the United States after the destruction of slavery proceeds now along the following lines. Wherever slavery was abolished we nowhere see it being replaced by free labour on a modern capitalist basis as we know it. Everywhere it was succeeded by some form of peonage or apprenticeship. Slavery was abolished when it was no longer profitable and this was the same in the United States as it had been in Jamaica or Martinique. But there were added factors in the United States. The South had ruined itself economically with the Civil War. It did not, in fact, have the proper economic basis for its adventure. Its economy was further disorganised in the period of Reconstruction when the Southland was plundered by the Northerners.

The North had begun to gain financial ascendancy over the South even before the Civil War and that war ruined the South while it greatly speeded up the industrial development of the North, so that after the Civil War the South became, for almost eighty years, no less a colony of Wall Street than Guatemala, though it was allowed a greater degree of self-government than that latter colony (presumably in deference to pure-white race of its ruling class). The Deep South of the United States and the areas immediately around it are, still today, the poorest parts of the country and the disparity was even greater in previous decades. (84) Slavery had hindered the industrialisation of the South, but much industrial development would probably not have occurred there anyway. Before the Civil War New Orleans was the only large city of the South. The traditions and culture of the region have always been agricultural and rural.

In the period preceding the Civil War, the North-East became increasingly inimical to slavery and to the South in general. This was partly because the South originally controlled the government to an inordinate extent. Originally no-one minded this very much as the South was the most prosperous part of the country and the source of its wealth. Later on, however, this system became more and more anachronistic. Four of the first five presidents of the United States came from the state of Virginia, and presidents and other important figures of state were often Southerners before the Civil War. (85) The North wanted to destroy the political hegemony of the South and the immediate cause of the Rebellion was that the Southern States walked out of the Union when they could no longer control it. They had become increasingly aggressive after 1850 because they could obviously see that their economic position was being corroded and that time was running against them. The Northwestern Territories were declared, at the very beginning, to be 'free soil' and this refers to those parts of the country which are now called the Mid-West. The compromise of 1820, or Missouri compromise, had been arrived at to contain slavery below a certain latitude. The small independent farmers developing the Northwestern Territories wanted to prevent slavery, but not because they loved Negroes. American thinking with its concept of 'race prejudice' has led many people to assume that those opposed to slavery should be sympathetic to Negroes, which is silly. As only Negroes or Negroid persons could be enslaved, the easiest way of keeping slavery out of their territory was simply to exclude enslavable people. As long as there were no Negroes there, there was no possibility of slavery because there were no enslavable individuals, hence all of these states, which were adamantly opposed to slavery, enacted measures of exclusion against Negroes and mulattoes. After the Dred Scott Decision they became even more exclusivist, and for good reasons: that decision held that slaves remained in that legal status even when transported to 'free soil' and thus slavery could be introduced north of the previously accepted boundary. Many of the features

of the race-system as we later know it appear first in the North and this includes such things as disenfranchisement, exclusion from juries, segregation in urban areas (obviously in the North, the South hardly had any urban areas) and some of these by legal enactment, others by social custom. Significantly enough, the word 'Jim Crow' (in this sense) was first heard in the North before the Civil War. Litwack's *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States* is the best work available on the position of the Negroes in the North before the Civil War and runs to the effect that their position was very much like what it later became in the South after the Civil War. Tocqueville commented upon this himself. Furthermore the defenders of slavery were not necessarily interested in scientific or pseudo-scientific theories about racial differences, and this goes for the ones in Europe as well as the ones in North America. Conversely the earliest authors of such theories often opposed slavery or took pains to point out that they were not trying to justify the institution. It may at first seem paradoxical, but this is because of the unrefined way of thinking which has been characteristic of this area of study. Many of those who opposed slavery - for whatever reasons - looked at the institution more critically and they therefore realised that it was doomed to destruction in the end. Consequently they thought ahead to the situation which would arise in these countries or regions when there was no more slavery. People who were partial to slavery or highly committed to its maintenance as a social system were forced into a reactionary ideological position, or they took an ostrich-like attitude, and this prevented them from thinking ahead to the time when it would be abolished. A few people in the United States seem to have fought abolition, not because they wanted slavery, but because they feared a society with emancipated slaves in it. (86) This is why many of these enemies of slavery, far from being adherents of racial equality, indulged themselves in fantasies about expelling the slaves to Africa, Haiti or to some other places in the Caribbean or the South-West of the United States. In fact, many of the original abolitionists wanted to abolish slavery and repatriate the slaves to Africa (this is the origin of the ruling class in Liberia). The question of racial equality does not really arise in a slave-society. Discriminations against free persons of colour are mainly enacted out of fear of the masses of slaves. The real question of racial equality only arises when there are no more slaves. Furthermore, the question of miscegenation is not very prominent before abolition. Negro slaves could not marry and neither could free coloureds marry whites in most of the Southern slave-states. There was at that time no very great opposition to illicit miscegenation per se in the slave-states (except for miscegenation between white women and black male slaves). Furthermore, in slave societies people have more concrete things to worry about than whether or not

their daughters might marry blacks. In slave-societies we see no real segregation of the type the race-system later engenders. The plantation was a relatively isolated social unit, and slaves and whites lived fairly close to each other and they often mixed. The 'keeping of distance' between free and slave simply meant that all such intimate mixing occurred under the sign of complete inequality. Furthermore the slave masses could not be segregated because they could not be policed if segregated. Large black ghettos of the type which appear after the Civil War would never have been tolerated in the slave period because they would have been looked upon as dangerous.

Slavery was abolished in New England at about the time of the American War of Independence. It was never very strong elsewhere and formal abolitions of it occur in Ohio in 1802, in Illinois in 1818, in Indiana in 1816, and so forth. Free states entering the Union thereafter simply included passages in their state constitutions forbidding the institution. Originally no-one thought of creating a separate legal category for free persons of colour since, for one thing, there were so few of them. But in most of these states there was a gradual increase in the free Negro population and this population was concentrated in the cities and this led to discriminatory legislation. Free Negroes in the North lost the franchise in several states where they had once enjoyed it and, as another example, it might be mentioned that they also lost most other civil rights, particularly the right to sit on juries (considered very important in the Anglo-Saxon countries). Most Northerners at that time disliked slavery for economic reasons, or they felt threatened by the possibility of its expansion into new areas in the West, or they opposed the disproportionate political influence of the South, but all of this by no means signifies that they had any sympathies for Negroes and, in fact, they had no reason to be sympathetic to Negroes as such. To a certain extent this even applies to some abolitionists, for Litwack and a number of other authors point out that some of these people were quite 'race-prejudiced' in our present sense of the word. Nevertheless among the abolitionists there was always a minority of patently Negrophile elements, and this included important political figures such as Salmon P. Chase, William Seward and Thaddeus Stevens, and the best example of this type of Negrophile abolitionist was the abolitionist martyr John Brown. All of these people very early showed Negrophile leanings and they all agitated for the improvement of the legal position of the free Negroes in their own home-states before they became prominent in national politics. Most of them either considered Negroes as potential equals or wished to grant them full legal equality. There is a vague but hardly significant trends toward Negrophilia in certain quarters in the decade immediately preceding the Civil War, but it was rather limited. Its main effects were felt in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts where social and legal discriminations against Negroes were entirely removed by

1860. This meant that in the states of Maine and Massachusetts free Negroes were legally equated with whites, a condition obtaining nowhere else at that time in the 'land of the Free'. This does not mean that colour was socially irrelevant in those states; but the situation was quite radical in American terms at that time.

After the Civil War Lincoln and his successor, Andrew Johnson, took a conciliatory attitude towards the former rebels, bringing them into conflict with the so-called Radicals in the Congress who opposed these two presidents and tried to legislate affairs in the conquered South by themselves. It is from this time on that the word 'radical' comes to have such negative connotations in American English (true to this day). One of the first things which these people did was to pass the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in February of 1865 (while Lincoln was still alive) and this was ratified in December of the same year (the fastest ratification ever of a constitutional amendment). This amendment abolished once and for all the legal institution of slavery, whereas the so-called Emancipation Proclamation had only freed slaves in areas then under rebellion (over which the North had no control anyway). Thus the 18th December 1865 is the date on which slavery as a legal institution ceased to exist. Their next step was to pass a law making Negroes full citizens, but Johnson vetoed it in December of 1865. In April of the following year they again passed it over his veto. After the elections of 1866 the Radicals took complete control of the Congress. With this begins the so-called period of Reconstruction, which resulted in two further amendments to the Constitution (ratified in 1868 and 1870 respectively), the first of which sought to ensure full equality for all citizens, and also made it possible to reduce the congressional representation of states which disenfranchised too many people. This threat was brought up again in the 1960's when the South was recalcitrant in allowing Negroes to vote. (By that time the Negroes being much less numerous in the South, the Southern politicians reasoned that it would be better to allow them to vote and manipulate their votes rather than have their influence in the Congress reduced). The second amendment passed held that no state could deny the franchise to any citizen, it previously having been established that Negroes were citizens. This latter amendment enfranchised Negroes as such throughout the entire country. The majority of the states which ratified it had not previously granted blacks the right to vote, so that in ratifying it they were instituting on a national level what they had previously refused to do locally. In fact, there is some doubt if these amendments were really ratified in accordance with the proper legal procedures. All of this was done, now, with the intention of smashing the power of the South and thus these measures were progressive. The Radicals had disenfranchised many whites in the South on the grounds that they were former rebels, and they took over control there by

manipulating the masses of enfranchised Negroes. Their aim was to crush the power of the former ruling class, both on the local and national level. One reason why they later lost interest in pursuing this policy to its logical conclusions was that the South was so disabled politically that it never again had much influence on the national level. Hence the Radicals eventually lost interest in smashing its power on the local level. But the Radicals went even further and toyed with the idea of confiscating the property of the large white land-owners (again on the grounds that they were former rebels) and dividing it up among the former slaves. This is known as 'forty acres and a mule' as this was to be the average portion of every black. This expression was so thoroughly forgotten in American history that until a few years ago even educated Americans did not know it. The entire policy of the Radicals was to enhance, as much as possible, the political, economic and social position of the Negroes in order to entrench their own party in the region at the expense of such native white Southerners as were opposed to them. They were originally led by one Thaddeus Stevens. He was a native of New England but had left the region as a young man and settled in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania where he was a lawyer and petty industrialist. For many years he had been a senator, elected from that state. He seems to have been somewhat of a fanatic and was often quite ill by this time (he died in the middle of it all), and he was also a patent Negrophile who had a Negro woman as his mistress. Consequently the Fourteenth Amendment was called 'the bastard child of Thaddeus Stevens and his mulatto mistress'. It goes without saying that his name is hated and his memory is slandered or deprecated by all bourgeois historians and political thinkers in the United States, not least of all by the pious liberals who are offended by his tendencies towards violence. Nevertheless these people - the abolitionists like John Brown and the Radicals like Thaddeus Stevens - are among the few worthy and inspiring historical figures in the otherwise sordid political history of the United States. As the Radicals in Congress were blocked by the president, Andrew Johnson - a native of the South who had remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War - they eventually tried to depose him by a process known as impeachment. An impeachment had never been attempted before in American history (nor since). He was duly indicted by the House of Representatives and was tried by the Senate, in accordance with the procedural rules in the Constitution. His main enemy was now one Charles Sumner, senator from Massachusetts (Stevens had already died). Unfortunately the Senate failed to impeach him for want of a single vote. This defeat eventually took the wind out of their sails and gradually they lost power and influence. This failure to impeach Andrew Johnson was one of the singly most tragic events in the history of the United States.

In the South the period after the Civil War is known as Reconstruction, which is only correct in a certain sense. The historical vision of Southern

reactionaries about this period is one of 'slaves on horse-back'; so to speak. It is claimed that Negroes and 'Carpetbaggers' ruled in chaos and that Negroes in the parliaments were illiterate slaves who spent their time drinking and joking and passed 'intermarriage bills' (there is a scene in a famous film showing all this); there are other stories about barefooted and illiterate slaves becoming ministers in top-hats. All of this is highly overdone because the blacks had little power in most places in the South, even though they were elected to public office. In general, however, political control remained in the hands of whites who were interested in enhancing the Negroes' interests, but who were also interested in enhancing their own political and financial status. During this period two Southern states elected Negroes to the Senate of the United States, something which has never been repeated since. In fact, the first Negro to be elected senator thereafter comes along in the 1960's (from Massachusetts, not the South). A federal agency known as the Freedmen's Bureau set up special schools for the former slaves and, in fact, general public education was introduced for the first time in some of these states. This change in the legal relationship of the two groups to each other seems, in certain places, to have led to a decrease in social distance, but rather minimally, and there are places where it seems to have had little effect on day-to-day social relations. According to C. Van Woodward no very clear picture of the situation in the Southland as a whole emerges. At any rate there was little real change because there was no change in the economic structure. The Negroes remained without capital and without land. The former slaves continued to work for their old masters as hired hands. The Civil War and Reconstruction led to the breaking-up of some larger plantations and the general economic chaos led to much shifting of property, but this had no significance for the Negroes who did not acquire much land in this period. The most radical, in fact quite revolutionary, change in property relations was, of course, the fact that a certain form of property in human beings ('ius in personas') was forever abolished. Blacks soon became what they were for most of the ensuing period - share-croppers, that is, peons. This system of share-cropping was described by Dubois in the 1900's and by Dollard in the 1930's and it appears to have changed little over these years. In fact it still exists to a certain extent and it is by no means unknown in other backward regions of the country, and neither were Negroes the only share-croppers. Where there were larger farms Negroes tended to be farm-labourers pure and simple. But they were not forbidden to own land and there have always been some independent Negro farmers. The vast masses of the blacks remained for the time being in rural districts and in agriculture. Until 1914 the percentage of blacks in agriculture and in rural districts was much higher than the national average; the opposite is now true. Southern agriculture was, from this time on, backward and in-

efficient and highly susceptible to natural disasters (something which is not entirely the fault of the economic system). Cheap Negro labour tended to cheapen the cost of white labour and hindered the rationalisation of agriculture. The industrial development of the South only started in the 1880's and it remained insignificant (in comparison with the rest of the country) until the Second World War. Its urban development also remained behind that of the country as a whole. This is one reason why this region received almost no foreign immigration in the period between the Civil War and the First World War. The policy of the Radicals in Congress and of the Southern ruling class tended to retain the Negro population in the Southland. Previously fantasies had been indulged in about emigration and as late as 1862 Lincoln obtained some money from the Congress for this purpose. No such thing ever happened because Negroes could not be dislodged from the economy, especially not in the Deep South and, if they had been, it would only have increased the economic ruin of the region. They were still necessary for the Southern economy, hence they stayed where they were. At that time there was still a considerable amount of land in the United States which was unoccupied and which was systematically alienated by the Government for practically nothing. The policy of all concerned - Radicals or racists - was to contain the Negroes in the South until these empty lands had been filled up. If the masses of emancipated slaves had left the South after the Civil War and settled parts of the West, as many Russian serfs settled Siberia after their emancipation (at about the same time), the history of the United States would probably have been much different. The Civil War helped to divide the United States up into a Northern and a Southern region, although in the eyes of Southerners even California is the 'North'. This division is now, after a hundred years, only very gradually disappearing. The Civil War was extremely bloody. It appears that the peculiar penchant which the Americans have for cruel, anti-civilian warfare methods was actually developed on other Americans in an internal conflict (cf. General Sherman's 'March through Georgia'). It is sometimes said that the Southerners are 'the only Americans who have memories of having lost a war' and consequently their mentality is very different from that of the rest of the nation. Historically the Southerners and the Northerners have hated each other and latent hatreds towards the South were still strong enough in the North in the 1960's so that they could be utilised when the Establishment decided to suppress the race-system in the South once and for all. The best way which the mass-media had for generating support for the Southern Negroes in the 1960's was simply to play on these latent hatreds and contempt which most Americans have for white Southerners.

Now the succeeding period is known as 'Redemption' in the terminology of Southern historians. The Republicans were no longer very radical and they lost interest in the South. They had taken away its power and its prosperity anyway,

and they let the former Rebels gradually reassert their control, but the latter did so only by degrees and they originally left much of Reconstruction legislation unchanged for many years. Many Negroes still voted. Most of them were easily manipulated by their employers - the landed aristocrats - and thus they indirectly supported their own enemies. The lower classes therefore became more interested in agitating to disenfranchise them again. The situation remained in flux for a long time. The number of black voters decreased gradually and the electoral system was gradually changed by small degrees to disfavour them. Sometimes terrorism was employed to prevent them from voting. Eventually, towards the turn of the century, they were formally disenfranchised altogether by legal enactment. It is this that is referred to as the 'grandfather clause' in imitation of a clause in the constitution of the State of Louisiana. By 1900 there were only insignificant numbers of voters among Negroes, but there were always a few. Generally speaking there were few blacks elected or appointed to public office after the 1870's. By the 1880's they no longer sat on juries and after 1900 they were totally excluded (jurors' rolls are drawn from voters' rolls).

It was also in this period that racial intermarriage was forbidden and in many cases this occurred during Reconstruction. During that time the Southern states (then outside the Union) were forced to draw up new constitutions and most of these contained such prohibitions, in some cases being nothing but repetitions of the ones they had previously had. The Radicals were least of all opposed to this. Forest G. Wood's *Black Scare* shows that American obsessions with 'miscegenation' and 'amalgamation' start as slavery draws to a close and Reconstruction begins. The word 'amalgamation' occurs for the first time (in this sense) in the 1840's and in the North. 'Miscegenation' occurs for the first time in 1863 in New York when a book was published (anonymously) with the title: *Miscegenation, The Theory of the Blending of the Races Applied to the American White Man and Negro*. This is said to be the first known use of the word. There also existed, originally, a word 'miscegen' which meant a child of mixed parentage, but it apparently also meant a person who 'miscegenated'. The book in question was meant as an attempt to embarrass the Republicans, claiming to be a party programme for racial miscegenation. During the election of 1864 accusations arose that the Republicans were planning to kill or castrate all the white men of the South. Abolitionists and other partisans of emancipation were frequently accused of engaging in intersexuality with Negroes, and such things had been heard long before the Civil War. During the War charges were made that Lincoln endorsed intermarriage and one newspaper in the Mid-West suggested that he was not quite white himself. (87) Wood's book contains reproductions of several cut-plates of the period, all of which tried to scare people with tales of impending 'miscegenation' on a grand scale. (88) The same general phenomenon is seen in South

African history. From 1795 there are recorded utterances of the frontier-farmers that their enemy, Magistrate Maynier in Graaff-Reinet, intended to take away their wives and give them to the 'heathens'. From the time of the Great Trek the sources contain any number of references to impending miscegenation to be forced upon the farmers by the government. At times when the system is disturbed by radical changes, fear of the new relationship between the two groups finds its expression in fears about racial purity and endogamy. For long periods of time the two endogamous groups remained endogamous without very much tension or exertion on anybody's part. Indeed one can say that this endogamy has often been totally natural. It is, however, when abrupt changes are made in the positions of the different groups that fear of the effects that this will have on endogamy are voiced. Generally these fears are quite exaggerated (to say the least). This is the same thing as when the Nationalists in South Africa insinuate that anyone slightly less reactionary than they on the 'race question' is either an inherent or a practitioner of 'miscegenation'.

Gradually there developed in the South a system of segregation which is historically known as 'Jim Crow' or 'the Jim Crow system'. The same word is also a verb (meaning to discriminate against a Negro). Jim Crow was apparently a Negro character in a song in the earlier part of the last century and the word first appeared in this sense in the 1840's (but in Massachusetts). It occurs again in the 1890's. After this time there was almost complete segregation in social life in the South. Much of this came about naturally after 1865, eventually it was made compulsory by law, but customs were often not firmly established before 1900. Originally there was some doubt as to its legality. In 1896 a case came before the United States Supreme Court known as Plessy v. Ferguson which legalised the whole system. Plessy was an octoroon and Ferguson was the official of a railway which had refused to seat him in a white coach and which had ordered him arrested for refusing to leave it. The high court found, basically, that laws separating different races did not necessarily imply the superiority of the one or the inferiority of the other. The decision cited the existence of separate schools and laws forbidding intermarriage, and established the precedent that 'separate but equal' was not necessarily forbidden by the Constitution. One justice, John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky, dissented. Previously much of this segregation had come about naturally. There were special Freedmen's Schools constructed for the emancipated slaves, elsewhere there were integrated public schools for both races but as whites abstained from sending their children to school with blacks, these latter had largely become black schools. Higher education was segregated because it was private and hence outside the control of the law. In addition, most of the Negro colleges in the South were founded by Northern philanthropists specifically for Negroes. Church segregation has always been volun-

tary and the blacks still today prefer it. It was only later that these segregation practices took on the character of obligatory law. The general culture in the United States supported all these measures. Throughout this entire period Negroes were definitely considered inferior and all thought of equality and assimilation with them was rejected by the vast majority of the white population. This was true throughout the entire country, including in places where they hardly existed and where there was little or no reason for the population to take this attitude. At this time there were still very few Negroes outside of the South and the Border States. This movement was indirectly due to external factors as well. This was the heyday of imperialism and the right of the 'Caucasian' or the Anglo-Saxon races to rule the coloured races on other continents was being proclaimed and scientifically supported, so that few people could logically deny the Anglo-Saxons the right to do within their own borders what they were allowed to do on foreign shores. The scientific thinking of the time offered little to discourage segregation practices and much to support them. In the United States, however, this took on a singularly vulgar form. Shortly after the turn of the century the historical novels of one Thomas Dixon jr. became popular (89), and all of these helped to establish the Southern view of Reconstruction and 'Redemption' as normative in the eyes of Americans in other regions who, from this time on, shared them. One of these novels was later made into a film (*Birth of a Nation*) which only spread these ideas further. Carroll's *The Negro a Beast* was published in 1900, in the same period we have William P. Calhoun's *The Caucasian and the Negro in the United States*, from 1905 we have William B. Smith's *The Colour Line: A Brief on Behalf of the Unborn*, and Robert W. Shufeldt's *The Negro a Menace to American Civilisation* from 1907. The last mentioned work tried to re-popularise the idea of eliminating the Negroes from the United States altogether, either through deportation or sterilisation. During the same period we have William Sumner, one of the founders of the American school of sociology with his *Folkways* (originally 1906), and much of his theorising was originally tailored to the purpose of legitimising the Jim Crow system in the South. In fact the real origin of his 'folkways' lies in *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Similarly William MacDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* from 1908 popularised the individual-psychological racist arguments, particularly those concerned with intelligence quotients. In general the scientific periodicals of the time contain many articles about Negroes, all of which were based on the premiss that they were genetically inferior and had to be kept away from the rest of the population. (90)

The few Negroes found outside of the South were mainly in certain Northern cities and in California (again mainly in cities). These Negroes were then economically ruined by immigration. It can therefore be asked what effect

immigration might have had on the situation in the South if any sizable immigration had been turned in that direction. But the economic position of the blacks in the South, plus the fact that they lost all political influence after 'Redemption' began in 1876 (and they had not had much before) sealed their fate in the long run. This process was accompanied by a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Negro petty bourgeoisie, generally associated with the name of Booker T. Washington. His entire mentality was that of a petty bourgeois, evidenced by his consistent talk of 'education' and 'self-help' and 'uplifting', all of which resemble what South Africans have to say about the 'race question'. His ideology, however, reflected the original position of the Negro petty bourgeoisie, which was extremely underdeveloped and only a little bit better-off than the masses of simple Negroes. This consisted of teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, owners of hotels and taverns and, to some extent, shop-keepers (but the latter are, even today, rather rare in the United States). All of these people engaged in service activities and sold their services to blacks and not to whites and for a number of reasons. Firstly because of public prejudices: a white would not go to a black doctor because public opinion was against it, and it was the same with teachers. One would not accept black teachers for white children. But the opposite was not true. There have always been many white 'country doctors' treating black patients in the South and white teachers in black schools have never been uncommon. The other reason for this is that this petty bourgeoisie was, in the beginning, not even in control of its own market. The difference in the economic resources of the two races was in its own favour: whites would be less interested in selling these services to blacks because the latter had less to pay for them. Tendencies towards such segregation of petty bourgeoisies was also encouraged by social attitudes, for whites disliked contact with blacks in certain situations. In Black Ghetto, Clark points out that Negro entrepreneurs in Harlem are often barbers, doctors, dentists and undertakers because whites are not wont to handle Negro bodies. This type of segregation was thus in the interests of this petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand they were also obliged, from the very beginning, to take an ambivalent attitude towards it because they also suffered from segregation. Segregation in higher education, in restaurants or in opera houses were not things which the masses of Negroes had the money to worry about. This was seen more recently among the Black Muslims who, ten years ago or so, had a slogan about 'keeping the money in the circle', something which was basically in the interests of black shop-owners. The miserable position of this black bourgeoisie - and it has until recently produced all the 'Negro leaders' - has always entailed a highly ambivalent attitude towards segregation, for it was partially in their interests, partially not in their interests. But it is our argument that, in the long run, it becomes less and less in their interests.

Starting out from a very inferior position in which they hardly even command the market for Negro customers in a few service professions, they eventually reach the point of saturation and their personal ambitions can no longer be satisfied. This is what drove them to favour integration. Having to restrict their clientele to Negroes meant, in the long run, having to accept lower salaries for their services. It is at this point that the white petty bourgeoisie becomes more attached to segregation and the maintenance of race-barriers, at least in those places where significant numbers of Negroes live (vide the increasing Negrophobia of the urban Jews in the United States - they are the petty bourgeoisie par excellence). This white petty bourgeoisie in the United States has traditionally made use of Negroes as servants or employees in smaller establishments. (Much of this is better illustrated in South Africa where it still goes on: the little shop-keeper with his African servant, the Greek cafe-owner with his African waiters or the large number of small businessmen who can afford to have African messengers, and so forth). This white petty bourgeoisie in the United States was more dependent on lower-paid black labour for these functions, for solid business enterprises or richer individuals could either pay whites higher wages for the same things, or else organise their operations on a more efficient basis. In urban areas of the South and the North it was generally this petty bourgeoisie which employed Negroes, as servants, charwomen, waiters, messengers and office-boys, clean-up men, shop-assistants and this, together with a few trades such as 'red-caps', was the traditional range of occupations for that Negro minority which was not in agriculture. In some urban milieux they were also begrudged a monopoly on certain more profitable occupations such as that of coachmen, barbers or brick-layers, but this was only in a few places in the South and they were often driven out of these occupations later on. But throughout all this period the huge masses of blacks remained in agriculture, as share-croppers or such, and in the Southland.

3.7. The Race-System Seen in Historical Perspective

The race-system proceeds therefore from the fact that the inferior race consisted of lower-paid agricultural labour (if paid at all) and that it had a depressed legal status at best, at worst no legal status at all (i.e. slaves). This is extremely important to note because in South Africa Africans were originally farm-labourers or house-servants and could be disciplined. They can still be disciplined. Legally they are not employees but servants. As the system develops there is no doubt that the physical differences in the original proto-stocks made it more viable. It is indeed hard to envision how it could have functioned if this had not been the case; for one thing, fear of illicit miscegenation would not be present because this could easily be absorbed by the

system if there were no physical differences between the two stocks. That is, descent from this or that individual cannot be determined where there are physical differences, but it can be determined from which of the two stocks a person descends. Otherwise in discrepancies between the biological and legal ancestry of a person one could evade the issue by allowing the presumption that the latter takes precedence over the former (as in most of our legal systems). But in saying that these differences in physical traits in the two proto-stocks were prerequisites for the system as we know it, this should not be misunderstood as saying that 'differences in skin-colour lead to racism'. The 'foreign' origins of the inferior race - as this is expressed in the ideology of the superior race - also conveniently played into the system's rise. Religion too, no doubt, had its hand in the development. All of these things have been discussed elsewhere (91) and one should not ignore the existence of these many minor causes and counter-causes. The main characteristic of the system is the complete immobility of all individuals in the two groups. This is extremely rare and there are only vague parallels to it in the Indian caste-system, other there are no parallels. In 'race relations' there are two schools of thought, both coming from the United States. The one is the complacency school which holds that emphasis on social mobility, or rather a higher degree of it, is a purely American phenomenon and that there is much less of this in the Gentile countries, or it is sometimes said that emphasis on it proceeds from a 'Protestant middle class' bias and that it would be ethnocentric to transpose this onto other societies and insist that such mobility be present, failing which a particular social system would be condemned as unjust. This holds that social mobility is not normal. The guilt school of thought in American sociology devotes its attention to the curious contradiction that there was considerable social mobility possible for whites in the United States, while there was little social mobility for Negroes (or no racial mobility, as we would express it). It is therefore necessary to discuss the question of so-called social mobility.

Aside from the question of different social systems which may encourage or discourage social mobility, there are also circumstances which may do the same. Radical changes in economic conditions as well as economic fluctuations in sectors of the economy or economically peculiar regions generally lead to it; political revolutions are also circumstances which encourage it. In European history it has been mainly bubonic plagues and wars which have been the greatest stimuli of social mobility, for which reason one cannot be an undivided partisan of social mobility. In the case of wars it seems to make little difference if a country wins or loses, but in our opinion social mobility seems to be greater when a country loses a war. Disorderly conditions always lead to an increase in social mobility and this is why it has been great in such countries as the United States and South

Africa (where racial mobility has been almost nil). As we have elsewhere discussed (92), in the last century Irish navvies and camp prostitutes could end up becoming the 'city's first families' in Colorado, and in Kimberley Yiddish peddlers from the East End and sickly parsons' brats could become diamond magnates. The development of these countries in the latter part of the last century are characterised by an extremely rapid economic growth, and such circumstances will, under any conditions, lead to increased social mobility. Older wealth is sometimes slower to invest in newer and more profitable economic endeavours, occasionally because there are aristocratic prejudices about it (e.g. notions about a gentleman's place being in agriculture).

It is furthermore necessary to emphasise that social mobility works for the stability of the social order because it allows all to occupy those places for which they are best inclined and qualified. The purpose of social mobility is not to be 'nice' or 'democratic' but to strengthen the social order and make it more viable and efficient. The social mobility which a social system allows determines the chances of survival of that very system. This is what Marx had to say about social mobility.

Selbst wo ein vermögensloser Mann als Industrieller oder Kaufmann Kredit erhält, geschieht es in dem Vertrauen, dass er als Kapitalist fungieren, unbezahlte Arbeit aneignen wird mit dem geliehenen Kapital. Es wird ihm Kredit gegeben als potentielltem Kapitalisten. Und dieser Umstand, der so sehr bewundert wird von den ökonomischen Apologeten, dass ein Mann ohne Vermögen, aber mit Energie, Solidität, Fähigkeit und Geschäftskennntnis sich in dieser Weise in einen Kapitalisten verwandeln kann - wie denn überhaupt in der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise der Handelswert eines jeden mehr oder weniger richtig abgeschätzt wird -, so sehr er beständig gegenüber den vorhandenen einzelnen Kapitalisten eine unwillkommene Reihe neuer Glücksritter ins Feld führt, befestigt die Herrschaft des Kapitals selbst, erweitert ihre Basis und erlaubt ihr, sich mit stets neuen Kräften aus der gesellschaftlichen Unterlage zu rekrutieren. Ganz wie der Umstand, dass die katholische Kirche im Mittelalter ihre Hierarchie ohne Ansehen von Stand, Geburt, Vermögen aus den besten Köpfen im Volk bildete, ein Hauptbefestigungsmittel der Pfaffenherrschaft und der Unterdrückung der Laien war. Je mehr eine herrschende Klasse fähig ist, die bedeutendsten Männer der beherrschten Klasse in sich aufzunehmen, desto solider und gefährlicher ist ihre Herrschaft. (93)

The mobility of individuals between social groups also strengthens a system in that it reduces pressure arising in the system because the size of the groups can be determined by what society needs at a given moment. Here is the inferiority of the racial system: the rule of the superior race is less dangerous and solid than it would be otherwise.

If we leave aside, for the moment, races and castes, we might take a look at such ethnic groups which are more or less permanent and have a peculiar 'class-like' character, even though they do not qualify as classes per se. The rationale on which the group is built may be religious, national, linguistic or

whatever. The classic example is that of the Ashkenazic Jews where the rationale was religious (in Eastern Europe, national or linguistic as well), but this group took up certain positions in the economic and social systems of feudal society. This was a matter of degree and not one of absolutes: at two extremes there were activities which were reserved for them or from which they were totally barred, in between there were occupations for which they were considered more or less fitted as the case might be. (94) In such cases one can transfer individuals from one group to another. If the rationale is religion (as with the Ashkenazic Jews in the Middle Ages) one simply had them change their religion. If there were too many Jews for local society to hold some could always convert, and whenever Jews became too populous we suddenly see tendencies towards proselytisation increasing; where there were too few, others could be let in from the outside, but the problem could also be solved by letting them proselytise (which undoubtedly must have happened in the early Middle Ages). Nevertheless the system did not always work this smoothly as mobility is not as complete in such cases as it would be in a modern bourgeois society. As the rationale for the group's existence is religion, some people may not want to change, others may be unable to. In Eastern Europe the entire matter was confused by linguistic and cultural factors as well, hence there was even less mobility. Thus often, when it was a question of controlling the proper proportions of the Jewish group, the rulers employed crude methods such as expelling them, or forcing them to convert or simply killing them. Joseph II of Austria tried to keep their population under control by forbidding certain of them to marry (thus decreasing their birth-rate), elsewhere impounding them into military service had the same effect (Czarist Russia). Something vaguely similar can now be seen in East Africa where persons of Indo-Pakistani descent are also too large a group for the population to hold (and no longer as necessary as previously) and again we see that, as complete mobility is not possible, there is a tendency to eliminate them by simple expulsion. However with races we are dealing with descent groups where all mobility is impossible. One may not transfer individuals in any given moment and one cannot transfer people over generations, which can be done when the group's rationale is religious, linguistic or national (cf. the Janissaries). We are perfectly willing to admit that the total theoretical mobility of a modern bourgeois society is, historically speaking, very rare, but it should also be pointed out that the total theoretical immobility in a racial order is even rarer. The usual text-books in sociology (American) previously used the caste-system in India and Mediaeval Europe as prototypes of societies with little social mobility, but they have underestimated the amount of social mobility in the Middle Ages. First of all, the religious estate could not be recruited from itself in the Middle Ages; a person could not be born into it. Hence everybody entering it was socially mobile in that sense.

But even outside of this, not all mobility was impossible. Even making status hereditary is not the main point, for a person's racial status is not only hereditary, it is also unchangeable. In the Middle Ages we see both of these tendencies, though not always together. In a race-system they are, in fact, inseparable.

(94) It is quite true to say that hereditary was much more important in the Middle Ages than nowadays, but this does not mean that all social mobility was impossible. Slaves could not become emperors (as a few had done in the days of Rome) but a few did reach high positions. A pirate once became pope, showing that social mobility of this sort is no means an exclusively American phenomenon. The concept of 'estate' did not originally refer, as text-book authors like to think, to a division of society into nobles, roturiers, clergymen and burgesses. In fact, it originally referred to the religious estate. Originally it referred to a person's being lay or religious, and the latter were sometimes divided up into different estates (regular and secular; according to Thomas the latter were not of the true religious estate). The religious estate (in whatever definition) in the Middle Ages could not be recruited from itself, hence one could not enter it by birth. Here we do not have the hereditary character of status, but we do have its unchangeability for, having once entered the religious estate, one could not leave it again. (This is ideologically reflected in the Roman Catholic religion in the claim that once a priest has been invested with the power to convert bread and wine into sacral substances he may never again lose this power, even if he become an apostate or heretic). This is, in fact, the meaning of the word 'estate' (état. Stand) which comes from Latin status and the very word expresses immobility. Therefore all talk in sociology text-books about 'status-mobility' is somewhat illogical, given the etymology of the word: status a stando, non movendo!

(96) It is significant that the word later passed from this to meaning different social estates in the later feudal period. It can also be pointed out that the purely hereditary character of estate only established itself with the passage of time, but, even becoming hereditary, estate never became unchangeable. All of our discussion here further excludes the question of adoption. In practically all societies where 'birth' is extremely important, mobility is absorbed by society's ideology by making exaggerated use of the institution of adoption. Mobility or immobility is now a question which contains two moments: 1) if a status is hereditary, and 2) if it is changeable; but these two things do not necessarily coincide. In the case of races (and castes) they do, and this is what is significant. But immobility should not be discussed solely from an individual point of view. It is true that this or that individual may not change his race in a race-society, but what is more important is the collective implications which this has: neither can the relevant sizes of the two groups be changed by transferring certain people from one race to another. Given the principles on which the system rests

- multilinear descent, a greater degree of 'purity' demanded for membership in the superior race, and the precedence of biological over legal descent - all of this means that the system logically leads to tendencies for the inferior race to expand numerically at the expense of the superior one. It is true that in the United States as a whole, and even in the Southland, as well as in South Africa, over long periods of time the opposite, in fact, happened. This might appear to be a paradox, but, far from being that, it casts light on how the system operated.

Legal marriage between the races was either discouraged by social convention or by slavery (where the race groups still took the form of groups of different legal status, marriage between them was legally impossible). But in any case if tolerance towards intermarriage or interfornication appears, then it will tend to be tolerance towards a superior-raced man marrying, or mating with, an inferior-raced woman, rather than vice-versa. Legal statute or social custom may allow the former and prohibit the latter, but never the opposite. Now if both superior and inferior race groups marry and permanently cohabit only among themselves, their proportions in the population do not necessarily change (except for other reasons), even if a superior-raced man occasionally fornicates with an inferior-raced woman. He still impregnates his own superior-raced wife, providing for the reproduction of his own racial group. And if he impregnates an inferior-raced woman this has no effect because she produces an inferior-raced child (because of the multilinear principle and of the requirement for a high degree of 'purity' for membership in the superior race), just as if she had been impregnated by an inferior-raced man. If such miscegenation comes from casual intercourse (without permanent cohabitation) it does not increase the birth rate of the inferior race per se. The inferior-raced woman only produces a certain number of children and these will be inferior-raced persons. Originally there was always a preponderance of men over women in both groups. Such miscegenation weakens the system if carried out on a large scale over a long period of time - and this is why there are eventually tendencies to suppress it - because it produces lighter and lighter people whose superior-raced ancestry increases. One possibility is that they then pass the legal borderline. (Assume a society in which a Negro is defined as a person with one-eighth or more Negro admixture; in such a society a mating between a white person and an octoroon produces a person who is legally white). Another possibility is that this happens unofficially, the resulting product being too light to notice and he may 'pass' without the support of the legal system, or even in open defiance of its provisions. Otherwise, however, miscegenation from casual fornication does not change the relative proportions of the two race-groups. Now if marriage between a superior-raced man and an inferior-raced woman is possible, or if permanent cohabitation is common, then this still does not have the same disastrous

effects on the relative proportions of the two races as the opposite crossing, but it does begin to change the proportions. This starts to increase the size of the inferior race at the expense of the superior race. The superior-raced man is taken out of the realm of reproducing his own racial group and put to work in reproducing the inferior one. At first there was a dearth of superior-raced women and this had no effect. The reproduction of the superior, purely white, group was dependent upon the presence of white women and not of white men because there was always a preponderance of males over females in these societies. (97) But as society advanced, conditions became more normal and stable and then the native-born population accounted for a larger and larger percentage of the population-increase. As this happens, the tendency mentioned above begins to have a greater and greater effect. One reason for this is that the sex-ratio then comes nearer to the norm. This is vaguely seen in one of the statistics (cited above) for South Africa. Such miscegenation, by its very nature, increases the inferior race at the expense of the superior race. It has other undesirable effects. In cases where miscegenation occurs in permanent (but not legalised) cohabitation, the half-caste children are more closely identified with their superior-raced fathers than they would be if they were the products of transient fornication; similarly the fathers are more interested in improving the status of such children. Now the above thinking applies to the American system with only two race-groups, that is, where one has only two groups with no intermediate ones (such as mulattoes). Apply the same thing analogously to such situations and you will find that the middle race-group tends to expand at the expense of the two extreme race-groups, that is, we have society as a whole tending toward the middle (a 'coffee-coloured nation'). This is easily seen in the fact that originally there were no such things as mulattoes, there were only whites and blacks. Mulattoes increase *ceteris paribus*. (98) In case of a three-way hierarchy with a superior, an intermediate and an inferior race, the superior race loses population in regard to the other two, but so does the inferior race (another way of saying the same thing). In South Africa we have a more complicated situation because of the fact that 1) one race is a sammelsurium-race, 2) that a person enters this race if his parents belonged to two different races, and 3) that there are two intermediate races which do not consist of persons who are crossings of the two extreme race-groups. A person whose parents (or more distant ancestors) were white and black becomes a 'coloured person' in South Africa, but the majority of the people classified as such are not the descendants of such crossings. South African pamphleteers have confused this by giving people this impression. At any rate, basically the same thing happens here. Miscegenation (even by way of casual fornication according to the legal system) increases the various inferior races at the expense of the superior race, as long as the superior race is allow-

ed to miscegenate. This has now been stopped, but the other two or three races may still legally miscegenate with each other, in fact they may still legally intermarry with each other. All of this helps the 'coloured' group expand at the expense of the others. (99) This is probably deliberate on the part of the government. In judging the genesis of this system we should also not forget that originally another condition obtained: the slave group could not reproduce because it was systematically worked to death. Even in later periods its morality was always relatively high.

Permitting an inferior-raced man to fornicate with a superior-raced woman must create problems in a racial society and it need not be a question of legal intermarriage, for the results are the same. If membership in the superior race-group is made dependent upon a relatively large degree of descent from that group, as is always the case, allowing superior-raced women to miscegenate with an inferior-raced man establishes bonds of consanguinity between persons of different race. The mother is always related to the child, the father not necessarily so. But this has further ramifications. While an inferior-raced woman necessarily produces an inferior-raced child (given the system and excluding certain marginal cases), the system is not symmetrical. A superior-raced woman produces a superior-raced child only if impregnated by a superior-raced man. Otherwise she starts reproducing, not her own racial group, but the inferior one (again given the system and excluding certain marginal cases). Given the dearth of superior-raced women in earlier periods, intermarriage and intersexuality between superior-raced women and inferior-raced men would have led to a sharp decrease in the population of the superior race-group vis-à-vis the inferior ones, which is another reason why it was strictly forbidden. This demographic explanation should not be understood (or misunderstood) as saying that no other factors played into the same development. Indeed they did, and some of these have been discussed elsewhere. Different combinations of causal and counter-causal forces in different places led to different peculiarities of the system here and there. We are dealing with forces tending to create specific effects, even though they do not always produce the effects they are supposed to. They may be and, in fact they are, counter-balanced by counter-forces. These are extremely complicated, hence the great diversity which can be observed within more or less the same genus. Society is not a vending machine where you insert your 'independent variable' in the proper slot, press a certain button for the desired 'intervening variable' and then have the machine automatically and invariably emit a specific and unchangeable and identical 'dependent variable'. It is precisely such a demotic notion of 'causes' and 'effects' which lies at the basis of much Western sociology and prevents it from being scientific.

Thus the system, by its very nature, tends to increase the inferior race numerically at the expense of the superior race. Does it always have this 'effect'? The answer is no, not necessarily. The connexion between the relative viability of a race-system and the proportions of the two groups (or more) has been vaguely perceived by van den Berghe when he makes the following distinctions. In 'patriarchal' systems of 'race relations' he holds that there is always a great preponderance of the inferior race over the superior race (of course he does not dare use these words), but that in the 'competitive pattern of race relations' he then states that it is the opposite. He does not explain how this comes about. Furthermore this is overly generalised. But the idea is basically sound. At first there is a large preponderance of inferior-raced persons over superior-raced ones, but this proportion changes in favour of the opposite tendency with the passage of time, although it does not have to go to the limit which van den Berghe's generalisations suggest. What is interesting here is that it does so despite the natural tendencies of the system to go in the opposite direction. Van den Berghe did not attempt to explain why it happened. The real reason why this inherent tendency on the part of the race-system did not have the effect it was supposed to was that it was counter-balanced by other factors. As regards South Africa the statistics are very unreliable. We have already seen that in the 18th century the statistics tell us simply the number of free colonists and we do not know how many of these were whites. Neither do we know how they might have defined their races and there are any number of confusing factors, one of which is the question of expanding borders. But it is our own personal opinion that between 1700 and 1820 the inferior-raced group increased slightly at the expense of the superior-raced group. Between 1820 and 1914 the superior-raced group increased its proportions and after that time (when accurate statistics begin) we know that it has decreased again. The same thing can, in fact, be studied more accurately in the United States. From 1790, when the Negroes made up 19.3% of the population, through 1860 when they made up only 14.1% of the total population, there is a continual decrease until 1960 when they made up only 10.5%. (100) Since then there has been a slight rise. All of this was due to a large immigration of whites into the country. But other factors played into it. Originally, as we saw, African slaves were imported to the countries of the Western Hemisphere because Europeans were simply not available in such large numbers, but later on the situation is reversed: a huge white immigration is available and we see that the white immigration to these countries begins to surpass the non-white immigration, tending to expand the white group at the expense of the non-white group. This tendency begins about 1800. As pure whites entering these societies could not be enslaved, they had per force to be accommodated within the superior race-group. The system with its total immobili-

ty and its hereditary character of group-membership created a permanent labour-force which could be excluded from the rights and privileges of the superior race, which could be exploited in a specific area, and whose spatial mobility could be prevented just as much as its social mobility. This large mass of people, the inferior race-group, tended to be more homogeneous than the superior race, whatever the proportions of the two. The system aimed at permanency, at the preservation of the two groups. It allowed the concentration of power and wealth, which was its purpose, and for which reason it cannot be totally condemned historically. The alternative would have been a reversion to a more primitive social system. It goes without saying that the superior race exploits the inferior race, but this is not the differentia specifica of the system. In order to exploit a group, you must have it to exploit. If there are social forces tending to dissolve the group, then you will have to preserve it if you want to exploit it. This is then the purpose of the system. It prevented common bonds between superior-raced and inferior-raced persons, it prevented the mutual dissolution of the groups into each other (by way of segregation, i.a.) and so forth. The borders were much more sharply drawn because all ties of consanguinity or conjugal affinity were made impossible by the legal system. The system, it would seem, only arises where the inferior group is used in a sector of the economy which is important, permanent and necessary, although it does not have to be the most important part of the economy. Where non-white slaves were used at incidental jobs or as personal servants, as in Indonesia, no such system developed. This does not mean that there are no divisions in all other known types of societies. It simply means that there are elsewhere no race-groups as here conceived of. In all historically known cases it was originally agriculture or animal-farming in which race-systems evolved. The historical connexion withslavery is not incidental because these countries developed under circumstances which made any other system impossible if, as Adam Smith said, they did not want to live in 'barbarism'. This system after slavery, or even in places where there had been little slavery (South Africa), had the same general purpose as the slave-system: it bound a certain part of the population in a position from which it could not emerge and therefore prevented tendencies for a demographic dispersal (either geographically or in the social system) which would have dissipated the human forces of production. The race-system concentrates labour in its earlier stages.

This is how the system basically operates. Let us say that we have only two races and that they both make up 50% of the population. The superior-raced people take up all the superior positions in society, its activities being varied, ranging from everything from the highest ruling functions to the élite proletariat, and it will include the directors of the parasitic sector of the economy (clergymen, sociologists, the Race Relations Industry, and so forth). The inferior

race is generally fairly homogeneous and provides the bulk of the productive labour-force at the lowest level, but members of it may also be put to work in incidental functions such as house-servants, waiters, concubines for members of the superior race, and so forth. Assume now that the economy is perfectly geared to this. There are a large number of functions to be filled, some reserved for members of the superior race and some for members of the inferior race (ideally there will be no marginal ones). The ideological social norms of this society will reflect this. A certain specific function will be reserved for members of the superior race and this can be justified in any number of ways, be it that it is God's will, be it that only 2000 years of Christianity in one's ancestry can produce a man capable of fulfilling it, or it might be more honestly stated that it would have 'disastrous effects on proper relations between masters and servants' if one allowed a member of the inferior race to occupy it. Other functions will be reserved for members of the inferior race and an obverse justification will be used. People will say that this or that job is 'only fit for a nigger' or that 'no decent self-respecting white man would do it'. This has other important implications. No individual of one race-group may perform a function reserved for the other one. If it turns out that a member of the superior race-group is not qualified or suitable for any endeavour proper to his own race-group, he still must be given one or accommodated otherwise. He may be allowed to parasite off others, but he would never be allowed to assume a position reserved for the inferior race. Similarly, if a member of the inferior race is better qualified for a position reserved for the superior race, he still may not occupy it. This lack of mobility weakens the system, as Marx would have pointed out. But it is not the individual implications which primarily interest us, rather it is the collective implications which all this has. And this is the crux of the matter: the economy must provide economic functions so that 50% can live off functions reserved for the inferior race and 50% off functions reserved for the superior race. If this latter condition is fulfilled, the system will function very smoothly. Probably it would be a very stable system. There would be less social discontent in the inferior race-group than might be expected because the all-pervading ideology of this society would only reinforce social reality and both would greatly contribute to create an impression in everybody's mind that it could hardly be otherwise. And this because membership in races is hereditary and unchangeable and everything depends on this membership (plus the fact that these groups are thought of as having been produced by nature). But this 'ideal type' is an impossibility in the long run because it is based on impossible premisses. Let us look at the situation. Suppose the proportions change. There are any number of things which determine the birth and death rates, but it is quite possible that such changes will have different effects on the different race-

groups. They lead very different lives under very different conditions, thus it is easy to imagine the possibility of a discrepancy in the birth and death rates. And this will shift the proportions. The economy is supposed to be geared to a 50-50 division of functions, but rationalisation, or regression, or any other economic change might lead to a system needing some other proportions. Let us say that the proportions remain 50-50 but the economy needs 40-60 or 60-40. Or the economy might remain geared to 50-50 but the proportions might become 40-60 or 60-40. Minimal changes of this type do not immediately lead people to abolish the social systems under which they live and start building up another one from scratch, but they lead to strains on the social system. An excess of population over available functions in one race-group (overflooded labour market), or the excess of available functions over the available population (labour shortage) will produce strains on the system, the one no less than the other. It matters little in which direction this imbalance goes, but historically the cases known have been of an excess in the population of the inferior race. With minimal discrepancies, such as here described, this system will simply be burdened with extra tensions, but this will, in turn, decrease its efficiency. As the discrepancies become greater and greater this will necessitate new measures of control, which then begin to undermine the stability of the system. Here we have assumed two variables: the proportions of the actual population and the proportions which the economy can use, and it is inevitable that a discrepancy will appear sooner or later, for only in an extremely static society could it be otherwise. There is, however, a third variable here and that is the system. But what is significant is that a race system cannot change as much as it would have to in order to be viable; if there is a slight excess in the population of the inferior race and a slight dearth in the population of the superior race, the system may readjust its definition of racial membership to include more people in the superior race, or it may close its eyes and allow a lot of unofficial 'passing'. Another possibility is to redefine truth and declare certain jobs, previously considered 'only fit for niggers', to be perfectly acceptable for white men under certain circumstances. But basically changes in the system can only be minimal and, in the case of South Africa, attempts of the system to escape its own contradictions only get it involved in greater difficulties later on. (101). Basically the system is fairly rigid and conservative because it is bound to nature. In other societies where highers and lowers are defined by other criteria and where descent is not taken seriously - if it be of any significance - it is easy to define the two categories as the situation demands and to change these definitions as conditions change. In a race-system reality is bound, to a certain extent, to nature because the socially defined characteristic is based on hereditary physical characteristics which are produced naturally. Originally racists loved to think how

normal and natural and convenient it was that God and/or nature had produced different biological races (identifiable by different hereditary physical traits) because this fit in well with their social system where these two groups were adapted to different social stations within the same society, but the racist is only this enamoured of this natural and material basis of a race-society as long as the proportions do not get out of hand. At that point he suddenly turns about and decides that God and/or nature intended the races to live separately in separate societies. The best illustration of this is the present nonsense in South Africa about 'developing the Bantu homelands'. At one time there were 'Bantu homelands' in South Africa which were quite developed under the circumstances and, historically speaking, the white man was more interested in liquidating them and drawing the black man into the white economy. As the proportions are now getting out of hand, he suddenly develops an interest in building up what his ancestors always sought to dismantle. The white man in South Africa now finds himself in the same situation as Rabbi Löw: Ach, Herr, die Not ist gross, Die ich rief, die Geister, Die werde ich nun nicht los! Originally the nature-bound character of the system probably led to considerable stability from the point of view of the superior race. At present it is leading to its instability. The system was probably very stable in its time; over long periods of time it seems to have been more stable than a normal bourgeois society, but it is by no means so stable when its time has come. Or, as the Christians say: 'that which was his sin then became his punishment'. At this stage, when its time is over, it becomes patently less stable than a normal bourgeois society, hence attempts have been made in the United States at present to abolish the system as such and extend formal bourgeois equality to all races in such a way as to make 'race' a socially insignificant factor and racial groups socially irrelevant groups. But this is much harder to do than the oligarchy originally thought. The impossibility of changing a person's race (racial membership) in a race-system makes the members of the inferior race less interested in improving their position individually and more interested in improving the position of the race-group as such. This is the main reason why blacks in the United States have never been able to accept the ideology of Americanism to the same extent as the whites. Even American sociologists now realise this and it is the members of the ruling Establishment who are most painfully aware of it. Originally this was not felt because there was still room for mobility within the race-group and within the terms of the system (hence the ambivalent attitude of the black bourgeoisie in the United States), but when these possibilities are exhausted it is the position of the race-group as such that has to be improved. Even this does not lead to social peace as expected but to its opposite, because the ultimate goal of this development is to abolish the system, even though the inferior race is not always conscious of what it is doing and even

though it may claim to have more limited goals in sight, such as 'full equality for all races', but this is a euphemism for abolishing the system because, if races be equal, then why have races at all? The French Revolution did not terminate in 'equality for all estates', it abolished this form of classifying people.

American sociologists have unwittingly shown why the race-system becomes patently unstable and leads to 'violence in the ghettos' at this point:

If we follow the clues provided by Simmel and Ross, we come to see that the multiple group affiliations of individuals make for a multiplicity of conflicts criss-crossing society. Such segmental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavage along one axis. (102)

Can one have any doubts as to the author's intention with this statement about 'preventing cleavage along one axis'? Can anyone be in any doubt as to which 'axis' he would like to prevent cleavage along? But at any rate, this is why cleavage on class-lines or other lines is less important in a racial society at best, and totally unimportant at most. Cleavage along racial lines prevents this to the extent that the system has not already made it impossible by forbidding or hindering multi-racial groupings of other sorts. This is one reason for the relative absence of sharp class cleavages in such societies. This would appear to lead to greater stability, but it does not for, whatever instability may be prevented 'along this line', the system engenders instability 'along that line'. Thus tensions arising from other divisions in the population - classes included - either take the form of race conflicts, or become distorted into such. Either we have class conflicts disguised as conflicts of viewpoint 'on the race question' or we find race conflicts breaking out into the open when some other conflict in some other sector of society cannot be fought out. An example of something very similar is seen in Northern Ireland where the groups have historically been defined on religious criteria and we see that class struggle is distorted in this direction, so that outsiders in certain neighbouring countries tend to look down their noses and snort about the Irish being just so many primitive religious bigots, engaging in a war of faith in the wrong century. In Northern Ireland we see, incidentally, the same thing mentioned above. During a long period of time, fifty years, this peculiar social system was very stable and for the same reason as a race-society. But when its time came, the very society which had previously suppressed all tendencies towards instability, then began to engender it all the more. This tendency towards race-cleavage, cleavage on purely racial lines, also explains why there is so little class consciousness in such societies, at least as far as multi-racial classes go. But even outside of this, where classes refer to divisions within the race groups, there is less consciousness about class. This is another reason why one should not confuse races in such societies with classes in our own, because in them racial consciousness is shown

to a much greater extent than is class consciousness in a bourgeois society. The difference between a race-society and a class-society is that, in a modern bourgeois society, the social structure consists of different classes but, as membership in them is neither necessarily hereditary nor unchangeable, there is no legal definition of class-membership and the existing social definitions are very vague. The tendency of bourgeois states nowadays is either to deny that classes exist (as in the United States) or to minimise their importance (as in Western Europe). At any rate we know of no bourgeois society where there is a Class Classification Board similar to South Africa's Race Classification Board, or where people have their 'class' written into their identity cards. The whole idea would sound quite amusing to us. This is the difference that we alluded to elsewhere (103) when we said that one's position in the economic system precedes one's class and determines it, whereas 'race' is a racial society precedes one's position in the economic structure and determines it. This is why there are no such things as laws defining class membership similar to South Africa's Population Registration Act. What could its purpose be in Europe? This is also why race consciousness is always greater in a racial society than is class consciousness in a modern bourgeois society and why it is more or less permanent. Would it not greatly increase class consciousness in our own societies if people were obliged to carry identity cards with their 'class' indicated on them? Class consciousness is only felt in a bourgeois society when some class conflict is going on (particularly during strikes), or when some tension is felt, whereas race consciousness is permanently felt in a race-society.

3.8. Brief Notes on Certain Other Minor Aspects of the Race-System

One of the few other social systems which resembles a race-system is the caste-system in India and, in recent years, it has been fashionable to dwell on the similarities. We have elsewhere (104) mentioned the American scholar Berreman who could hardly see any difference between India and Alabama. We hold no brief for Alabama or its traditional social structure and we would normally be quite willing to ridicule it (or the United States as a whole) by suggesting that it is no better than backward old India. But, for reasons of scientific honesty, we are obliged to point out that analogies between the race-system and the Indian caste-system are very misleading. The classical caste-system was a division into four main castes which were supposedly equally separate from each other. The race-system rarely contains as many as four race-groups in the same place and, furthermore, they are not all equally distant from each other as there is generally one superior race and several inferior races of varying degrees of inferiority. But in addition, the proportions must necessarily be different in a race-system from

what they are in the caste-system. The history of the caste-system shows an unending process of castes splitting up into sub-castes so that there eventually evolved several thousand castes by the beginning of this century (at which time the census ceased to contain information on caste). We see no such thing in the race-system; quite the contrary we see a gradual fusion of races. Certain race-groups grew up from the mixing of several different race-groups or ancestral stocks and this is what we have referred to as a sammelsurium-race. The 'colour-eds' in South Africa (in the legal sense) are an excellent example, but more narrowly the Cape 'Bruinmense' also arose from a fusion of two socially distinct parental stocks, the Hottentots and the slaves at the Cape. In the South of the United States, the Negroes and Indians, originally two races, blended together eventually (though there are a few pure-blooded Indians left), and much of this seems to have occurred in the days of slavery, but it apparently continued until as recently as the turn of the century. Within race-groups we rarely, if ever, find racially defined sub-groups. South Africa's Population Registration Act provides for the delimitation of 'ethnic groups' within the inferior race-groups, but these 'ethnic groups' are not racially defined. Note also that the legislators avoided using the word 'race' here. In the United States it is the superior race which contains any number of sub-groupings, some called 'ethnic groups', but these are not racially defined either. The caste-system in India was originally said to have arisen when the Aryan invaders subjugated the darker-skinned Dravidian inhabitants of the sub-continent. This seems to have been an ideologic inversion of reality. The white racial system elsewhere led people to see such a thing in India's past. At any rate, the basic idea of the caste-system - as we have heard it described - is that castes occupy different professions and perform different duties. There are castes of priests, warriors, barbers, potters and every other imaginable thing. This is the opposite of the segregation system where we have parallel functions in many trades, as where you have a Negro preaching for the Negro Baptist church and a white preacher for the white Baptist church. You also have a black doctor to treat the black patients and a white doctor to treat the white patients and so forth. The proponents of segregation always defend it on the grounds that it is better to have the members of the inferior race 'serving his fellows rather than trying to compete with the white man'. This is the opposite because functions here are parallel and not complementary. Even where the functions were complementary, the inferior race was never alone in that function (Negroes were basically agricultural workers in the South, but so were many whites). Regarding the relationship between Hinduism and the caste-system, it has long been argued over which led to which. Leaving aside speculation on this point, we can say that the two have coexisted so long together that they are practically inseparable and well-attuned to each other. Islam is much less

compatible with the caste-system, and where the two coexist they have modified each other. Christianity, on the other hand, is not that compatible with the race-system, in fact, Christianity existed for some 1500 years without any such thing. The caste-system tends to weaken and break down when Indo-Pakistanis emigrate from their own country and settle elsewhere. The race-system grew up in societies founded by Europeans who had migrated there from their continent of origin. The caste-system was possible in a static society for almost 1500 years. Racism as a social system appears only for a short while in a few countries at a relatively early period in their development. It will definitely not last 1500 years. All that we know seems to indicate that the caste-system is a logical and natural outgrowth of Indian civilisation, whereas the race-system is a bastard product of unseemly parentage in the history of Western Civilisation and will be looked upon as such in the future.

Our thinking above referred basically to the United States and South Africa where there are two races, or several but with a tendency to divide into one superior race and leave the others as inferior races. In South Africa the historical tendency has been towards a division into pure whites and all others, vide the use of the word 'gekleurd' in the Transvaal as early as the last century, and vide also the gradual assimilation of the legal status of the coloureds to that of the Africans. But what about more complicated situations with several race-groups? Our impression is that, unless miscegenation takes place very early and no system evolves, they all tend to a polarisation into two main race-groups. But it is never certain in the beginning what will happen. The Amerindian races in the Western Hemisphere have largely disappeared into the white or black races, in Brazil more into the former, in the United States more into the latter. Here we have races which were all present from the beginning. What happens if a third race is introduced from the exterior later on? At first the presence of a race-system vis-à-vis one group of non-whites tends to disfavour other groups of non-whites. This is seen in Natal. Established traditions of defining individuals on the basis of 'race' make it easier to do the same thing with new groups, something which is harder to do in a society which has traditionally not contained any race-groups (such as Western Europe). Frequently these races can be used as buffers or intermediates between the two extreme race-groups. The Indo-Pakistanis often end up in this unfortunate position. To the superior-raced oligarchy it always seems advisable to divide up the inferior races into groups to prevent their making common cause and to play them off against each other, and in South Africa this is the official aim and policy is supposed to be formulated according to it ('five million hearts beating as one'). But, whatever the official day-dream may be, the system has always had the opposite effects. In South Africa the opposition often accuses the Nationalist government of alienating the coloureds with its policy,

suggesting that it would be more advisable to cultivate their support to be used against the Africans. But it is not blimpishness which leads the Nationalists to pursue this policy. They are obviously being forced in this direction by tendencies inherent in the system. Just as tendencies to strengthen a race-system vis-à-vis this race might have the same effects vis-à-vis some other race (as in South Africa since 1948), it can be pointed out that the same is true for many factors which motivate towards a liquidation of the system. This is brought out by the problem posed to the State of California by the ratification of the 15th Amendment. In ratifying this amendment, the white people of California would have been forced to grant the franchise to the Negroes in their own midst, something which they had theretofore declined to do voluntarily. But their object in ratifying it was not to 'be nice' to the blacks, rather it was to smash the power of the old ruling class in the South, something which vastly outweighed the disadvantages it might have had if the local Negroes had been allowed to vote (the latter were very few). But there was another problem and that was the Chinese, who were also a 'race' and the wording of the amendment made it easily applicable to them as well. Here the ratification of this amendment on the national level, with California participating, had main effects which were to be felt elsewhere and its purpose was to enhance the legal position of another race, but it also improved the position of the Chinese 'race' in California. The traditional view has been to interpret everything in terms of 'prejudice' or 'colour prejudice' which is only true to the extent that, in all of these societies, it is pure whites who make up the superior race, so that it is difficult to start admitting people with darker skin to this race, even if they in no way be related to the dark-skinned race against whom the system operates. But marginal situations do occur. We can refer the reader to what we have written elsewhere (104) about the Amerindians and the Indo-Pakistanis in the United States and about transient Japanese visitors to South Africa. Few definite conclusions emerge from this. An entire school of thought once held that traditions of 'tolerance' or 'lack of prejudice' towards one race might incline people to the same virtues vis-à-vis some other race. This is behind Freyre's theory of the 'bi-continental culture of the Portuguese' (he later said something similar about the Russians). He often supported this theory by using a confused and confusing vocabulary. The Moors were Africans, and so are the Negroes, but they are not of the same biological race (nor are they culturally considered as very closely related to each other). As the Portuguese mixed with the Moors in Portugal, so, he reasoned, they later tended to mix with Negroes and Amerindians in Brazil. Nevertheless the history of Brazil proves the opposite, at least heretofore and at least as far as Negroes are concerned. Several hundred years after the Reconquest of Algarve there are no recognisable groups of Moors left in Portugal, but there are still groups recognisable

as Negroes in Brazil. The only thing we can state definitely here is that it would seem that miscegenation between the white race and a darker race is liable to make it harder for a race-system to appear vis-à-vis another dark-skinned race, as long as skin-colour is evidence of an 'ascertainable admixture' of that descent. But there are other possibilities: one can declare hair form to be a racial characteristic and run the system on that. If skin-colour is the main criterion chosen, and if the superior race-group is too dark, the distinction will disappear with a lesser degree of miscegenation. Another way of saying the same thing is that it makes physical appearance an unreliable guide to racial ancestry in an earlier generation, leading either to a less efficiently functioning race-system, or discouraging its development altogether. It is our own opinion that part of the Japanese or Chinese 'races' in California have disappeared into the white group through intermarriage because statistics show a peculiarly low rate of growth for these race-groups. Bound to nature as it is, the race-system cannot operate very well if the original stocks were not that disparate physically. The statistics for the Jewish 'mestizos of the first degree' and, even more, those 'of the second degree' collected by the National Socialists show this very well: the physical differences between Jews and other Europeans were too slight for such a system to operate in the way its authors intended. We can draw the same general conclusion from the history of Brazil, but otherwise it is a complex question which would require greater study and thought and it would probably also require data which we simply do not possess. Not only full-blown racial societies, but even societies with tendencies in that direction are rather rare. 'Race relations' sociology with its conceptual apparatus of 'prejudice' and 'intolerance' and 'ethnicity' and God-knows-what-else has confused this matter because racial societies are freaks and we do not really possess so many examples that we could speculate about this. In the United States questions of different races are confused by the fact that almost all non-whites are Negroes and the other races which exist live in different places so that we cannot test the effects of a race-system with regard to them all. Some categories such as 'Puerto Ricans' and 'Chicanos' are not races legally. In New York the Negroes and Puerto Ricans remain distinct even though they may live near each other and were originally relegated to the same economic and social status, but this says much less than it would seem to because some Puerto Ricans are Negroes and outsiders cannot always distinguish the various groups. Furthermore, the large colony of Spanish-speaking persons in New York includes people from places other than Puerto Rico but they are confused with Puerto Ricans in the public mind. Types of race-systems have also existed in California vis-à-vis two Asian races, the Japanese and the Chinese, but it would appear that they have, despite this, been disappearing into the white population, and this race-system was never very stringent compared to the one which operated vis-à-vis the Negroes. The

number of people encompassed by these 'race' categories is small even from a local point of view. Certain cities in Southern California are the only places in the United States where one can really speak of a 'multi-racial society' (and this situation only came about in the last twenty-five years); in most other places society is either biracial or monoracial. Generally in cities there is a white majority and a black minority, plus scattered little colonies and individuals who belong to neither group.

The social attitudes and social mores generated by the race-system in one place are, as can be expected, carried to other regions where they cannot have the same 'causes' or functions. Here we see the importance of national culture, for in the United States the race-system has operated vis-à-vis the Negroes in a fairly uniform manner throughout the entire country, including in many places where it could only be explained by habit or custom imposed upon the region by the national culture, for the simple reason that the population of Negroes was too negligible for it to be the result of the local social structure, or anything else in the locality. We could cite the name of a little town in the Great Interior of the country where 'prejudice' vis-à-vis the Negroes is probably greater than in large cities such as New York or Detroit and 'where social distance' has undoubtedly always been greater. Nevertheless, in this particular place with a population of about 10,000 people there seemed to be only about fifty Negroes (a maximum estimate), or about 0.5% of the population. There are entire states of the Union with a smaller percentage. Vermont, according to the 1960 census, had only 519 Negroes within its borders out of a total population of 190,000; North Dakota had only 777 out of a population of 632,000; Negroes made up only 0.2% of the population of Montana and only 0.6% of the population in Minnesota. There are undoubtedly a few million Americans who have never seen a living Negro. Nevertheless in many of these localities with such negligible black populations the general population shares the same feelings towards them which one can find elsewhere. Segregation was also practiced in these places (unofficially) and it was rather cruel. Where the Negro group is large enough, there are enough blacks to support their own segregated institutions and to socialise with each other, but in places where they were very few they were condemned to great loneliness. Their problems have been increased by a serious imbalance in the sex-ratio. According to a recent study, in 1970 there were 169.2 black males for every black female in Montana, the figure was 160.3 for North Dakota and 158.5 for Idaho. These are all states with negligible Negro populations. Racists in the United States and South Africa tended to explain European attitudes on the subject out of the fact that the countries of Europe have a homogeneous white population. Where non-whites are only a handful in a basically

white society there is no reason to discriminate against them and they may even be cultivated as exotic, or so it was said. This excuse is no longer tenable. There are European cities and even countries which have higher percentages of non-whites than many of these states in the interior of the United States (albeit these 'non-whites' in Europe are not always Negroid). North Dakota and Montana once forbade intermarriage where the Negro minority was so small, and they forbade it by law. The Negro minority within these states was much smaller than is now the Negroid minority in England or France. They also forbade intermarriage with 'Mongolians' and the number of such people in the population was much smaller than is now the percentage of so-called Indo-Europeans in the population of the Netherlands. But none of these European countries has ever enacted laws prohibiting intermarriage of persons of different race and none ever will; in fact, in France and the Netherlands there is no legal concept of race. In Great Britain there is only a vague tendency to define an 'Asian' race in the legal system. Such things as 'Negroes' or 'non-whites' are simply not relevant entities in the laws of European countries. The only exceptions are outside of modern European culture (the 'cult of the blood' in 16th century Spain, the Third Reich).

Such attitudes to such small racial minorities can never be explained by their position in the social structure, for what position can 0.2% of the population take up in a social structure? It would be possible if they were the top 0.2% of the population, but never the bottom 0.2%. The explanation that all 'race prejudice' should function as a 'justification for exploitation' cannot apply to such places, for it would be hard to explain how 99.8% of the population needs 'race prejudice' in order to justify its exploitation of the other 0.2%. For that matter, it would be interesting to know how 99.8% of the population can exploit the remaining 0.2%. All of this shows the very strong influence of national culture. The same effects can be seen if we go outside the realm of national culture and talk of such national cultures as are closely related to each other. The same thing is true, but to a lesser degree. Observe the fact that there have always been small colonies of Negroes in Canada (generally living near the border of the United States) and they have lived under similar conditions, but legal discrimination against them has fallen on the fact that the Canadian legal system contains no distinction between 'Negroes' and other parts of the general population. Such discrimination by custom could easily spread over the border, because the culture of Canada is hardly very different from that of the regions of the United States which directly border on it. But legal discrimination (such as intermarriage prohibitions) could not spread because the culturally meaningless border between North Dakota and Manitoba was, nonetheless, meaningful as a legal border because it divided legal systems which were more distinct from each other than the day-to-day culture of the local inhabitants. If one went further afield studied the matter in England, one could find the same influence but with even

weaker effects. It has always been our impression that the high degree of racial consciousness in Great Britain has been the result of the close cultural and ideologic ties of that country to the Anglo-Saxon countries of the Ultramarine, all of which are race-societies to some extent or other. Similarly the contact between different peoples may spread tendencies in this direction. American tourism, at least in Europe, had the effect (in previous years) of encouraging Europeans to discriminate against non-whites. This left most Europeans, especially of the middle generation, with an exaggerated idea about the extent of anti-Negro discrimination in the United States and of the degree of commitment of most Americans to it. Among the French and the Germans the idea is still strongly in-rooted that all Americans in all parts of the United States were opposed to so much as sitting in the same bus as Negroes. In Great Britain it was the 'visitors from the colonies and the Commonwealth countries' which brought about the same effect. This was once discussed by Kenneth Little and Michael Banton, and it seems to have been particularly acute in the 1940's and 1950's. Both of these scholars leaned to the view that some of this discrimination was stimulated by foreign Anglo-Saxons who had popularised their peculiar attitudes in Great Britain. Banton also mentioned civil servants who had retired back to the Metropolitan from the former colonies. Sheila Patterson's argument ran in the opposite direction, suggesting that it was war-time experiences overseas and other contacts with the old Empire which had left too many Englishmen with 'wog complexes' (as she called it). Whatever the case, if it be the Anglo-Saxons of the Ultramarine who brought their attitudes to Great Britain, or Britons who picked it up from visiting the Anglo-Saxon countries of the Ultramarine, the conclusion is the same: it spreads by close cultural contact from the Ultramarine to Europe. Tendencies in this direction can be stimulated by such contact, but it would be silly to think that an entire social system could be transplanted across the oceans in like manner. At any rate, those societies which have heretofore been racial societies to some extent or another are all progressing towards the liquidation of such systems or such tendencies, thus the whole thing is being eliminated at its source.

One of the best measuring sticks for the development of a race-system is the attitude taken to the half-raced person, called 'mulatto' or 'mestizo' in the various terminologies of classification. In the beginning no-one in these societies was opposed to his existence and he was welcomed as a convenience and he was clearly distinguished from the pure-raced inferiors, even though he was not always equal to the pure-raced superiors. The production of such half-raced persons was not opposed in the beginning, least of all was it considered immoral. On the contrary it was often considered in a very positive light. In later periods the position of the half-raced man tends to deteriorate and sometimes he, was

equated with the pure-raced inferior altogether (as in the United States); generally a line was drawn between those who were of pure superior race and all others, and while differences between inferior races might still be made, the borderline now went between pure white and all else. Eventually the half-raced person is not wanted at all and at this point theories arise to the effect that it is wrong to 'mix one's blood' and that the 'race-purity' of the inferior race should be protected and preserved as much as that of the superior race. Here even illicit intersexuality between superior-raced males and inferior-raced females became considered so shameful that it was never mentioned. This is seen in South Africa where the sources are often at great pains to point out that South Africans, true South Africans never 'miscegenated' and that any eventual half-raced persons with white blood must be the result of the doings of transient sailors. And as recently as fifteen years ago the official version of this was that it had been English sailors who had committed that abominable deed. The same thing is seen in the Southland where the existence of mulattoes was blamed on the 'Yankee overseers' in the slave-period or the 'Carpetbaggers' in Reconstruction.

If one reads through the pseudo-scientific literature in support of the race-system, one can see that this entire ideology of racism never solved the problem of the half-raced person. Sometimes he was considered better than both parental stocks, sometimes worse, sometimes he was said to be in between, other times he was said to represent the worst elements of both his parental stocks. Still other people said that stable intermediate types could probably not be formed. And all these contradictory views are not just found in different ideologists of the same general school, they are often found in the very same ideologist. In the last century (no earlier) the idea began to appear that schizophrenia and instability and weakness of character were typical for mulattoes. The mulatto was said to be torn between two races, his superior genes giving him ambitions which his inferior genes prevented him from fulfilling; even wierder things were brought up. It was said that the crossing of a large-chested race with a small-chested race could be dangerous because it might produce a person with a small chest and large lungs and this would lead to respiratory disorders. Analogously a large-jawed man 'mixing his blood' with a woman of a small-jawed race might have to worry about producing a crossing whose teeth would not sit right in his mouth. The weirdest example was that of the crossing of tall and short races which could, it was said, produce people with extremely long legs and extremely short arms. In all seriousness it was held that such a person would be disadvantaged in the 'struggle for survival' because he was less adept at picking things up off the ground. From Lapouge apparently comes the idea that the mulatto had no desire to reproduce, because he had no type to reproduce. In the last century the stereotype developed about the mulatto who hated his father and despised his mother, a misfit

who was rejected by both his parental race-groups. Despite all this, the excuse is (still! in the United States) invariably offered in ideologic defence of the race-system that any Negro not as inferior as theories would hold could easily be explained away as a 'mulatto'. Inconvenient empiric findings about the intelligence quotients of Negroes in the North of the United States were invariably explained away on the grounds that the 'Negroes' there were mulattoes. Some people even claimed that Shaka Zulu was not entirely black. In general South African anthropologists think that the Bantu-speaking peoples of the Eastern Coast have some Phoenician or Arabic blood in them which is supposed to explain away the fact that they are not as inferior as racial theories would normally suggest.

The inability of pseudo-scientific racism to decide once and for all about the status and character of the half-raced man, or to come to any semi-coherent conclusions about the results of 'race mixing' reflects nothing but the inability of the racial system to fit the half-raced man into its social scheme, or to survive the effects of miscegenation. This is also seen in the commonly-heard excuses of people 'who bear no ill will to coloured people as such' but who oppose intermarriage nonetheless. We are all acquainted with the talk about 'of course people who love each other should marry' but with the added reservation, 'but there's the problem of the child. It's always the child who suffers in an interracial marriage'. This attitude assumes that the world is divided into two sorts of people, and that this is the most important division, and that a person must be either the one or the other, but this is only because the system (or its culture) provides only these two categories. Remarks about it 'really being the child who suffers' allude to the real difficulty and that is that it is this system which suffers from the existence of half-raced people. Hence, towards the end, the system tries to discourage half-raced people and this is sanctimoniously called a 'brief for the unborn' or something similar. Eventually this fear of the half-raced person is taken to extremes and extended to near-whites and even whites with a suspected 'touch of the tar-brush'. In the first part of this century in the Anglo-Saxon countries certain ideologues spread hysteria about so-called throw-backs. It was common in the United States and Carroll's *The Negro a Beast* contains several plates alluding to the possibility of two perfectly white people having a fully Negroid child with thick lips and kinky hair, and this simply because one of the parents had a slight Negro ancestry. Carroll even tried to prove that a person with even the slightest Negro ancestry could not have an 'immortal soul' and could not be a human being in the Christian sense of the word (i.e. he would be incapable of going to hell). Cox in *White America* complained that it was 'not the assegai but the tar-brush which was threatening Western Civilisation' which is just the ideologue's way of saying that miscegen-

ation was beginning to threaten the racial system. (105) This shows that this system or this ideology cannot be understood without listening attentively to its propagandists and apologists. The pious liberal bias of most race relations industrialists who study this matter is that 'science has disproven these racist myths' and that 'the arguments of the apologists are so irrational and illogical that they need no refutation', hence instead of reading an ideologue who is a racist himself, the pious liberal reads what this or that antiracist has to say about the system. Such methodology is impermissible for a Marxist scholar. Our founder always went 'ad fontes' and not to the polemical writings of those who were of exactly the same opinion as he himself. For what racist ideologists have to say alludes to the reality which he perceives better than the pious liberal pamphleteer, except that in the racist's mind everything appears in a distorted and topsy-turvy form. He says 'the child suffers' when he really means 'the system suffers', or in the expression of a proverb which is common in the Germanic languages: he clearly hears the bell ringing though he cannot see the clapper.

In this regard it would be relevant to point out, in closing, that inasmuch as the half-raced man is the negation of racism in the very terms which this system establishes, it logically follows that miscegenation is what follows upon the passing of such a social formation. If a man of one colour should impregnate a woman of another colour and she should produce a child of intermediate skin-colour, then this is in itself nothing but a case of human reproduction. It is only within a certain period and within a certain type of society that people even think of creating a special term such as 'miscegenation' for such an occurrence, and it demands even more peculiar circumstances for society to try to criminalise such an act. When the race-society is surpassed and passes onto history, the barriers between the descendants of the two historical races also fall and they mix, just as knights and knaves, Christians and Jews were endogamous groups in the Middle Ages but their descendants are now confounded with each other.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter One

1. Conlen, 131-224.
2. Weber, 70.
3. Ibid, 177.
4. Ibid, 195.
5. Conlen, 70-72.
6. Weber, 637.
7. See in this regard the remarks of Betty Friedan in Feminine Mystique.
8. Elmer, 198ff.
9. Christensen, 281ff.
10. Ibid, 184.
11. Barron, 58.
12. Ibid, 59.
13. Weber, 83-84.
14. Ibid, 183.
15. Ibid, 186.
16. Ibid, 220.
17. Ibid, 534-35.
18. Ibid, 363.
19. Ibid, 144, 147.
20. Ibid, 179, 219.
21. Ibid, 217, 223.
22. Ibid, 221.
23. Ibid, 15.
24. Ibid, 400.
25. Conlen, Chapter Eight.
26. Ibid, Ninth Chapter; also Chapter Three of this dissertation.
27. Weber, 17-18.
28. Chapter Three of this dissertation.
29. Marx, Grundrisse.
30. Conlen, Chapters Nine and Ten; see also Chapter Three of this dissertation.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, Chapter Ten.

Chapter Two

1. Dixon, 29, 37; Ernest Sevier Cox, 126; Cash, 119; Arnold Rose, 23, 25; Dollard, 439.
2. Fernandes, 1:255.
3. Richmond, 279.
4. Sheila Patterson, Colour and Culture, 302; Björkhem, 82ff.
5. Sachsenspiegel, 1:45:1.
6. Kennedy, 59; Alabama Constitution 1865, art. IV, sec. 31; Arizona Revised Code 1928, §2166; Mississippi Constitution 1890, sec. 263; Florida Constitution 1885, art. XVI, sec. 24; Florida Statutes 1959, §741.11-19; Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 42, sec. 12-15; Oregon Code 1930, 14:840-842, 6-902, 33-102; Georgia Civil Code 1927, §2179; Mississippi Code 1927, §1128; North Carolina Code 1927, §§4341, 4343; Code of South Carolina Laws 1932, §1438; Virginia Code 1930, §§4540, 4546, 4547, 5099a.(5).
7. Act No. 55 of 1949 (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act); Act No. 21 of 1968 (Mixed Marriages Amendment Act).
8. Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre (Blutschutzgesetz) vom 15.9.1935; Erste Verordnung zur Ausführung des BSchG vom 14.11.1935; Runderlass des Reichs- und Preussischen Ministeriums der Justiz zugleich im Namen des Stellvertreters des Führers vom 17.1.1936 ("Ausführungsanweisung zum 3. Paragraph der ersten Verordnung zur Ausführung vom BSchG"); Stuckart/Globke, passim, esp. 130.
9. Stürmer, 22:1936.

10. Stürmer, 50:1936.
11. Deutsches Recht, 1939, Heft 31, S. 1678, "Zur Scheidung rassisch gemischter Ehen", quoted in Poliakov/Wulf, Das dritte Reich und seine Diener, 297.
12. Werner Klemm, "Die Lösung deutsch-jüdischer Mischehen" in Deutsches Recht, 1939, Heft 38, S. 1869.
13. Decisions Breslau Synod of 1266, 19:11; Vienna Synod of 1267, caput 17; Prager Stadtrecht (1269) §§125-26; Augsburger Stadtrecht (1267), 19:11; Schwabenspiegel, §322 (Lassberger Text), or §319 (Zürcher Handschrift); Hessische Judenordnung (1692, 1748), §15; Landrecht des Königreiches Preussen 6:7:3:7; Leopoldische Landgerichtsordnung (1692), 3:23:5; Halsgerichtordnung für Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (1707), 19:20; Codex Bavaricus (1751), 1:4:11; Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana (1768), 82:2:5; see Rumberg, 4ff.
14. Summa, 1:1:51:6; Hansen, Zauberwahn and Quellen.
15. Tennessee Code 1932, Title 4, art. I, 8409-10; Virginia Code 1930, §§4543, 4545.
16. See Langenhoven, essay entitled 'Republicans and Sinners'.
17. Cape: Act No. 36 of 1902 (The Betting Houses, Gaming Houses and Brothels Suppression Act); Transvaal: Ordinance No. 4 of 1903 (The Immorality Ordinance); Natal: Act No. 31 of 1903 (Criminal Law Amendment Act); Orange River Colony: Ordinance No. 11 of 1903 (The Suppression of Brothels and Immorality Ordinance).
18. Act No. 5 of 1927 (Immorality Act).
19. Act No. 21 of 1950 (Immorality Amendment Act).
20. Act No. 23 of 1957 (Immorality Act).
21. See Albie Sachs' South Africa: The Violence of Apartheid.
22. See articles, 'My Man Het die Ontugwet Oortree' in Landstem (Cape Town) of 29.11.1967; also 'Ontug en My Man: Deur 'n Moeder wat die Bittere Kelk Moes Ledig' in Landstem of 13.9.1967.
23. Paton, 7-8.
24. Lewin, 97.
25. See Patrick Duncan's South Africa's Rule of Violence.
26. See article by Jan van Rooyen, 'The Dilemma of the Prince: or Morality and Law Enforcement in the Land of Id,' in New Nation (South Africa), of September 1969; also article, 'Ontug: 'n Nuwe Benadering Nodig' by Dirk Richards in Dagbreek of 6.4.1969; also the public opinion survey in Dagbreek of 29.3.1970; also article 'Celebrating Twenty-One Years of Shame' by Rupert Langermann in Cape Times of 13.2.1971.
27. See Burger (Cape Town) of 21.6.1969.
28. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 444-45.
29. Blutschutzgesetz vom 15.9.1935.
30. 1. VO z. Ausf. d. BSchG vom 14.11.1935; Rumberg, 40-41.
31. Rumberg, 26.
32. Stürmer, 4:1936, 9:1936.
33. Poliakov/Wulf, 255-270 ("die Affäre Katzenberger").
34. Roland Freisler, "Ein Jahr Blutschutzrechtsprechung".
35. Dr. Kuhn, "Das Blutschutzgesetz in der strafrechtlichen Praxis".
36. Rumberg, 12-13, 16.
37. Prof. Dr. Dahm, "Rasseverrat, Volksverrat und Treubruch".
38. Rudolf Leppin, "Das Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre".
39. Ludwig Fischer, "Rasseschande als strafbare Handlung".
40. Fink, passim, esp. 41-44.
41. Evans, 32-33, 190-91, 281; Landry, 304; Arnold Rose, 22; Ernest Sevier Cox, 130; see also Passage to India, remarks by the police prosecutor McBryde, page 213 of the Penguin edition.
42. Fernandes, 1:113; Wagley et al., 97; Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos, 382.
43. Hitler, 1:357.
44. Stürmer, 1:1936.
45. Hitler, 1:63, 1:267-70, 1:346, 1:357, 2:629.
46. Roger Peyrefitte, Les Juifs, éd. J'ai lu, 1969, see esp. 114-18, 236-38, 483-86, 504.

47. See article by Jan Coetzee in Landstem of 13.9.1967.
48. For an example, see Maucorps/Memmi/Held, 123.
49. Leiris, 129.
50. Mishne Tora: Sefer Kadisha, 2:17:9-12; see also Talmud, Avoda Zara.
51. Cash, 89, 130, 253, 340; Golden, 33-34; Whiteman's Guidebook; see also Alfred Rosenberg's Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts.
52. Freyre, op cit, 99.
53. Schuyler/Schuyler, 179.
54. Leiris, 169.

Chapter Three

1. In de Reuck/Knight, 14-15.
2. Quoted by Engels in Ursprung der Familie.
3. As contrasted to 'ius in rem'.
4. Grotius, 2:5:29:1-2.
5. L. lex naturae, D. de statu hominum, 1.24.D.I.5., quoted in Grotius, op cit, 3:7:5:2.
6. Grotius, 3:7:2; the quotation comes from Annales, 1:59.
7. Conlen, Chapter Four.
8. In the Talmud (Kidushin, 3:13) there is an interesting discussion revolving around the same general principle. It was held possible (by some) that a male 'mamzer' in marrying a female slave would 'purify himself', that is his descendants would not be 'mamzerim' because they must necessarily follow the mother.
9. Genesis, 30:3-6 (King James).
10. Koran, 24:34 (Zafrullah Khan's translation).
11. Quoted in Grotius, 3:14:3.
12. Quoted in ibid, 3:14:2:3.
13. De civitate Dei, 19:16: 'Domestica pax a iustis patribus ita olim administrata est, ut secundum haec temporalia bona filiorum sortem a servorum conditione distinguerent, ad Deum autem colendum omnibus domus suae membris pari dilectione consulerent; quod naturalis ordo ita praescribi ut nomen patris familias hinc exortum sit, et tam late vulgatum, ut inique etiam dominantes hoc se gaudeant appellari. Qui autem veri patres familias sunt omnibus in familia sua tanquam filiis ad colendum et promerendum Deum consultant.'
14. Vinsor Babalkær; 'Now the peasant wants to sell his thrall, he shall make the purchase with friend and witness, as with a horse'.
15. Besides the question of legal capacity, there is the question of political rights. It goes without saying that slaves have no political rights. In the Middle Ages the general distinction between free and serf was that the freemen were 'scabini' or 'vrie scheppenbare liute' (as it was called in Middle High German). This meant that they had the right to speak and vote at the gathering of the freemen. It is curious to note that the word used here is taken from the same root as the modern German word Schöffe (juror). One can say that the position of the Negro in the United States after his 'emancipation' from slavery was the same as that of a mediaeval serf because he was not 'scheppenbar', i.e. he was not capable of being a juror. We see that the 'New World' was by no means free of feudalism in its culture. Quite the contrary, many feudal customs survived longer there than in Europe.
16. Quoted in de Reuck/Knight, 14.
17. Quoted in ibid, 15.
18. See Marc Bloch, 368ff.
19. One Hartz, quoted by Elkins in de Reuck/Knight, 196.
20. Kapital, 24th Chapter.
21. In Lohnarbeit und Kapital.
22. Kapital II.
23. Orlando Patterson, 44, quotes one man testifying before a committee of Parliament, 'It was more the object of the overseers to work the slaves out, and trust for supplies from Africa, because I have heard many of the overseers say, "I have made my employer 20, 30 or 40 more hogheads per year than any of my

- predecessors ever did; and though I have killed 30 or 40 Negroes more per year yet the produce had been more than adequate to that loss".
24. Kapital, 25th Chapter.
 25. Elkins in de Reuck/Knight, 186.
 26. In De la démocratie en Amérique .
 27. Mörrner, 22.
 28. Quoted in Italiaander, 115 (here reworked).
 29. Van der Smissen, 2:195, 199.
 30. Conlen, Chapter Eight.
 31. Godée-Molsbergen, 2:122.
 32. Goslinga, 26.
 33. Cited in van der Linde, 120. As regards the Cape, vide Mentzel, 130-31: 'Female slaves sometimes live with Europeans as husband and wife with the permission of their masters who benefit in two ways: the cost of the upkeep of the slave is reduced through the presents she receives from the man, and her children are the property of her master since children of female slaves are themselves slaves...European fathers of such children often purchase them from their legal masters and then emancipate them. Some of these children are taken to Holland by their fathers when their contract of service with the Company has terminated...Sometimes freed slaves emancipate their parents.'
 34. In Ursprung der Familie.
 35. 8th Chapter: "Dennoch hätte sie, um ihre besten Jahre nicht in Entsagung zu verbringen, niemals herbeigelassen, Zumutungen zu erhdren, die aus niederen Sphären, von Soldaten, Arbeitern, Handwerkern, an ihre reife Jugend gerichtet wurden; denn sie rechnete sich nicht zum gemeinen Volk und verachtete seine Sprache und seinen Geruch. Etwas anderes war es mit dem Sohne des Hauses, der, in dem Masse, als er angenehm heranwuchs, ihr weibliches Gefallen erregen mochte und dessen Zufriedenstellung für sie gewissermassen eine häusliche Pflicht und ausserdem eine Vereinigung mit der höheren Klasse bedeutete."
 36. See Abbenhuis, 88, Orlando Patterson, 42, 160.
 37. Marais, Cape Coloured, 10.
 38. Quoted in MacCrone, 41.
 39. Quoted, i.a., in Klein, 42.
 40. Quoted in van Lier, 74: "Alle inwoonders werden scherpelijck verboden haer met de negerinnen of veel meer met de vrije Indiaaninnen gemeen te maecten en vleeschelijke conversatie met die te plegen op verbeurte, die sulx doen, van twee ponden Zuycker (sic!)"
 41. Van Lier, 75.
 42. Abbenhuis, 115 (a contemporary alluded to this).
 43. Quoted in Abbenhuis, 58: "(Werd) we, expresselijk aan alle inwoonders, bediendens van een Plantagie, als mede vrije ambagtslieden, niemand uitgezondert, hoe of waar, scherpelijck verboden, zig niet te vermengen met Slavinnen hoe genaamt, veel minder tegelijk met diverse aan te leggen, nog daarom dezelve uit 't werk te houden (sic), tot grote schade van de Plantagien, nog ook geen Slavinnen (van) andere Plantagien aan te lokken of debaucheren, op verbeurte van twee hondert Guldens Hollands, ieder rijs, ten profijte als boven, en voorts verders gecorrigeert te worden naar bevind van zaken".
 44. See also Equiano, 206, who tells that in one of the West Indian islands a Negro had his ears cut off for fornicating with a white prostitute.
 45. Quoted in Klein, 51.
 46. Van Lier, 65-67.
 47. See Equiano, 243, for an interesting anecdote about this.
 48. Jefferson Davis, quoted in Banton, Race Relations, 117.
 49. In Les Villes du Moyen Age.
 50. Franklin, 215.
 51. Van Lier, 104-105.
 52. One Hilliard d'Auberteuil, in 'Considérations sur la Colonie de Sainte Domingue', 1775.
 53. Quoted in Paraf, 154.
 54. Godée-Molsbergen, 1:256.

55. Mentioned by Sir Harry Johnston, for whatever it is worth.
56. Franklin, 74.
57. Quoted in Banton, op cit, 118.
58. See Orlando Patterson, 80.
59. Klein, 43, 44-49, 228-34.
60. Vide the remarks of Elkins in de Reuck/Knight, 186.
61. Things were similar in British India where, until about 1800 or so the English could not do without the aid of at least some allies, hence the equality between the whites and the Anglo-Indian population.
62. Aristotle, Politics, 3:5 (Jowett's translation).
63. Van Lier, 109-111.
64. The exact date of this abolition is 16 Pluviôse, An Deux (4 February 1794).
65. In Fanon there is somewhere an anecdote about a black man having intercourse with a white woman and, at the moment of orgasm, shouting, 'Vive Schoelcher!'; or perhaps it was the woman (we don't remember).
66. A slight exception is the District of Columbia where slaves were freed with compensation for the owners. The total number of such slaves was several thousand.
67. Exact quote in Franklin, 128.
68. MacCrone, 68: 'The influence of the East was, in many ways, far stronger than the influence of Holland or Europe, upon the mentality of those who inhabited the town. The resident population, both free and slave, together with the floating population of those who enjoyed the hospitality of the "Tavern of the Seas," presented an infinite variety of races, colour and of language.' The peculiar difference between the attitudes of Capetonians and whites of the interior is, thus, of very old origin.
69. MacCrone, 37, quotes Valentijn, the contemporary historian of the O.I.C. on this subject.
70. Figures from van der Merwe, Trekboer, 21 and 57. It should be pointed out that the sheep bred did not have any wool; they are called 'Afrikaner-sheep'.
71. Figures from G. D. Scholtz, Die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner 1652-1806, Cape Town, 1967, 55, 59 and 67.
72. Conlen, Chapter Six.
73. See Cape Times, 19.7.1969: 'Crack Down on Unemployed, Congress Told,' by the paper's agricultural reporter. 'Stellenbosch. - Farmers should crack down on unemployed young Coloured men in their districts by ensuring that these men registered in terms of the Act on Training Centres for Coloured Cadets, Mr. P. R. de Villiers, secretary of the Boland Agricultural Union, said here yesterday... Addressing the union's annual congress, he said that farmers' organizations had long advocated a revision of the legislation regarding vagrancy, as it had been difficult to prove that a person was unemployed.'
74. This terminology is in accordance only with the practices of the O.I.C., it being the same in Indonesia. These people were not 'burgers' in the sense that the word had in the United Provinces at that time. This is easily seen by the fact that in the Netherlands the same person could not be a 'boer' and a 'burger' at the same time.
75. MacCrone, 131.
76. MacCrone, 192, and many other sources tell an anecdote originally coming from the missionary van der Kemp about a farmer who refused to have one of his slave-girls baptised, not because he might have to manumit her, but rather because he thought that 'baptism would raise her pride and make her unmanageable'. This is a reflection of the objective situation as interpreted in the ideology of the time and it is not to be confused with 'cause'. True enough, the farmer did not want to make his slave-girl a Christian for then she would belong to the superior group (in the terms of the ideology, but not in real terms and this is what is important). Thus the Christianisation of the non-whites eventually had little effect.
77. Marais, Cape Coloured, 15.

78. A recent Afrikaans novel has brought to light the previously soft-pedalled detail that one Afrikaans historical hero connected with the Uprising of Slagtersnek cohabited with a Hottentot woman. Originally the official story was that this uprising had started when this white farmer killed a number of Hottentot soldiers who had been sent (under a white officer) to fetch him to court. The traditional explanation was that his 'race pride' rebelled at having to submit to non-white soldiers. Neither did the 'race pride' of his brother, who led the uprising, prevent him from trying to get a small tribe of Xhosa to join in with the rebels. Things were much more complicated than the 'race prejudice' school of thought would have us believe.
79. This interesting detail is found in Coertser's *Die Kafferoorloë*. This entire little book, which has recently been re-printed in foto-offset, displays little nastiness or haughtiness towards the Xhosa. It is the dry account of a simple-minded and laconic frontiersman. It is indicative of the period in which this type of conflict was looked upon as normal and not brooded about as historians later claimed.
80. De Kiewiet, 82.
81. Duncan, 121-22.
82. The difference between persons of Indo-Pakistani origin in South Africa and in the East-African countries is said to be this, namely that the ones in East Africa are of higher caste and were not indentured labourers. It is our own personal opinion that those in South Africa tend to be darker.
83. Colin Legum mentions a South African passport, issued to an Indian for travel abroad, which carried on it the stipulation 'not valid for the Orange Free State'.
84. We see the same thing in Brazil and in the West Indies that, after the abolition of slavery, the former slave-areas are impoverished and economically disorganised. Freyre has compared such areas which those areas which have been devastated by long periods of warfare.
85. By contrast, after the Civil War, the only Southerners to be president were Andrew Johnson who left office in 1869 and Lyndon B. Johnson who assumed office in 1963. In fact they were both accidents, as was Missouri-born Harry S. Truman (from a border state). Woodrow Wilson was born in the South but is not considered a Southerner by American historians.
86. This element was not present in the West Indies where the local planters were too weak. In Brazil it was not there either because there were few slaves left by the time slavery was abolished.
87. Wood, 53, 64, and 72.
88. Ibid, 92-93.
89. The Leopard's Spots originally published in 1906; The Clansman originally 1905; The Traitor in 1907.
90. Dollard quotes a number of these copiously in his footnotes.
91. Conlen, Chapters Seven and Eight.
92. Ibid.
93. Kapital III, 36th Chapter. Our italics.
94. This is illustrated by a story in Léon's *Conception matérialiste de la question juive* about a Jew in 17th century Poland who came into possession of a farm and decided to live as a squire. The king of Poland demanded his conversion to Christianity. What lay behind this was not 'intolerance', as if the king thought that people should not remain Jews, for he had a million of them living in his country and he never tried to convert them. But he felt that a squire should be a Christian. Léon writes, 96, the following: "On voit par là la naïveté de nos historiens idéalistes qui s'imaginent que tous les efforts de la chrétienté tendaient vers la conversion des Juifs et qui croient que toutes les souffrances des Juifs doivent être expliquées par la résistance qu'ils ont opposée à ces efforts. Aussi longtemps que la fonction économique représentée par le judaïsme était nécessaire, on s'opposait à leur assimilation religieuse. C'est seulement quand le judaïsme est devenu superflu économiquement qu'il dut s'assimiler ou disparaître".
95. In our own societies, it can be pointed out, citizenship and surnames are also

- hereditary ascribed characteristics which does not mean that they cannot be changed. It may be easier or harder from time to time or from country to country to change them. This too is a form of mobility.
96. See Thomas, *Summa*, 2:183, resp. 3: "Sed ad statum requiritur immobilitas in eo quod pertinet ad conditionem personae". Status is therefore supposed to emphasise immobility, connotations which the word conditio does not have etymologically. The latter word, however, is much older in this sense. Note that we also speak of 'marital status' (Ehestand, état civil), again referring to something originally unchangeable.
97. And this is also true because of the nature of reproduction. A man can impregnate any number of women any number of times, but a woman can only produce a certain number of children. Furthermore, it must be remembered that fertility was often much lower in previous centuries when still-births and deaths-in-childbirth were more common. Some older authorities claimed that European-born women were adversely affected by the tropics so that their fertility was reduced.
98. This is also one reason why trying to judge the 'extent of miscegenation' can not be done by looking at the racial characteristics of the inferior race. The fact that a large contingent of American 'blacks' are not entirely black does not really prove that much 'miscegenation' has occurred, because these non-black genes may have been spread throughout the group when mulattoes began to miscegenate with pure blacks. Similarly, two mulattoes produce a mulatto, so that a large population of mulattoes does not necessarily attest to a 'large extent of miscegenation' as Anglo-Saxons seem to think. What it more probably attests to is that miscegenation started very early when the population was small. This is also the case with the white admixture in the Coloureds in South Africa.
99. Technically and legally there are three race-groups, socially there are four, because we think of the 'Indians' as a separate race. It is presumably the 'ethnic group' known as 'diverse coloured' which tends to grow at the expense of other sub-groupings of the legally defined 'coloured' race.
100. Figures from Vander Zanden, 33.
101. The functionalist school of thought likes to talk of 'tension-absorption mechanisms' but let us look at what happens in actual fact. In South Africa 'tensions' arose because non-whites began to invade the industrial labour-force. To 'absorb tension' the solution was found of allowing whites and blacks to perform the same economic functions but for racially differentiated wages (this is what the policy of 'civilised labour' boils down to). But this makes non-white labour even more desirable for employers because it is cheaper. Because of the influence which they can exert on the state and its official labour policy, white workers in South Africa have, for two generations, been busily at work in pricing themselves out of the labour-market and removing any economic basis for their very existence. The solution found in order to 'absorb tension' only increases it at a later stage! So much for functionalism!
102. Coser, 78. On page 142 of the same book he says: 'In the United States, with its absence of any trace of feudal elements (*sic!*), perhaps the purest example of a capitalist society, the essentially individualistic orientation towards success is conducive to associational types of grouping in which members have no other bond with their fellow-members than the immediate purpose at hand.' This book was written in the 1950's. It is an excellent example of the inability of the American intellectual 'élite' to integrate the existence of a race-system in their own country into their own conception of it. As here, the existence of any such thing was simply ignored. A black would laugh at this statement; indeed, many of them probably did in their time. This whole statement is an excellent example of the chauvinistic and shallow ideas about the United States which were the order-of-the-day in that generation.
103. Conlen, Chapter Two.

104. Conlen, Chapters Two and Eight.

105. In reaction to all this, Davenport and Steggerda in their studies of the West Indies (1920's) felt obliged to remind readers that they could find no recorded case of such a 'throw-back' and that relevant scientific literature had not recorded any either, thus trying to allay fears in this regard. It has also been widely debated to what extent the Sandra Laing case in South Africa (1960's) may have been a 'throw-back'.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Legal Sources and Commentaries - United States

Alabama Code 1923
 Arizona Revised Code 1928
 Florida Statutes 1959
 Georgia Civil Code 1927
 Mississippi State Constitution 1890
 North Carolina Code 1927
 Oklahoma State Constitution 1907
 Oklahoma Statutes 1961
 Oregon Code 1930
 Code of South Carolina Laws 1932
 Tennessee State Constitution 1870
 Tennessee Code 1932
 Virginia Code 1930

Legal Sources and Commentaries - South Africa

Act No. 55 of 1949 (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act)
 Act No. 30 of 1950 (Population Registration Act)
 Act No. 71 of 1956 (Population Registration Amendment Act)
 Act No. 23 of 1957 (Immorality Act)
 Act No. 30 of 1960 (Population Registration Amendment Act)
 Act No. 61 of 1962 (Population Registration Amendment Act)
 Act No. 69 of 1962 (Commonwealth Relations Act)
 Act No. 80 of 1964 (General Law Amendment Act)
 Act No. 30 of 1966 (Group Areas Act)
 Act No. 64 of 1967 (Population Registration Amendment Act)
 Act No. 21 of 1968 (Mixed Marriages Amendment Act)
 Act No. 69 of 1969 (Group Areas Amendment Act)
 Act No. 106 of 1969 (Population Registration Amendment Act)

Bamford, B. R., Race Classification, in: South African Law Journal, 1967, 37-42.

Hahlo, H. R., The South African Law of Husband and Wife, Cape Town, 1963.

Hardie, Garth M./Hartford, Gordon F., Commentary on the Immorality Act, Cape Town, 1960.

Matthews, E. L., South African Legislation Relating to Marriage or Sexual Intercourse Between Europeans and Natives or Coloured Persons, in: South African Law Journal, 1921, 313-320.

Suzman, A., Race Classification and Definition in the Legislation of the Union of South Africa 1910-1960, in: Acta Juridica (Johannesburg), 1960, 339-67.

Legal Sources and Commentaries - Third Reich

Reichsbürgergesetz (RBG) vom 15.9.1935.

1. VO zum RBG vom 14.11.1935.
2. VO zum RBG vom 21.12.1935.
3. VO zum RBG vom 14. 6.1938.
4. VO zum RBG vom 25. 7.1938.
5. VO zum RBG vom 27. 9.1938.
6. VO zum RBG vom 31.10.1938.
7. VO zum RBG vom 5.12.1938.
8. VO zum RBG vom 17. 1.1939.
9. VO zum RBG vom 5. 5.1939.
10. VO zum RBG vom 4 .7 . 1939.
11. VO zum RBG vom 15.11.1941.
12. VO zum RBG vom 25. 4.1943.
13. VO zum RBG vom 1. 7.1943.

Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre (BSchG) vom 15.9.1935.

1. VO zur Ausf. des BSchG vom 14.11.1935.

RdErl. d. RuPrMdl zgl. im N. d. Stf. vom 17.1.1936.

Bekanntmachung vom 21.11.1935.

Ausführungsanweisung zum §3 der 1. AusVO des BSchG (RdErl. d. RuPrMdl. zgl. im N. d. Stf.) vom 23.12.1935.

RdErl. d. RuPrMdl. vom 4.12.1935.

Durchführungsverordnung des Reichsjustizministeriums vom 4.2.1936.

Verordnung über den Nachweis deutschblütiger Abstammung vom 1.8.1940.

Ausführungsverordnung des Reichsjustizministeriums vom 25.2.1941.

Ausführungsverordnung des Reichsjustizministeriums vom 15.7.1942.

Blau, Bruno, Das Ausnahmerecht für die Juden in den europäischen Ländern, New York, 1952.

Boschan, Siegfried, Nationalsozialistische Rassen- und Familiengesetzgebung: Praktische Rechtsanwendung und Auswirkungen auf Rechtspflege, Verwaltung und Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1935.

Bukofzer, Dr., Judengesetzgebung und Judenverfolgung unter den Nazis, Berlin, 1946.

Dahn, Prof. Dr., Rasseverrat, Volksverrat und Treubruch, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 802-03.

Deiss, Robert, Das Recht der Rasse, Munich, 1938.

Feldscher, Werner, Rassen- und Erbpflege im dritten Reich, Berlin-Leipzig, 1943.

Fischer, Ludwig, Rasseschande als strafbare Handlung, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1935, 536-37.

Freisler, Roland, Rasse als Träger und Ziel des deutschen Volksrechtes, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Strafrechts, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 803-07.

- Ein Jahr Blutschutzrechtsprechung in Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Lehren, in: Deutsches Strafrecht, November-Dezember 1936, 385-97.

Frick, Wilhelm, Die Rassepolitik des dritten Reiches, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1936, 2-5.

Gütt, Arthur/Linden, Herbert/Massfeller, Franz, Blutschutz- und Ehegesundheitsgesetz, Munich, 1936.

Jobst, H., Mischling oder Jude?, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1939, 308-09.

Klemm, Werner, Die Lösung deutsch-jüdischer Mischehen, in: Deutsches Recht, 1939, 1899-1902.

Kuhn, Dr., Das Blutschutzgesetz in der strafrechtlichen Praxis, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 2:1005-08.

- Umfang des Vorsatzes bei Verbrechen gegen §2 des Blutschutzgesetzes, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 2:1374.

Lange, Dr., Rasse und Erbe, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 802-03.

Leppin, Rudolf, Das Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre: Ein Überblick über Rechtsprechung und Schrifttum, in: Juristische Wochenschrift, 1937, 3076-7.

Lorenzen, Sievert, Die Juden und die Justiz, Berlin, 1943.

Mössmer, Dr., Rasse und Familie, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 802.

Rissom, Dr., Mischehen im Lichte der neuen Gesetzgebung, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1936, 8-9.

Rumberg, Egon, Rassenschande, Düsseldorf, 1937 (dissertation).

Ruttke, Dr., Rasse und Volk, in: Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 801-02.

- Rasse und Recht im deutschen Hochschulwesen, in: Recht und Rechtswahrer: Beiträge zum Rassegedanken, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1936.

Satter, Karl, Zur Frage der Nichtigkeit von Ehen zwischen Juden und Mischlingen zweiten Grades, in: Zeitschrift d. Akademie f. deutsches Recht, 1939, 488-89.

Schulz, Heinz, Die Rechtsstellung der jüdischen Mischlinge nach den Verordnungen zum RBG und BSchG, Quakenbrück, 1938 (dissertation).

- Schwarz, Dr., Das Verbrechen der Rassenschande, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1937, 459-61.
- Schwind, Dr. Frhr. v., Zur Frage der Nichtigkeit von Ehen zwischen Juden und Mischlingen zweiten Grades, in: Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1939, 379-80.
- Sigg, Marianne, Das Rassestrafrecht in Deutschland in den Jahren 1933-1945, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Blutschutzgesetzes, Aarau, 1951, (dissertation).
- Stuckart, Wilhelm/Globke, Hans, Kommentar zur deutschen Rassengesetzgebung, Munich-Berlin, 1936.
- Stuckart, Wilhelm/Schiedemair, Rolf, Rassen- und Erbpflege in der Gesetzgebung des Reiches, Leipzig, 1944.
- Sturmabteilung, Handbuch der SA, Berlin, 1935.

General Bibliography

- Abbenhuis, M.F., Verhalen en Schetsen uit de Surinaamse Geschiedenis, Afl. 4: De Slaverij in de 17e en 18e Eeuw, Paramaribo, 1946.
- Adamastor (pseud.), White Man Boss: Footsteps to the South Africa Volk Republic, London, 1951.
- Axelson, Eric, The Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 1964.
- Banton, Michael, White and Coloured: The Behaviour of British People towards Coloured Immigrants, London, 1959.
- Race Relations, London, 1967.
- Barron, Milton L., People Who Inter marry: Inter marriage in a New England Industrial Community, Syracuse (New York), 1946.
- Bilbo, Theodore G., Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization, Poplarville (Mississippi), 1947.
- Björkhem, John, Livet och människan: en bok om själavård, Stockholm, 1952.
- Bloch, Marc, La Société féodale, Albin Michel, 1968.
- Boxer, C. R., Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825, Johannesburg, 1965.
- Race Relations in the Portuguese Empire 1415-1825, Oxford, 1963.
- Brookes, Edgar H., The Colour Problems of South Africa, London, 1934.
- / Webb, C. de B., A History of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1965.
- Bunting, Brian, The Rise of the South African Reich, Penguin, 1964.
- Burns, Sir Alan, Colour Prejudice, with Particular Reference to the Relationship between Whites and Negroes, London, 1948.
- Carroll, Charles, "The Negro a Beast" or "In the Image of God": The Reasoner of the Age, the Revelator of the Century! The Bible as it is! The Negro and his Relation to the Human Family!, etc., (reprinted) Savannah, 1968.
- Cash, W. J., The Mind of the South, New York, 1941.
- Christensen, Harold T., Marriage Analysis: Foundations for Successful Family Life, New York, 1958.
- Clark, Kenneth B., Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, New York, 1965.
- Coetser, P.P.J. Sr., Gebeurtenisse uit di Kaffer-Oorloge fan 1834, 1835, 1846, 1850 tot 1853, (reprinted) Cape Town, 1963.
- Conlen, Paul, Racism, Lund, 1972 (roneo; Department of Sociology).
- Coser, Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe, 1964.
- Cox, Ernest Sevier, White America: The American Racial Problem as seen in a Worldwide Perspective, Los Angeles, 1966.
- Cox, Oliver Cromwell, Caste, Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics, New York, 1948.
- Crijns, Arthur Gerardus Joannes, Race Relations and Race Attitudes in South Africa, Nijmegen, 1959 (dissertation).
- de Graaf, H. J., Geschiedenis van Indonesië, the Hague, 1949.
- de Graaf, Nicolaus, Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaf, the Hague, 1930.
- Dentz, Fred Oudschantz, De Kolonisatie van de Portugeesche Joodsche Natie in Suriname en de Geschiedenis van den Joden Savanne, Amsterdam, 1927.
- de Reuck, Anthony/Knight, Julie (editors), Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches, London, 1967 (CIBA).

- de Kiewiet, C. W., *A History of South Africa: Social and Economic*, London, 1950.
- Dixon, Thomas Jr., *The Leopard's Spots*, Jackson (Mississippi), 1969.
- Dollard, John, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, New Haven, 1937.
- Douglas, Charles, *Een Blik in het Verleden van Suriname*, Paramaribo, 1930.
- Duncan, Patrick, *South Africa's Rule of Violence*, London, 1964.
- Duchet, C./Comarmond, P. de, (editors), *Racisme et société*, Maspero, 1969.
- Elmers, M. C., *The Sociology of the Family*, Boston, 1945.
- Equiano, Olaudah, *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa, the African, Written by Himself*, London, 1789, 2 vols.
- Evans, Maurice S., *Black and White in the Southern States*, London, 1915.
- Fernandes, Florestan, *A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes*, São Paulo, 1965, 2 vols.
- Fink, Fritz, *Die Judenfrage im Unterricht*, Munich, 1937.
- Franklin, John Hope, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of the American Negroes*, New York, 1947.
- Freyre, Gilberto, *Casa Grande e Senzala*, Rio de Janeiro, 1966.
- *Sobrados e Mucambos*, Lisbon, n.d. (Livros do Brasil).
- Geyer, A.L./Wiid, J.A./van der Walt, A.J.H., *Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika*, Cape Town, n.d. (post 1961).
- Gie, S. F. N., *Geskiedenis vir Suid-Afrika*, of, *Ons Verlede*, dl. II (1795-1918), Pretoria, 1950.
- Godée-Molsbergen, E. C., *Tijdens de O. I. Compagnie*, Amsterdam, 1932, 2 vols.
- Golden, Harry, *Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes*, Cleveland-New York, 1964.
- Gordon, Eugene, *An Essay on Racial Amalgamation*, Rio de Janeiro, 1951.
- Goslinga, Cornelis Christiaan, *Emancipatie en Emancipator*, Assen, 1956 (diss.).
- Grotius, Hugo, *De iure belli ac pacis*, Leiden, 1919.
- Halford, Samuel James, *The Griquas of Griqualand: An Historical Narrative of the Griqua People, their Rise, Progress and Decline*, Cape Town, n.d. (c.1949).
- Hansen, Joseph, *Zauberwahn, Inquisition und Hexenprozess im Mittelalter*, Munich-Leipzig, 1900.
- *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Hexenwahns und der Hexenverfolgung im Mittelalter*, Bonn, 1901.
- Hernton, Calvin C., *Sex and Racism in America*, New York, 1965.
- Hitler, Adolf, *Mein Kampf*, Munich, 1933, 2 vols.
- Hoetink, Hermanus, *Het Patroon van de Oude Curacaose Samenleving*, Leiden, 1958 (dissertation).
- Ianni, Octavio, *As Metamorfoses do Escravo: Apogeu e Crise da Escravatura no Brasil Meridional*, São Paulo, 1962.
- Idenburg, P. J., *The Cape of Good Hope at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century*, Leiden, 1963.
- Italiaander, Rolf (editor), *Rassenkonflikte in der Welt*, Frankfurt-Hamburg, 1966.
- Kennedy, Stetson, *Jim Crow Guide to the U.S.A.: The Laws, Customs and Etiquette Governing the Conduct of Nonwhites and other Minorities as Second-Class Citizens*, London, 1959.
- Klein, Herbert S., *Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of Cuba and Virginia*, London, 1967.
- Landry, Stuart Omer, *The Cult of Equality: A Study of the Race Problem*, New Orleans, 1945.
- Langenhoven, Cornelis Jakob, *Essays*, Cape Town, 1960.
- Leers, Johann von, *Blut und Rasse in der Gesetzgebung: Ein Gang durch die Völkergeschichte*, Munich, 1936.
- Leiris, Michel, *Contacts de civilisation en Martinique et Gaudeloupe*, Unesco, Paris, 1961.
- Léon, Abraham, *Conception matérialiste de la question juive*, EDI, 1968.
- Lewin, Julius, *Politics and Law in South Africa: Essays on Race Relations*, London, 1963.
- Lichtenstein, Heinrich, *Reisen im südlichen Afrika in den Jahren 1803-1804, 1805 und 1806*, Berlin, 1811-12, 2 vols.
- Litwack, Leon F., *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860*, London, 1965.

- Lukács, Georg, Von Nietzsche zu Hitler: oder, der Irrationalismus und die deutsche Politik, Frankfurt, 1966.
- MacCrone, I. D., Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical, Experimental and Psychological Studies, Johannesburg, 1965.
- MacMillan, W. M., The Cape Colour Question: A Historical Survey, Cape Town, 1968.
- Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem, Oxford, 1963.
- Marais, J. S., Maynier and the First Boer Republic, Cape Town, 1944.
- The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937, Johannesburg, 1962.
- Marx, Karl, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (konkret), Frankfurt, n.d.
- / Engels, Friedrich, Werke (MEW), Dietz, Berlin, 1962-1970, 39 vols.
- Maucorps, P.H./Memmi, Albert/Held, J.-F., Les Français et le racisme, Payot, 1965.
- Menkman, W. R., De Nederlanders in het Caraïbische Zeegebied: Waarin Vervat de Geschiedenis der Nederlandse Antillen, Amsterdam, 1942.
- Mentzel, O. P., A Complete and Authentic Geographical and Topographical Description of the Famous and (All Things Considered) Remarkable African Cape of Good Hope, Cape Town, 1925.
- Millin, Sarah Gertrude, King of the Bastards, London, 1950.
- Mörner, Magnus, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America, Boston, 1967.
- Myrdal, Gunnar (with Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose), An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem in Modern Democracy, New York, 1944.
- Newby, I. A., The Development of Segregationist Thought, Homewood (Illinois), 1968.
- Jim Crow's Defense, Baton Rouge, 1968.
- Odum, Howard R., Race and Rumours of Race: Challenge to American Crisis, Chapel Hill, 1943.
- Paraf, Pierre, Racisme dans le monde, Payot, 1964.
- Parry, J.H./Sherlock, P. M., A Short History of the West Indies, New York, 1966.
- Paton, Alan, Hope for South Africa, London, 1958.
- Patterson, Orlando, The Sociology of Slavery, London, 1967.
- Patterson, Sheila, Colour and Culture: A Study of the Status of the Cape Coloured People within the Social Structure of the Union of South Africa, London, 1953.
- The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation, London, 1957.
- Pereira de Leon, Moses/et al., Essai historique sur la colonie de Surinam, Paramaribo, 1788, 2 vols.
- Poliakov, Léon/Wulf, Josef, Das dritte Reich und seine Diener, Berlin, 1956.
- Das dritte Reich und die Juden, Berlin, 1955.
- Poore, Ben Perley, The Federal and State Constitutions, Washington, 1877.
- da Silva Rego, A., Portuguese Colonisation in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of the Royal Ordinances, Johannesburg, 1965.
- Rhodie, N. J., Apartheid in Partnership: 'n Rasse-Sosiologiese Ontleding van Afsonderlike Volksontwikkeling en Vennootskap, Met Besondere Verwysing na die Motiewe vir hierdie Beleidsisteme, Cape Town, 1966.
- / Venter, H. J., Apartheid: A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea, Cape Town, 1959.
- Richmond, Anthony, The Colour Problem, Pelican, 1955.
- Rose, Arnold, The Negro in America, New York, 1964.
- Rose, Peter J., They and We: Racial and Ethnic Relations in the United States, New York, 1964.
- Rosenberg, Alfred, Der Mythos des XX. Jahrhunderts, Munich, 1935.
- Rosenthal, Eric, Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, London, 1964.
- Sachs, Albie, The Violence of Apartheid, London, 1969 (Defence and Aid Fund).
- Schuyler, Lambert/Schuyler, Patricia, Close That Bedroom Door, Winslow (Washington), 1957.
- Stampp, Kenneth, The Peculiar Institution, New York, 1956.
- Stapel, F. W., Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië, Amsterdam, 1938-1940, 5 vols.

- Tannenbaum, Frank, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas*, New York, 1946.
- Teenstra, M. D., *Vruchten Mijner Werkzaamheden gedurende Mijne Reize over de Kaap de Goede Hoop naar Java en terug*, Groningen, 1830, 3 vols.
- *De Nederlandsche West-Indische Eilanden*, Amsterdam, 1836, 2 vols.
 - *Beknopte Beschrijving der Nederlandsche Bezittingen*, Groningen, 1852, 3 vols.
- Tumin, Melvin M., *Social Stratification*, Princeton, 1967.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective*, London, 1967.
- van der Linde, J. M., *Surinaamse Suikerheren en hun Kerk*, Wageningen, 1966.
- van der Merwe, J. P., *Die Kaap onder die Bataafse Republiek 1803-1806*, Amsterdam, 1926.
- *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-1842)*, the Hague, 1937 (dissertation).
 - Trek: *Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap*, Cape Town, 1945.
 - *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie (1657-1842)*, Cape Town, 1938.
- van der Smissen, J., *Beschouwingen over de Kolonie Suriname in Verband met een Ontwerp tot Emancipatie der Slaven*, Amsterdam, 1849, 2 vols.
- Vander Zanden, James W., *American Minority Relations: The Sociology of Race and Ethnic Groups*, New York, 1963.
- van Lier, Rudolf, *Samenleving in een Grensgebied: Een Sociaal-Historische Studie van de Maatschappij in Suriname*, the Hague, 1949.
- Vrijman, L. C., *Slavenhalers en Slavenhandel*, Amsterdam, 1943.
- Waalwijk, Theodorus Eugenius, *Die Rolle der niederländischen Publizistik bei der Meinungsbildung hinsichtlich der Aufhebung der Sklaverei in den West-indischen Kolonien*, Münster, 1959 (dissertation).
- Wagley, Charles, et al., *Race and Class in Rural Brazil*, Unesco, Paris, 1953.
- Walker, Eric A., *A History of Southern Africa*, London, 1965.
- Weber, Max, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik: III Abteilung: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1947.
- Whiteman's Guide Book, n.a., Milwaukee, n.d. (c. 1950's).
- Wood, Forrest G., *The Black Scare*, Los Angeles, 1968.
- Woodward, C. Vann, *The Burden of Southern History*, New York, 1960.
- *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, New York, 1966.
- Zubaida, Sami (editor), *Race and Racism (Explorations in Sociology)*, London, 1970.

